Spring 2009 MBA Course

B8299-014: Game Theory and Incentives in Business

W - Full Term, 02:15PM to 05:30PM

Location: URI 330

Instructor: Bogachan Celen; Paolo Siconolfi

Download Syllabus

View textbook info

View course evaluation


This is a course on game theory and its application to business. The course aims to provide the students with the basic tools of game theory, and apply them to business situations and cases. Game Theory is concerned about how economic entities make decisions when their actions affect others, and when they know that others' actions affect them.  Most, if not all, of the business situations involve strategic interactions where the faith of individuals are interdependent. Game Theory provides us with a methodology to identify optimal strategies and predict the outcomes of strategic interactions. In this course we will focus on the following topics among others: Contracts and Incentives (Moral Hazard, Adverse Selection); Auctions; Dynamic Price Competition and Tacit Collusion; Entry, Accommodation and Exit; Information and Strategic Behavior (Reputation, Limit Pricing, Predation); Bargaining (War of Attrition, Hold-up Problem.)

Bogachan Celen

Associate ProfessorProfessor Çelen teaches the core course Managerial Economics. His main research focus is on game theory, microeconomic theory, and experimental economics. In his recent work he provides an information-based explanation for uniform of social behavior, which is often refereed to as herd behavior or information cascades. He also works on positive and normative implications of different interest arbitration procedures. Çelen is the winner...

View full profile

Personal Website

Paolo Siconolfi

Franklin Pitcher Johnson Jr. Professor of Finance and EconomicsProfessor Siconolfi teaches the core course Managerial Economics. He works with general equilibrium theory, information theory and dynamic models in monetary theory. His main contributions deal with the equilibrium properties of incomplete market economies, the existence of sunspot equilibria and the informativeness of equilibrium prices. Recently, he has also examined the dynamic efficiency of a social security system in the context of an overlapping generations...

View full profile

Personal Website