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This dissertation contains a series of essays intended to introduce strategic modeling techniques into the network design problem.
This thesis considers two applications in dynamics economic models with many agents. The dynamics of the economic systems under consideration are intractable since they depend on the (stochastic) outcomes of the agents' actions. However, as the number of agents grows large, approximations to the aggregate behavior of agents come to light. I use this observation to characterize market dynamics and subsequently to study these applications.
This dissertation addresses a number of outstanding, fundamental questions in operations management and industrial organization literature. Operations management literature has a long history of studying the competitive impact of operational, firm-level strategic decisions within oligopoly markets.
Adopting a regulatory focus perspective, I study why people repeat a prior behavior that could be unpleasant, ineffective, or unethical. Driven by the concerns to avoid negative deviations from the status quo, the prevention aspect of self-regulation (i.e., prevention focus) is associated with the motivation to maintain the status quo (Higgins, 2005).
This thesis studies the impact of various fundamental frictions in the microstructure of financial markets. Specific market frictions we consider are latency in high-frequency trading, transaction costs arising from price impact or commissions, unhedgeable inventory risks due to stochastic volatility and time-varying liquidity costs. We explore the implications of each of these frictions in rigorous theoretical models from an investor's point of view and derive analytical expressions or efficient computational procedures for dynamic strategies.
In this thesis, we model and analyze the impact of two behavioral aspects of customer decision-making upon the revenue maximization problem of a monopolist firm. First, We study the revenue maximization problem of a monopolist firm selling a homogeneous good to a market of risk-averse, strategic customers. Using a discrete (but arbitrary) valuation distribution, we show how the dynamic pricing problem with strategic customers can be formulated as a mechanism design problem, thereby making it more amenable to analysis.
This study investigates the framework of how litigation risk affects management forecasting of bad news and good news differently, resulting in differential optimism in these forecasts. I argue that distinct stock price patterns following these two types of management forecasts expose them to differential litigation risk ex post. While optimistic management forecasts of good news attract lawsuits, truthful rather than optimistic forecasts of bad news are more likely to trigger immediate lawsuits.
Financial markets, where companies are characterized by a separation of ownership from control and interactions are opaque to a large majority of uninformed investors provide a fertile ground for executives to conduct practices that push the ethical boundaries of accepted and expected behavior.
This dissertation analyzes hedge fund leverage and its determinants, investigates optimal hedge fund manager behavior induced by hedge fund contracts, and uncovers an evidenc