The Measurement of Wealth: Recessions, Sustainability and Inequality

Joseph E. Stiglitz
Columbia University

This chapter considers two central problems in the measurement of wealth, within the existing statistical frameworks, which impair both the ability to assess economic sustainability and the impacts of an economic downturn. These measurement problems have, in turn, led to confusion concerning the interpretation to be given to the dramatic increase in the wealth–output ratio in recent decades.

The Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress emphasized the central role of wealth in the assessment of sustainability. The proposition was simple: if wealth (with a growing population, wealth per capita), appropriately measured, was non-decreasing, then the given path of consumption could be sustained in the future. The Commission noted, however, that there might be significant problems in the valuation of assets — exemplified by real estate bubbles (which might give the impression that wealth was larger than was actually the case, and that therefore the economy was on a sustainable path, when in fact it was not, as occurred in the 2008 financial crisis). It also noted the difficulties of assessing natural/environmental assets, particularly because there were no markets for such assets.

But standard measures of "wealth" may not adequately reflect sustainability for other reasons, or, more broadly, an increase in measured wealth may not reflect the ability of the economy to sustain higher rates of consumption. Here we focus on three key instances, in two of which an increase in wealth does not measure an increase in future productive capacities and in one of which our wealth metrics do not capture a diminution in the economy’s productive potential.

Two anomalies

The possibility that there might not be a close correspondence between measured wealth and a variable ("K" for capital) that assesses the future productive potential of the economy helps explain a disquieting aspect of Piketty’s recent book. He showed that the wealth–output ratio increased enormously in recent decades. In spite of this, average wages did not increase, and interest rates did not fall. It is
hard to obtain such results in any standard production function if we interpret wealth as capital.

There is a second puzzle. It has been observed that labor's share of income is decreasing. There is a wealth of evidence arguing that the elasticity of substitution is less than unity. If wealth is increasing, relative to the labor supply, then the share of labor should be increasing.

But these puzzles are immediately resolved if the measured wealth is not what is meant by productive capital. Wealth and capital are both aggregates, but they represent different aggregates. It is possible that wealth has gone up, but productive capital has not gone up commensurately, or may even have gone down. That appears to have been what has happened in several countries.7

A quick look at some of the key sources of the increases in wealth shows that some may not lead to an increase in the economy's productive potential – and some may even lead to a decrease in its potential.

7.1 Land

The most important source of the disparity between the growth of wealth and the growth of productive capital is land: much of the increase in wealth is an increase in the value of land – not associated with any increase in the amount of land (and, therefore, of the productivity of the economy). An increase in the value of land in the Riviera or in Southampton does not increase the productive capacities of the land. Even if measured wealth has increased, if the value of "K" has decreased, the economy's future productive potential has decreased: the amount of land is no greater now than it was fifty years ago.

Why the value of land might increase (and, in particular, why it might have increased so dramatically in recent decades) is a question I discuss more extensively elsewhere. (See Stiglitz. 2015a, b, c.) Note, for instance, that if the rents associated with land are fixed and last in perpetuity, then a slight decrease in the (long-term real) interest rate can lead to a large increase in the value of land.8 As we noted earlier, the Commission, deliberating as a housing bubble was forming in the United States, Spain, and many other countries, could not help but observe that market prices of land and other assets may not represent "equilibrium prices," that is, may not even provide an accurate assessment of the present discounted value of future rents to be derived from the asset. (That is why the Commission took the eclectic approach of suggesting a dashboard that would include along with value measures physical metrics, for example, of atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gases and changes in those numbers.)

Bubbles are a pervasive and recurrent aspect of market economies. While recessions may represent "corrections," the economy may not fully correct the prices of real estate, so the economy simply moves from one bubble path to another.
The central point of this section is simple: an increase in wealth reflecting an increase in the value of real estate in no way measures an increase in the productive capacity of the economy.

7.2 Increased rents capitalized in financial assets

Some increases in wealth (as conventionally measured) may reflect increased economic rents, unrelated to an increase in the productive capacity of the economy. Rather, they reflect an increase in the ability of those in the financial sector, or, more broadly, "capitalists," to exploit others—workers, consumers, and ordinary citizens. The result is that, overall, changes in measured wealth in recent decades probably overstate true "capital" accumulation. (In the third part of this paper, we will argue that, in the context of the Great Recession, our metrics understated the adverse effects of the downturn, by understating the adverse impacts on wealth and wealth accumulation.)

Such would be the case if the average degree of monopoly in the economy increases—i.e., if, for instance, network economies became more important, so that the fraction of the economy in which monopolies or oligopolies dominate is increased. While hard to quantify, and varying from country to country, in almost all countries these exploitative rents are significant, and in many countries they seem to have gone up significantly.

The effective degree of monopoly could also increase if firms get better at exploiting whatever market power they have—i.e., if, for instance, firms get better in discriminating among different categories of customers.

Typically, the value of these rents gets capitalized into the value of financial assets—in the value of those who can lay claim to the monopoly rents. Such exploitation represents a redistribution from workers to capitalists, rather than an increase in the productive capacity of the economy. Indeed, because there are distortions associated with the exercise of monopoly power, the true productive potential of the economy has, in this sense, been reduced. If we included in our accounting framework the present discounted value of real wages (human capital), we would note that the increase in financial capital as a result of an increase in monopoly power is less than the diminution in human capital. But, of course, wealth, or capital, as conventionally measured does not include human capital.

But there are more subtle forms of "exploitation." Government allows "too-big-to-fail" banks. The value of those banks is higher than they otherwise would be, because of government risk-absorption. But the contingent liability of the government is not capitalized; it doesn't show up in the national balance sheet, and so it appears as if the wealth of the economy has increased. But with appropriate metrics (where the decreased after-tax wealth of wage-earning citizens, as a result of the increase in the expected present discounted value of the higher
taxes that they will have to pay to bail out the banks), just the opposite would have happened: we would have recognized that because of the distortions associated with "too-big-to-fail" banks, the productive capacity of the economy has been diminished, with the decreased "wealth" of taxpayers being larger than the increased value of banks; these metrics would have told us that the bailouts are Pareto-inefficient, and that the wealth of the economy has been diminished.11

Although the capitalization of exploitative rents may perhaps represent the largest part of the increase in financial wealth associated with an increase in rents, changes in taxes and regulatory regimes can have similar effects.

7.2.1 What's missing?
In each of these situations, a change in the flow of resources that accrue to "capital" gets capitalized in wealth, and the present discounted value of the decreased flow to the rest of the economy is not reflected in our wealth metrics. We do not, for instance, value the stream of tax revenues to the government or the reduced wages accruing to workers as a result of increased market exploitation.

There is a further potential problem, which we can only hint at here: Market intertemporal pricing is, in general, not correct. Wealth (in the conventional accounts) uses the private sector's after-tax returns. Whether a shift in taxation from capital to labor increases or decreases societal welfare depends on labor and savings elasticities, and societal evaluations of the resulting redistribution; changes in wealth may not only inadequately reflect these changes in societal welfare – the two may actually move in different directions. For instance, measured wealth won't reflect the diminution of the present discounted value of what workers receive, while the effects on capital are ambiguous – the measured wealth of the economy will increase as a result of the increased flow of profits, but will decrease as a result of the higher after-tax return. Tax changes which lower the average tax on capital, but at the same time increase the marginal tax can, on this account, have a far greater impact on wealth – even if, because of the increase in the marginal tax rate, the tax structure is more distortionary.

Consider, for instance, a neoclassical production function where output is a function of capital, $K$, labor, $L$, and land, $T$. Assume $L$ and $T$ are fixed. In the absence of taxation, wealth, $W$, is just the sum of the value of $K$ and land:

$$W = K + pT,$$

where $p$ is the price of land, which in steady state is just equal to the return on land divided by the return on capital: $p = F_T/F_K$.

It is easy to see that $dW/dK = 1 + pT (F_{TT}/F_T - F_{KK}/F_K) > 1$ provided only that capital and land are complements, i.e. wealth goes up more than the increase in capital stock.

But now assume that the government imposes a tax on the return to land at the rate $t$, but that the return to capital – and therefore the level of $K$ – remains unchanged. Then $p = F_T(1-t)/F_K$. Wealth decreases, but the productive capacity
of the economy is unaffected. In life cycle models, the lower value of land typically leads to a higher value of \( K \). If so, \( W \) and \( K \) can actually move in opposite directions; the lower value of wealth is associated with an increase in aggregate output.\(^{12}\)

There are many similar examples. Many of the changes in wealth, associated with human, social, and natural capital, may not be captured in our wealth metrics. The next section looks at one particularly important example.

### 7.3 Missing real capital: The destruction of human and other forms of capital in recessions

Recessions destroy capital and impede its accumulation. We can trace out the consequences for plant and equipment, as revealed by investment data.\(^{13}\) (Even then, we may not do so fully: we don’t adequately monitor maintenance expenditures.\(^{14}\))

But we don’t adequately trace out the other forms of capital, and, in particular, human capital. There are several important effects.

The first has to do with education, and the effects would appear to be ambiguous: Some stay in school longer when no jobs are available. It should be clear that, a priori, the effects on student enrollment are ambiguous: Does increased competition for jobs lead to greater incentives for formal education? Or do reduced employment opportunities reduce incentives? Does the effect of a lower opportunity cost outweigh these incentive effects?

On the other hand, with a prolonged downturn, many can’t afford to stay in school. Many worry that if they have to borrow to go to school, if they can’t get a job, the debt burden will be enormous. (These effects are obviously stronger in countries like the US where children and their parents have to pay the bulk of costs, where tuition is high and there is greater reliance on loan programs where repayments are not contingent on the borrower’s income.) In the case of the US, further discouragement results from a bankruptcy law which states that student debt cannot be discharged even in bankruptcy.\(^{15}\) Yet another adverse effect arises from the particular way that government support is provided: by states, who have balanced budget frameworks, and who, accordingly, typically cut back support for higher education in a recession, forcing much higher tuitions.\(^{16}\)

In practice, it appears that in normal downturns, the first effect (increased demand for education as a result of a lowered opportunity cost) dominates, but there is increasing evidence that in the current more extended downturn, at least in the US, over time the second effect has become more important, especially for advanced (graduate) education.\(^{17}\)

#### 7.3.1 Other hidden losses

In addition to the unmeasured change in societal wealth from these changes in investments in formal education, there are several other effects.
First, there is a reduction in the quality of education as government cuts back on funding, not only for tertiary education, but also for primary and secondary levels.

Secondly, other government cutbacks affect both learning and future productivity: Reduced access to health care and nutrition on the part of the poor can have life-long effects, including on the ability of children to learn, and these effects become especially important as the number of children living in poverty increases with an economic downturn.

Perhaps the most adverse effects are related to a decrease in job experience (learning on the job) – long recognized as a major part of human capital. There are especially adverse effects on young people who can’t get jobs in a period in which they should be accumulating skills and work experience, their skills atrophy. Several studies have documented that those entering the labor market at a time when unemployment is high experience significantly diminished lifetime incomes. Such adverse effects are particularly significant, of course, among those who do not get jobs. And when these adverse effects are aggregated over the large fractions of young people who face extended unemployment (youth unemployment in Europe as a whole has been persistently almost 25%, and in the most countries most afflicted by the euro crisis, over 50%) one obtains significant losses in human capital.

But this is not the only loss: Those in their 50s and early 60s are forced to retire early. They had productive skills (human capital) which, in more normal times, would have yielded returns for years to come. As a result of the crisis, all of this human capital is written down to zero – or would be if we had a good set of accounts.

There is another effect in those countries where there has been a cutback in pensions and/or where individuals rely on their own savings: many who would have retired are forced to keep working (often in low-skilled jobs), as their retirement income becomes greatly diminished (especially with QE, quantitative easing, those who had put their money into “safe” assets – government bonds – saw their incomes eviscerated). While as a result, the labor force participation of the elderly might not have declined as much as it would have otherwise, it is worth noting that there are adverse welfare effects both from the destruction of human capital from the premature retirement and from the “forced” labor force participation. Our standard metrics capture neither of these effects.

When there is a deep and prolonged downturn, these effects on human capital can be very significant; and it would seem that the adverse effects far outweigh the positive effects that might arise from more extended enrollment in school. This is certainly consistent with hysteresis effects associated with extended periods of unemployment, and with econometric studies suggesting that prolonged downturns lead to a decrease in potential growth. These unobserved wealth effects help explain why effects of downturns persist.
7.3.2 Estimating the size of the missing capital – the magnitude of capital destruction in a recession

We can get a rough order-of-magnitude estimate of the magnitude of the capital destruction in a recession by estimating the difference between where the economy would have been, in the absence of the recession, and where it is today and is likely to be in the future. See Figures 7.1 and 7.2, which show that today GDP in the US is some 16% below what it would have been in the absence of crisis—in Europe some 17% lower—and that these differences, even if they don’t become bigger, are likely to extend into the foreseeable future. The total cost of the crisis in terms of lost output is truly enormous—depending on the discount rate, possibly well in excess of $100 trillion. (A 16% loss in a $19 trillion economy amounts to a loss of $3.04 trillion. Even if the economy were immediately to return to a growth path of 2% growth, with a 3% real interest rate, the present discounted value of the loss is over $300 trillion.)

We can in principle measure the delta in “normal” capital $K$ (the difference between what $K$, as conventionally measured, would have been but for the recession and actual $K$), that is, we can estimate the consequences of reduced investment to the capital stock. Similarly, we can estimate the delta in normal human capital (“education”) as conventionally measured, that is again, the difference between what the level of human capital, as conventionally measured, would have been, in the absence of the recession, and its actual level. We can
Figure 7.2  Europe growth below trend

Notes: Euro Area includes Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. Some current Euro countries (as of 2015) are not included in this analysis due to data unavailability. Euro Area GDP is obtained from aggregating GDP (in National Currency, Constant Price) of these countries using IMF WEO Data available at https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2015/01/weoredata/index.aspx (accessed on Nov 7, 2015). Also used was the GDP deflator (Index) of the involved countries from IMF WEO data available at the same source (accessed on Nov 7, 2015) to transform some of the GDP (in National Currency, Constant Prices) data series in order to make all GDP (in National Currency, Constant Prices) data series in our aggregation have the same base year of 2010. The GDP (in National Currency, Constant Prices) of Austria, Germany and Luxembourg in 2014 are IMF estimates instead of the actual outputs.

then estimate the predicted effect of these changes on output. (For instance, if lower investment has decreased the capital stock from what would normally have been the case, in the absence of the recession, by some 5 percent, then the share of capital is .25, standard analyses would suggest that output would be some 1.25 percent lower than it would have been on the normal path.)

The difference between the decline in GDP (relative to the normal path) that can thus be accounted for and the actual decline in output (relative to the normal path) is the result of missing “dark matter” – analogous to Solow’s residual. The present discounted value of the difference is the value of the missing capital.
Back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that the magnitude of this missing capital is enormous. True GDP is the sum of consumption plus true investment. True investment is the difference in true wealth. We have been ignoring the effect of the downturn on hidden wealth, and thus on true investment. The decline in GDP in the recession was, accordingly, much greater than the standard numbers suggest.

There is an important agenda going forward of trying to parse out this missing capital. The problem is analogous to that posed by Scow in his classic 1957 paper. He showed that one could explain only about 12.5 percentage of the growth of output per capita by an increase in the capital-labor ratio. The rest was called “the residual,” and considerable efforts were made in subsequent years to explain the residual, for example, the movement of labor from less productive sectors (agriculture) to more productive sectors, the shortening of hours of work, and, most importantly, technological change.

Our earlier discussion helps identify some of this missing capital. We know that those who enter the labor force in a bad (recession) year have a significantly lower lifetime present discounted value of income. And this is especially true of those who remain unemployed for extended periods – the decreased experience shows up as lower incomes throughout their lifetimes. We also know that those who get displaced from a job face a significant loss in present discounted value of income. We can use these numbers to provide an estimate of the value of the loss in human capital on this account.

There are other capital losses that are harder to measure. Bankruptcy results in a loss of organizational capital, including the tacit knowledge that resides within the bounds of a firm. In recent years, there has been increasing recognition of the role of social capital for the well-functioning of the economy, and there is some direct evidence of the erosion of social capital as a result of long-lasting deep downturns. Trust is too important, and the behavior of the banks in the years before the crisis undoubtedly led to an erosion of trust. Quantifying these effects is an ambitious task for the future.

Even if we can't precisely parse out the components of this dark matter, this missing capital – partly due to the destruction of organizational and social capital, and partly due to the destruction of key components of human capital (experience) – is real and needs to be taken into account.

7.4 Concluding comments

The idea that there can be an increase in the value of wealth, without any change in the amount of productive capital, is, of course, an old one: in developing countries, there has long been a concern that savings get transmitted only into an increase in the value of land or holdings of gold. Indeed, a key issue in the theoretical literature of the 1960s and 1970s was whether there was any meaningful measure of aggregate “capital.” The reswitching literature (focusing on models
in which there was production of commodities by means of commodities (Sraffa 1963), so that “capital” represented working capital) noted that an economy at a low interest rate and a high interest rate could look identical, though the value of capital might be markedly different.  

7.4.1 Another example of why metrics matter

One of the key messages of the International Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress (Stiglitz, Sen, and Fitoussi 2010) was, What you measure affects what you do.

This chapter has argued that our standard metrics have not captured adequately the adverse effects of recessions.

If we don’t measure the adverse effects on human capital, we will do nothing to ameliorate these effects, and we may even undertake policies which look good in the absence of these effects, but which would look disastrous in their presence.

This analysis emphasizes that there are long-term consequences of not taking strong counter-cyclical policies; and that because of deficiencies in our wealth measures, we don’t correctly assess these long-term effects. If one focuses on the liability side of the government—as those who have urged austerity in Europe and elsewhere have done—one may take actions that result in the net asset side of the entire economy decreasing, undermining sustainability. Austerity and the single-minded focus on government debt has been short-sighted, besides being counterproductive. Better metrics might have noted that austerity reduces correctly calculated GDP by far more than is widely recognized, and worsens national balance sheets, because of the resulting large amounts of missing capital, including hidden decrease in human capital.  

To put this another way: GDP is supposed to be measured as consumption plus the change in wealth. But if we don’t measure the decrease in human capital and the other forms of capital (which together constitute the missing capital), we are underestimating the decline in the recession in GDP, and we are underestimating the adverse effects of the austerity measures that have been adopted in Europe, especially for Europe’s future growth potential.

On the other side of the ledger, this short paper also provides an important cautionary note in the interpretation of wealth-income ratios, and the implication of these increases: they do not necessarily mean that the economy has become more productive, and that current levels of consumption are sustainable.

A natural resource economy which uses the revenues gleaned from the extraction of its resources to fuel a real estate bubble might even show an increase in “wealth” – but its future productive capacities may well be diminished significantly. The increase in financial wealth that has marked many advanced countries in recent decades may similarly be a chimera, with the increase in real estate prices masking the far more important reduction in real productive capital.
Notes

1. Paper presented at a special session of the International Economic Association World Congress, Dead Sea, Jordan, June, 2014 sponsored by the OECD. I am deeply indebted to the other members of the panel—Gonzalo Hernandez Licana, Francois Bourguignon, and Martine Durand—and to Martin Guzman for their insightful comments, and also to Jun Huang, Leo Lijun Wang, Ruoke Yang and Feiran Zhang for research assistance. Financial assistance from INET and the Roosevelt Institute Inequality Project, and support by the Ford, McArthur, and Bernard and Irene Schwartz foundations are gratefully acknowledged.

2. University Professor, Columbia University.

3. Arrow et al. (2012).

4. The ideas in this section are elaborated upon in Stiglitz (2015a,b).


6. See: Arrow et al (1961), Young (2013). It should be noted that some authors have recently argued otherwise. See Mallick (2007). But the assumption of an elasticity of substitution is greater than unity has one very disturbing consequence: in models where the factor bias (i.e. whether technological change is capital or labor augmenting) is endogenous, the steady state equilibrium is a saddle point. The economy is unstable. (Stiglitz 2014).

7. There is a third important puzzle: one can only explain a fraction of the increase in wealth (in the case of the US, between one half and three quarters) on the basis of savings, from national income data. In some cases, they suggest a decline in the wealth income ratio (assuming wealth were capital), when there appears to be an increase. Stiglitz (2015a, 2015b) refers to this as the wealth residual—the unexplained increase in wealth. But this is at least part of a puzzle once it is recognized that wealth and capital are different concepts. The discussion in sections 7.1 and 7.2 below explains why wealth can go up even when capital is declining.

8. If \( R \) is the rent from the land, and \( r \) is the real interest rate, then the value of land \( V_T = R/r, \) so that there is an equiproportionate increase in the value of land from a permanent decrease in the real interest rate.

9. The recurrence of bubbles has been noted by Kindleberger (1978) and may reflect the fundamental instability of economies with heterogeneous capital goods in the absence of a full set of futures markets extending infinitely far into the future (or without perfect foresight extending infinitely far into the future) analyzed by Hahn (1966) and Shell and Stiglitz (1967). Stiglitz (2014) shows the same dynamic instability arises in models with productive capital \( K \) and land: unless the price of land is set initially correctly, the dynamics do not lead the economy to the steady state equilibrium.
10. Some of the ideas in this section are elaborated on in greater length in Stiglitz (2015a).

11. This discussion raises similar issues as those that the Commission discussed in moving economic activities from the public to the private sector.

12. For instance, in the standard overlapping generations model, where individuals live for two periods, working only in the first, the steady-state value of $K$ is given by $s(K)w(K) - (1 - t)TF/(FK) = K$, where $s$ is the savings rate of workers and $w$ is their wage. If $ds/dK < 0$, then an increase in the tax rate $t$ leads to an increase in $K$ and a lowering of wealth.

13. We could also measure the increased market value of capital (including the increased value of equities) but for reasons that should be clear from the discussion of Section 7.2 of this paper, that would not be a good measure of the change in wealth. The economic downturn worsens the bargaining position of workers, lowering their real wage (increasing the ability of firms to “exploit” workers). The resulting increase in the value of measured capital is offset by a corresponding decrease in the present discounted value of wages (human capital), but the latter is typically not recorded. (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984, provides a formal model showing how higher unemployment lowers the real wage.)

14. Thus, traditional analyses describing the decline in productivity in recessions as a result of labor hoarding may not be quite correct: some of the labor was spent in maintaining plant and equipment – doing maintenance that had been deferred during the preceding boom. By the same token, the markedly different patterns of productivity in recent downturns – reflecting ruthless management that quickly trims any unneeded labor – may not be as positive as the numbers on their face suggest: they do not capture the impacts on the maintenance of either human or physical capital stocks.

15. See the discussion in Stiglitz (2012).

16. This has been especially true in the 2008 recession, because of its severity and duration. For a discussion of the impacts on tuition and student indebtedness, see Stiglitz (2013).

17. Note that in any case, the market for education is distorted: there may either be too much or too little investment in education. Because of signaling/screening effects as well as societal benefits arising from a more education populace, social returns to education may be greater or less than the private returns.


19. There are a further set of complex adverse welfare effects, with potentially important implications for the stock of human capital. As the elderly, who otherwise would have retired, seek jobs, there are search externalities on other job-seekers (see Greenwald and Stiglitz 1988). If the economy is in a demand constrained equilibrium, firms that are capital constrained may decide to
hire these older workers, rather than younger workers, adversely affecting the accumulation of human capital by the former.


21. Indeed, there is a literature suggesting that the economy’s dynamics exhibit near unit roots. See Campbell and Mankiw (1987).

22. As Stiglitz, Sen and Fitoussi (2010) point out, GDP does not provide a good measure of the loss of well-being: it does not, for instance, include any valuation of the increased insecurity that the downturn has brought. Cutbacks in public programs are valued at the reduction in the value of the inputs, not the value to citizens of the services provided.

23. As we have noted above, there may be significant measurement errors in both variables, e.g. because of hard-to-observe changes in maintenance.


25. For a brief review, see Stiglitz (1974).

26. These are effects that go beyond the oft-made observation that the improvement in the liability side of the balance sheet is often disappointing; because market GDP decreases (more than expected) tax revenues are lower (than expected) and social expenditures higher.

References


