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Governance, Executive Compensation and Excessive Risk
Governance, Executive Compensation and Excessive Risk in the Financial Services Industry
The financial crisis of 2008/09 has brought about a wide range of policy measures, and these measures have helped to circumvent a major global recession. The crisis has also reinforced the need for structural reforms—especially in the banking and financial services sector—that still have to be addressed by governments. In addition, the crisis has shown the need for policy coordination on a global level: prudent regulation and supervision on a national level alone is not sufficient to ensure that we lay the groundwork for a sustainable growth path.
This conference brought together the latest academic research and industry best practices on corporate governance and compensation in the financial industry as well as the latest proposals for reform and regulation of these practices. The goal of the conference was to take stock of the recent research findings and to debate the various regulation proposals—at both the national and international level—to better identify the areas of consensus (if any) on these important issues. Ultimately, our goal was to contribute to help firms and governments to craft the best policies for promoting socially responsible and sustainable economies.
Co-hosted by: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung and the Sanford C. Bernstein & Co. Center for Leadership and Ethics.
Thursday May 27, 2010 from 7:00 p.m. – 9:00 p.m.
Friday May 28, 2010 from 9:00 a.m. – 6:00 p.m.
Venue: Faculty House
Adams, Renée B. and Hamid Mehran. “Bank Board Structure and Performance: Evidence for Large Bank Holding Companies” 2010.
Adams, Renée B. and Hamid Mehran. “Is Corporate Governance Different for Bank Holding Companies?” April 2003.
Ahrend, R., J. Arnold and F. Murtin, "Prudential Regulation and Competition in Financial Markets," OECD Economics Department Working Papers, No. 735, OECD Publishing, 2009.
Balachandran, Sudhakar, Bruce Kogut and Hitesh Harnal. “The Probability of Default, Excessive Risk, and Executive Compensation: A Study of Financial Services Firms from 1995 to 2008” May 2010.
Bebchuk, Lucian A., Alma Cohen and Holger Spamann. “The Wages of Failure: Executive Compensation at Bear Stearns and Lehman 2000–2008” February 2010.
Bebchuk, Lucian A. and Jesse M. Fried. “Paying for Long-Term Performance” April 2010.
Bebchuk, Lucian A. and Holger Spamann. “Regulating Bankers' Pay” October 2009.
Becht, Marco, Patrick Bolton and Ailsa Roell. “Corporate Law and Governance” 2007.
Black, J. and S. Jacobzone (2009), “Tools for Regulatory Quality and Financial Sector Regulation: A Cross-Country Perspective”, OECD Working Papers on Public Governance, No. 16, OECD Publishing, OECD.
Bolton, Patrick, Hamid Mehran and Joel Shapiro. “Executive Compensation and Risk Taking” May 27, 2010.
Bolton, Patrick, Jose Scheinkman and Wei Xiong. “Pay for Short-Term Performance: Executive Compensation in Speculative Markets” 2005.
Cheng, Ing-Haw, Harrison Hong and Jose Scheinkman. “Yesterday's Heroes: Compensation and Creative Risk-Taking” May 2010.
Core, John E. and Wayne R. Guay. “Is there a case for regulating executive pay in the financial services industry?” January 2010.
Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs, OECD Steering Group on Corporate Governance, "Corporate Governance and the Financial Crisis: Conclusions and emerging good practices to enhance implementation of the Principles," 2010.
Greenberg, Maurice R. “Regulation of Executive Compensation in Financial Services” February 2010.
Hau, Harold and Marcel Thum. “Banks and the Crisis” October 2009.
Hau, Harold, Johannes Steinbrecher and Marcel Thum. “Board (in)competence and the Subprime Crisis” January 2009.
Mehran, Hamid and Joshua Rosenberg. “The Effect of CEO Stock Options on Bank Investment Choice, Borrowing, and Capital” March 2009.
“Thematic Review on Compensation” Peer Review Report, Financial Stability Board, March 2010.
Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development. “Transparency and Integrity in Lobbying”
Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development. “Policy Framework for Effective and Efficient Financial Regulation” 2010.
Stultz, René M. “Bank CEO Incentives and the Credit Crisis” March 2010.
American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, Letter to the Federal Reserve on Sound Incentive Compensation Policies, November 2009.
The Aspen Institute. “Long-Term Value Creation: Guiding Principles for Corporations and Investors.”
“A Fair and Substantial Contribution by the Financial Sector” Interim Report for the G20 prepared by the staff of the International Monetary Fund, to be presented at June G20 summit.
Regulators, business leaders and faculty members interested in attending future symposia can contact: leadershipethics (AT) gsb (DOT) columbia (DOT) edu.
Watch the trailer for our interactive debate entitled “Financial Innovation: A Risky Business?”
The Small Worlds of Corporate Governance
Identifies "structural breaks" — privatization, for example, or globalization — and assesses why powerful actors across countries behave similarly or differently in terms of network properties and corporate governance.