This dissertation consists of two independent essays in the area of corporate governance. The first essay, "Do Corporate Insiders Prefer Nasdaq," argues that since volume on Nasdaq is exaggerated and SEC Rule 144 ties the limit on insider selling to total volume, insiders of troubled firms may be able to use private information to take advantage of other shareholders by switching to Nasdaq and unloading more stock. Consistent with the hypothesis, I find that insiders engage in heavy selling of company stock in the months following the move. Post-announcement abnormal returns are strongly negative. The second essay, "In Search of Responsible CEOs: The Case of CEOs with Non-profit Experience," argues that prior non-profit experience at the CEO level may be a strong signal of low/high predisposition to corrupt behavior. Results consistent with the hypothesis that the bureaucratic and chaotic culture of non-profits attracts and/or molds individuals with subpar ethical standards are presented and discussed.