

Will Corporate Governance Reform Change Japanese Capitalism?

Takatoshi Ito
Professor, Columbia University

For the Center on Japanese Economy and Business
Conference on “Japan’s Changing Corporate Governance,”
Tokyo, May 21, 2015

Corporate Governance Reform

- Political agenda
- Impacts on corporate management
- Macroeconomic implications
- Implications on workers

- Challenges and Future

Corporate Governance Reform as a Political Agenda

- Top of the Growth Strategy (Third Arrow)
Agenda of *Abenomics*
 - Narrow objective: Dividend increases; and stock price increases → Stimulate consumption and investment
 - Broader implication: Attempt to change executives' mind toward efficient use of capital
 - Governance Reform is to make corporations to use resources more efficiently → more profitable

Instruments for the Policy Push

- JPX Nikkei 400, emphasizing ROE
- Corporate Governance Code
 - Circulated in March 2015, to be implemented on 01 June 2015 by JPX
 - E.g., two independent outside board members
- Pressure from pension funds
 - Stewardship code, April 2014
 - Along with pension fund reform (e.g., GPIF reform)

Impacts on Corporate Management: Stakeholder Capitalism to Shareholder Capitalism?

- “Japanese management” was in vogue in the 1980s
 - Low dividends but high growth and stock price increases
 - Cross-share holdings (no M&As) allows management to focus on long-term issues
 - Stakeholder capitalism (workers; communities) over shareholder capitalism → Hostile M&A can be bad
 - American capitalism forces short-term views
- After lost two decades, superiority of Japanese management is gone (in many industries)
 - Shareholders are important
 - Fiduciary duty of institutional investors is important
 - Earning higher profits and paying higher dividends are good
 - Lots of resources were wasted in loss-making subsidiaries and projects → need to reform

Macroeconomic Implications

- Rising stock prices stimulates consumption
 - Along with the first and second arrows
- **Management will allocate capital efficiently → potential growth rate becomes higher**
 - Close down money-losing operations
 - Accept M&A (create values)
 - Unwind interlocking shares
- This is a key
 - Paying higher dividends (higher ROE) is easy
 - Allocate capital efficiently (higher ROE) is difficult, but most important

Implications on Workers

- Will improved corporate governance be bad for workers?
 - More layoffs?
 - No “life-time employment”?
 - Less labor shares (more capital shares) of profits?
 - Rich vs. Poor; Regular vs. Irregular; “inequity”?
- Corporate governance reform is about increasing the size of a pie; not necessarily how to slice a pie
- Labor market issues and inequality issues have to be addressed separately
- Workers have to develop skills that make them qualified for globally-demanded jobs

Challenges and Future

- “Will Corporate Governance Reform change the (stereotypical) Japanese Capitalism?”
 - Yes. But not all the way to the stereotypical American capitalism
- In order to have intended effects,
 - Corporate executives should embrace and implement corporate governance reform
 - Life-time employment may have to be modified
 - Wages have to be raised for workers with higher skills
 - Capital markets should differentiate good and bad companies
 - Investors should become “active”
 - Mutual fund (Toshin) has to be reformed to pursue long-term values
- Political push has to be maintained
 - Concerns among workers and the public have to be addressed
 - Universities have to be reformed to produce workers with higher (and demanded) skills