Instructors: Yash Kanoria and Jay Sethuraman
Class Dates: 1/27, 02/03, 10, 17, 24, 03/03, 24, 31, 04/07, 14, 21, 28.
This class will explore the intersection of operations, engineering and economics relevant to modern internet marketplaces, with a focus on matching markets. Matching markets allow compatible agents to match with each other for mutual benefit, including those for dating, labor, accommodation and rides. The topics covered will emphasize recent developments and research, technical tools that may help advance the frontier in this space, and open directions. We will not cover the important and heavily studied topics of stable marriage and auctions.
Some of the major topics the class will touch on:
• Intro to two-sided platforms. Thinking about the platform operator and platform participants.
Rochet and Tirole (2003), Platform competition in two-sided markets
Rochet and Tirole (2006), Two-sided markets: A progress report
Armstrong (2006), Competition in two-sided markets
Horton and Zeckhauser (2016), “Owning, Using and Renting: Some Simple Economics of the “Sharing Economy”
• Search frictions in matching markets
Rogerson, Shimer & Wright (2005), “Search-theoretic models of the labor market: A survey”.
Hoppe, Moldovanu & Sela (2009), “The Theory of Assortative Matching Based on Costly Signals”.
Horton (2015), “Supply Constraints as a Market Friction: Evidence from an Online Labor Market”.
• Design of the “search environment” on platforms within which participants search for partners.
Halaburda, Piskorski & Yildirim (2015), Competing by restricting choice: the case of search platforms
Kanoria and Saban (2016), Facilitating the search for partners on matching platforms: Restricting agent actions.
Romanyuk (2016), Ignorance is Strength: Improving the Performance of Matching Markets by Limiting Information.
• The theory of optimal transport: a powerful tool for matching supply and demand?
A. Galichon (2016), Optimal Transport Methods in Economics (Princeton University Press).
Also, tools from switch scheduling that appear promising in the context of dynamic matching: Maguluri & Srikant (2016), “Heavy traffic queue length behavior in a switch under the MaxWeight algorithm”. Eryilmaz & Srikant (2012). “Asymptotically tight steady-state queue length bounds implied by drift conditions”.
• Balancing supply and demand in a spatio-temporal environment
Braverman, Dai, Liu & Ying (2016), “Empty-car Routing in Ridesharing Systems”.
Work by Cornell IEOR folk (Henderson, Shmoys and others) on Citibike.
Kanoria & Qian (2016), “Using dispatch to balance supply and demand via virtual flows”.
• Pricing issues
Banerjee, Freund & Lykouris (2016), Multi-objective pricing for shared vehicle systems
Bimpikis, Candogan & Saban (2016), Spatial Pricing in Ride-Sharing Networks
Gomes & Pavan (2014), Many-to-many matching and price discrimination.
• Reputation systems
Nosko, Tadelis (2015), “The limits of reputation in platform markets: An empirical analysis and field experiment”.
Resnick, Kuwabara, Zeckhauser & Friedman (2000), Reputation Systems.
• Project presentations by students
Class evaluation will be based on class participation (40%) and projects (60%).
Sidney Taurel Associate Professor of Business
Yash Kanoria is the Sidney Taurel Associate Professor of Business in the Decision, Risk and Operations division at Columbia Business School, working primarily on matching markets and the design and operations of marketplaces. Previously, he obtained a BTech from IIT Bombay in 2007, a PhD in Electrical Engineering from Stanford in 2012, and spent a year at Microsoft Research New England during 2012-13 as a ...