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Introduction and Overview

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Objectives of this volume

Why has the economic performance of Sub-Saharan Africa (which we will simply refer to as Africa from here on) been so disappointing? Our real objective, though, is not so much to understand what went wrong, as to assess how Africa can change its course: What are the policy options for a sustained reversal of that trend? How can Africa catch up with other developing countries, some of which have had spectacular successes in the very period during which Africa was stagnating?

It is worth recalling that as Africa emerged from colonialism, East Asia was the region in trouble and turmoil. Its extensive involvement with and destruction in World War II was followed by the Chinese Revolution (1949), the Korean War (1950–2), insurgency in the Malay Peninsula in the 1950s, the bloodbath in Indonesia (1967–8), and the Vietnam War that spilled over into Laos and Cambodia and continued for over three decades. A widely held view at the time contrasted Africa’s promise with Asia’s pitfalls. Thus, just a half century ago, Nobel Laureate economist Gunnar Myrdal visited Asia—whose economies then were doing little better than those of Africa have since that time. Even his rich and sophisticated work shared the view that that continent’s prospects were dismal.1 History, of course, proved that consensus view to be wrong: Much of the continent was just beginning the most rapid period of sustained growth seen anywhere in the world at any time. Stiglitz was one of the leaders of the early 1990s World Bank study, undertaken to understand the factors responsible for Asian countries’ success; The East Asian Miracle2 described the important role that government had played in promoting savings, education, technology, and entrepreneurship as well as regulating finance and ensuring that financial markets served the needs of society—a view markedly different from that embodied in the market-fundamentalist version of the “Washington Consensus,”3 which entails a very limited role of the state and was
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the prevailing doctrine in the World Bank and the IMF at the time. (The financial crisis that broke out in 2008 and the ensuing recession has, of course, bolstered the critique of market fundamentalism.) These ideas—that the government can play a central role in the promotion of development and govern markets—have been encapsulated in the notion of the developmental state.

Given the disappointing results of reforms that relied excessively on markets, one of the central issues addressed by the chapters in this volume is, could government play a more active role in promoting development? If so, what should it do? What are the governance requirements of a more activist state? How could one mitigate the risks of government failure? What lessons could Africa glean from the experience of Asia? There are, of course, many differences between the two regions, leading some to suggest that the experiences in one were of little relevance to the other. Most of the participants in the meetings of the Initiative for Policy Dialogue’s Africa Task Force in Pretoria, Addis Abba, and Manchester (where various drafts of these papers were presented and where these ideas were hotly debated) disagreed with that conclusion.

There was one fundamental issue that clearly had to be addressed, and that was governance: Do at least some of the states of Africa have the capacity to play the roles that they would have to play? How could one square accusations of corruption, one of the standard explanations for Africa’s failures, with the tasks to be performed by the developmental state or its more common and feasible variant, the “developmentalist state.” That is why the Task Force addressed not only the economics of the developmental state, but also its institutional and political dimensions. The predominant view of the Task Force had a strong note of optimism: governments could actively promote development—and some in fact were doing so. Full success was not around the corner; many difficulties lay ahead; but, especially with well-designed assistance from the more advanced industrial countries and international organizations—and a favorable global economic environment—there were good prospects for sustained growth and poverty reduction in several African countries.

The puzzle of Africa’s growth has, of course, been a subject of intense debate and alternative views that blame poor governance, an unfortunate location (geography), or history (colonial legacy), especially after the failure of the simplistic formula of “get prices right, privatize, and liberate the magic of the market.” As we explain below, most of the members of the Task Force found these explanations or, at any rate, the importance often accorded to them, unpersuasive. Unfortunately, too much of the policy discourse on Africa has been too dominated by these perspectives.

The need to widen the policy debate and space in Africa and suggestions for some crucial ways of doing so are the dominant themes of the collection of chapters that follow. In this introductory chapter, we will not only draw on them, pulling together many of their threads, but also supplement them, notably
by trying to reflect some of the highlights of the rich and wide-ranging discussions that took place in meetings of the Task Force.7

There was, of course, no unanimity of views, and later in this introduction, we comment on one key debate. The discussion was lively and at times contentious. But what was clear was that it was imperative for new strategies be placed on the policy agenda for African countries, if the region is to break out of its “low-growth-and-low-expectations equilibrium” and if the growth achieved in the decade before the 2008 crisis is to be sustained and enhanced.

Complexities of African development

The question of interpreting Africa’s developmental experience is not as simple as was starkly posed above because of the diversity of African countries and their experiences. The region includes the fastest growing economy in the world during 1960–2000: Botswana. It also includes the long-standing success story of Mauritius, as well as other countries that have experienced fairly rapid growth, of 5 percent or more, over the long-term period of a decade or so, countries such as Mozambique, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Uganda, and Ghana. There is also great diversity when it comes to factors such as size, natural and human resources, ethnic configurations, and regime types.

There are a myriad of country-specific or idiosyncratic factors that affect economic performance. The crucial factors determining economic outcomes may have little to do with economic policies. In particular, states mired in civil conflicts and states that have failed are not contexts that are amenable to the sort of policy solutions we are seeking to illuminate. Economic difficulties and mismanagement may contribute in varying degrees to such political meltdowns in particular cases; but beyond a point, political failure rules. Economic success may prevent political collapse but it cannot cure it. We have little, if anything, to say for contexts such as today’s Somalia and Eritrea or Mugabe’s Zimbabwe or Mobutu’s Zaire (or, for that matter, the contexts of Burma, North Korea, Haiti, and elsewhere). However, for such post-conflict states as Liberia or Ethiopia, the policy options we propose are likely to be of relevance, as serious, committed, developmental regimes embark on rebuilding their economies or moving beyond reconstruction and toward accelerated development. At any rate, it is the economic policy options for these types of regimes—whether post-conflict or not—that we are concerned with. Today, Africa has many such regimes—something that is ignored by sweeping generalizations about problems of governance in Africa.

But still, there is a stylized or “average” African case, which can be useful for engaging in the sort of broad discourse on development strategies that we aim for. (Much of what we have to say is also relevant for low-income, least-developed, or latecomer economies in other regions of the world.)
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The fact that so many of the countries have succeeded in creating reasonably “good governments” and adopting reasonably “sound policies” (at least as defined by conventional standards) and yet have failed to attract non-extractive foreign direct investment, or even to promote domestic investment, has been a major source of concern. Some investments in natural resources may simply reflect the fact that those countries willing to give away their resources for a low enough price can always find some company to take them. But these typically bring relatively few jobs, and often bring harm to the environment as well as leading to suboptimal use of depletable resources. Similarly, if a country gives away a telecom concession at sweet enough terms, it can find an interested investor. The concern is that there has been too little of the kind of investment in manufacturing or service sectors that would give rise to sustained growth and job creation.

In this introductory chapter we describe and explain Africa’s growth, putting its experience within a global context. The next section discusses Africa’s “lost quarter century,” while the following one provides a short contrast with successes in other parts of the world. The fourth section briefly describes alternative hypotheses for Africa’s dismal performance. Each, of course, has strong policy implications. Thus if the problem is poor governance, then the fault lies not in economic policies or in the market, but in the public sector, and the remedy is either to “fix” the state, or to make sure that it does not get in the way of the market. Next, we argue against that view, in that problems of governance are not always irredeemable. We suggest that, instead, the right question to ask is: In which contexts could which particular mix of measures improve governance and markets? And, how can markets and government work together to best enhance economic performance? The sixth section provides an explanation for Africa’s lost quarter century and the seventh discusses a few other aspects of public policy that are critical to Africa’s success (some of which are to be taken up in subsequent work of the Africa Task Force). Finally, we touch upon some aspects of the impact on Africa of the international context.

Before beginning our analysis, there are two more preliminary notes: Discussions of policy, especially those from the international economic institutions (the World Bank and the IMF) typically talk about “good policies” and “good institutions.” The failure to have good policies and institutions is usually given center stage in the explanations of Africa’s failures. But the global financial crisis has shed new light on these long-standing platitudes: Before the crisis, defining a “good” institution or a “good” policy may have been difficult, but if asked to give an example, a common response would have been to cite those of the US as exemplary—though, to be sure, its persistent deficits would have meant that it would not be given an A+. Indeed, during the East Asia crisis, the countries of that region were told to adopt American-style capitalism, with its bankruptcy, corporate governance, and financial regulations. Now, most observers would have to admit that there were major deficiencies in both US policies and institutions. Critical
institutions—including its Central Bank—were captured by special interests. The policies adopted—and which were advocated by the international financial institutions and many government agencies, most notably the US Treasury— contributed to creating the crisis and its rapid spread around the world. The faith in independent central banks has come under attack because of the banks’ lack of transparency and deficiencies in the ways in which some officers are chosen, resulting in disturbing conflicts of interest; the system of self-regulation is a model of what should not be done. The lesson here is that we should be less confident in what we mean by good policies and institutions; we should be even more modest in our belief that exactly replicating institutions and policies that may have worked in one context will be as successful in another.

The second observation is that neither the recent growth rates nor the changes in economic fundamentals and structures in Africa that have accompanied this higher growth are adequate in relation to both what is needed and what has been achieved in successful cases, including the African star, Botswana. And Africa remains too dependent on what happens outside of its borders, as the recent slowdown resulting from the global financial crisis illustrates.

This book suggests a set of policy reforms that we believe may be able to meet these higher ambitions. It is based on the notion that long-term success rests on societies’ “learning”—new technologies, new ways of doing business, new ways of managing the economy, new ways of dealing with other economies. The “old” policies (which we glibly refer to as Washington Consensus policies, described at greater length below) focused on improving economic efficiency within a static framework. But the essence of development is dynamic. What matters, for instance, is not comparative advantage as of today, but dynamic comparative advantage. If South Korea had focused on its static comparative advantage, it would arguably still be a country of rice farmers.

We also argue that we need to think about governance in a way that is markedly different from how it has been thought about in the past. Successful development requires that the state play an important role. Failed or failing states with dysfunctional and egregiously corrupt governments obviously cannot do that. But much of the discussion on governance has focused on restricting and restraining the state, rather than strengthening and enabling it to perform the roles it needs to perform as a catalyst for growth and development.

These are the two simple but powerful messages of this book.

A disappointing record

On average, in most African countries, per capita income in 2000 was not much above that of 1960 and lower than that of 1975. Even with the improved growth performance of the region after 1995, at the onset of the Great Recession, on
average per capita income had barely reached the level of the early 1970s. (See the figures at the end of this section. Other features of this disappointing performance are noted below.) But the reasonable average annual growth of around 5 percent that was achieved during 1960–75, and the acceleration of growth in the past decade or so to roughly that level once again, shows that Africa is not doomed to the economic stagnation or decline that characterized the quarter century or so that these periods of reasonable growth bookend. This is the more so, given the ample scope for improving policies, as suggested by the papers in this volume. The case that growth can be substantially increased is made more compelling, not only by the modesty of the growth itself—even the accelerated growth of 1995–2005 remains below the rates achieved during 1960–80 or 1965–75—but also by the scope for structural improvements, notably the lack of economic or export diversification (see below).

Indeed, the share of manufacturing has been generally declining steadily since 1980 (as has employment in the formal sector). At 12.9 percent on average, the share of manufacturing in GDP in 2009 was actually lower than the 17.5 percent reached in 1965.8 There has also been little success in exporting manufactures and in attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) in non-extractive industries. Much of the growth of the past decade or so is accounted for by extractive activities in non-renewable resources—metals, minerals, and, above all, oil. Such growth won’t be sustainable, if all or most of the income generated by using non-renewable resources is consumed or wasted rather than used to create productive assets. Yields in agriculture have also stagnated, and this has had important adverse implications for the reduction of poverty. But the stagnation in agriculture is not a surprise, given the low levels of investment. The level of irrigation remains far below that of Asia: only 4 percent of arable and permanent cropland, compared with 39 percent in South Asia and 29 percent in East Asia. Related: Fertilizer use of 13 kilograms per hectare in Africa contrasts with 90 kilograms in South Asia and 190 kilograms in East Asia.9 Africa is still to benefit from a “green revolution.”

Whilst it is difficult to directly measure learning and the acquisition of technology10—which we argue is central to sustained growth—these trends suggest that there has been precious little of that. Moreover, the global crisis that broke out in 2008 highlights the vulnerabilities of commodity-dependent African economies and the importance of breaking out of the “structural stagnation” of Africa.

There are, of course, a myriad of country-specific factors that affect economic performance. Learning lessons of success and failure involves not merely documenting and interpreting policy lessons but also adapting them to particular country contexts. This is as true in Africa as it is in East Asia, where the mix of policies varied considerably across countries and over time (as emphasized, for example, in the contributions by Hanatani and Watanabe and by Ohno and Ohno). There are controversies in interpreting lessons and on the need to reform the reforms.
There is, for instance, a broad consensus that some of the policies pursued by many African states contributed to the problems facing them by the late 1970s or early 1980s: highly overvalued exchange rates, macroeconomic instability, irrational and extreme protection, un- or counterproductive rent-seeking, bloated bureaucracies and public sectors, and dysfunctional financial sectors. Frequently, extensive and excessive interventions were undertaken without regard for the capacity to design and implement them effectively.

To the extent that the Africa version of the Washington Consensus served to highlight these deficiencies and tilt the balance toward the market, it served a useful purpose. But it went too far in the other direction. From a neglect of government failure, the policy pendulum swung to the other extreme of neglect of market failure. As discussed further (especially in the fifth section), neither economic theory nor history provide a case for unfettered markets. When government programs were cut back, markets often did not arise to fill the gaps; when regulations were stripped, market performance often did not improve in the ways predicted. In many cases, welfare was reduced, growth impeded, and poverty increased.

Global experience: The cases and ingredients of success

Africa’s poor performance is especially disturbing when seen in a global perspective. The period of African stagnation corresponded to a period of rapid growth in East Asia. The causes of that growth have been the subject of extensive discussion, including the aforementioned World Bank study, *The East Asian Miracle*.

![Figure 1.1](image-url)  
*Figure 1.1* Africa* GDP per capita trend*  
*Referring to Sub-Saharan Africa*  
*Sources: World Bank, World Development Indicators database*
A more recent study, the Growth or Spence Commission (as it is often referred to and that we label GSC) has revisited the issues on a global scale and seeks to extract policy lessons from the experience of thirteen countries that achieved annual growth rates of 7 percent or more for at least twenty-five years. ¹¹

The countries and their periods of sustained growth at the rates that GSC concerns itself with are as follows: Botswana 1960–2005; Brazil 1950–80; China 1961–2005; Hong Kong 1960–97; Indonesia 1966–97; Malaysia 1967–97; Japan
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Figure 1.4 GDP per capita annual growth rates: regional comparisons
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators database

1950–83; S. Korea 1960–2001; Malta 1963–94; Oman 1960–99; Singapore 1967–2002; Taiwan 1965–2002; and Thailand 1960–97. Nine of these thirteen countries are East Asian. Of the remaining four, only one is of significant size (Brazil), only one is African (Botswana), and two are in distinct circumstances: one is on the border of Europe and tiny (Malta), the other an oil sheikdom (Oman). In its own words, the Report “is about sustained, high growth of this kind: its causes, consequences and internal dynamics.”12 In a sense, the Spence Commission reinforced the motivation of the African Task Force: Were there lessons from that experience (or more accurately, those experiences) that were applicable to Africa, with appropriate adaptation?

The Commission’s analysis is wide-ranging, highly nuanced, eclectic, and context-sensitive in a very marked and possibly deliberate contrast to the oversimplified certainties of the Washington Consensus (see the discussion below). Its broad canvass and the diversity and distinction of its membership13 are amongst its virtues but they do inevitably tend toward “two-handedness.” Nonetheless, it also has some clear and potentially strong messages; perhaps the central one being the context-specificity of what constitutes good and bad policies (though it does identify some that are always good or bad without sacrificing much of its non-dogmatic character). Its unorthodoxy even goes so far as not rejecting outright the case for industrial policy in all circumstances.

GSC notes the diversity of the experiences of the thirteen countries, but adds that “A close look at the 13 cases reveals five striking points of resemblance: 1) They fully exploited the world economy; 2) They maintained macroeconomic stability; 3) They mustered high rates of savings and investment; 4) They let markets allocate resources; 5) They had committed, credible, and capable governments.”14 The markets that it speaks of, though, were not unfettered and GSC adds
that aside from Hong Kong, “Other governments in our list were more hands-on, intervening with tax breaks, subsidized credit, directed lending, and other such measures. These interventions may have helped them to discover their comparative advantage . . . But they did not defy their comparative advantage . . . This process of ‘self-discovery’ may have been helped along by the government’s hand.”

These can also be said to be among the lessons of The East Asian Miracle. In a sense, the Spence Commission reinforced the findings of the earlier study—not surprising given the dominance of the East Asian countries among the success cases. The GSC, though, is refreshingly free of the encumbrance of trying to make its analysis conform to institutional positions, something the final version of The East Asian Miracle study tries to do. Adding Brazil and Botswana enhances, of course, the importance of the perspective advanced in this book, one which we refer to as the developmentalist state, which takes an active role in promoting development. In both of these countries, governments played a central role in promoting growth. Brazil adds one important wrinkle: it pursued what was essentially an import-substitution policy, as opposed to export-led growth (though it did not neglect exports), during the period of rapid growth that the GSC focuses on. (There is one other way in which Brazil changes the picture presented in The East Asian Miracle. That book emphasized the importance of education and equality. Through most of this period, Brazil performed relatively poorly on both counts; more recently, it has performed better on both.) What is essential is “learning”; and an appropriately designed import-substitution policy can be the basis of technological advances and export diversification, as Brazil has repeatedly shown. (The Spence Commission seems to implicitly disagree with the Washington Consensus view of Latin America’s “lost decade”: that it was the inevitable result of flawed import substitution policies. As Stiglitz, Rodrik, and Ocampo have argued elsewhere, it was mainly the result of the macroeconomic disturbance brought to Latin America by US monetary policies, sometimes referred to as the “Volcker shock.”)

Botswana brings to the fore another lesson of especial importance to Africa: Natural resources do not have to be a curse. If appropriately managed, they can be a blessing. But the fact that there are so few natural-resource-rich countries on the list of success cases is a reminder of how difficult that is.

On the list of policies leading to sustained growth, a few strategies are notably absent. The “expanded” Washington Consensus policies (expanded beyond the list of prescriptions formulated for Latin America in Williamson’s original paper defining the Washington Consensus) did not include capital and financial market liberalization—something that most of the success cases treated with caution; and it did not include clear systems of property rights—how could it, when among the most successful cases was China, where property rights are just now becoming more precisely defined. Indeed, contrary to the “property rights school,” several of the success cases began with large land reforms. But while
property rights may not play the pivotal role that Hernando DeSoto has suggested, deficiencies in the property rights system can be a hindrance to growth, and that may be the case in some African countries.

Finally, the Task Force discussions noted that there may be more agreement about what should be on the list of policies that contribute to growth than the specifics: Everybody can agree that good macroeconomic policy is not only desirable, but almost necessary. Growth is impossible with Zimbabwe’s levels of runaway inflation. But, beyond avoiding such extremes, what constitutes “good” macroeconomic policy is a subject of intense debate. To many central bankers, it has meant focusing on keeping inflation rates low. While the fad among central bankers twenty-five years ago was monetarism, which has faded and been replaced by inflation targeting, many of the success cases took a very different tack. They realized that what mattered was the real economy—stability of growth as much as that of prices—and good monetary policy entailed having access to an adequate supply of capital. As Stiglitz et al. argue in Stability with Growth,24 policies that tolerate low to moderate levels of inflation may actually lead to more stability of the real economy and higher rates of growth.

Interpreting the African experience

There are three strands of work that interpret Africa’s experience that respectively focus on Africa’s distinct circumstances (its geography or its natural resources); what has been done to Africa and the global environment in which it finds itself (changes in international prices, IMF programs); and its own policies (the failure of governance). This book takes the view that while geography may affect levels of per capita income, or even growth, geography is not destiny. So too failed states have played a role—but arguably they can be as much of a consequence as a cause, a consequence of low and falling or stagnant income and of policies that argued for a minimalist state. At any rate what we are concerned with are the policy options for African states that have not failed and that have or can have reasonably adequate governance.

The role of geography

An important strand of research has emphasized Africa’s geography as an impediment to its growth. This is even echoed, albeit somewhat faintly, in the report of the Growth Spence Commission. The argument25 is that landlocked countries are at a disadvantage because of a lack of access to global markets and trade, and that isolation is even more acute for mountainous countries. Tropical countries have the further problem of a disease burden. Every country begins life with advantages and disadvantages. We noted that many African countries have a rich endowment
of resources, which on average has served as an impediment to growth. But that need not be the case, as landlocked Botswana shows so forcefully. By the same token, the example of Switzerland shows that landlocked mountainous countries can perform well. Nor is it likely that Mongolia would have grown more rapidly if this landlocked country had had a corridor to the sea.

Countries cannot, moreover, change their geography. The relevant question is: Given their geography, what policies and institutions can best promote growth? Indeed, in the light of the improvement in African growth performance since the late 1990s, with a number of landlocked countries recording annual growth rates of some 5 percent or so, there is the question of the significance of the whole geography debate.

The passion generated by the debate is reflected in one African participant being moved to comment that “in the ‘80s we were told to get our prices right; then we were told to get our policies right; then to get our institutions right; and now we are being told to get our geography right but where on earth can we move Africa to?” There was cited the example of Ethiopia, where the new, rapidly growing exports of flowers and leather goods are based around Addis Ababa rather than cities much nearer the coast, so that “geography doesn’t even work within a country.” Resource-poor, landlocked Ethiopia was attempting to emulate East Asia with some success, and its policymakers did not consider geography to be an insuperable or even all that important a barrier (Prime Minister Meles Zenawi and his economic adviser, Ato Newai Gebre-Ab, participated in two meetings, though not in their official capacities).

The position of the “geography-growth skeptics” is more precisely interpreted as follows. Geography is, of course important: It affects the availability of natural resources, transport costs, irrigation potential, infrastructure costs, disease burden, and so on. But geography is multidimensional, and simply focusing on one or the other element, such as being landlocked, is too simplistic. Geography may well provide an important explanation of why some countries are poorer than others. It may have even played a role in past growth or technical change. Indeed, there may well be some validity to the Jared Diamond view that in the distant past, the East-West Axis and contiguous land mass of Eurasia facilitated trade and knowledge flows as compared with the North-South axis and physical barriers of Africa and the Americas.

But so what in terms of current policies and future growth potential? Are transport costs that important and measures to reduce them that difficult or expensive to implement? At worst, being landlocked means a somewhat higher requirement for investments for any given growth, as well as lower wages and land rents. It may well argue for aid donors to provide more assistance for investments to overcome such infrastructural barriers in landlocked countries, ceteris paribus. And once these “adjustments” are made, even if levels of income are lower, why should growth be lower? Indeed, if changes in technology that reduce transport costs will
differentially benefit geographically disadvantaged countries, that will allow them to have growth rates that are higher than average.

The danger of an excessive focus on geography is that (a) it distracts attention away from the policies and institutions needed to realize a country’s growth potential; and (b) it camouflages the past failings of policies and reform conditionals inspired by the Washington Consensus.

The view that geography has, at most, limited relevance for determining growth would seem to be supported by the following estimates based on the data in the book by Benno Ndulu and his co-authors.27

On the face of it, this particular cut at geography suggests that geography does not make much of a difference, or at least is not the determining factor. If anything, the most notable feature of these data is that the average growth rate of landlocked countries was significantly faster than that of coastal countries in Africa over 43 years! Amongst the subcategory of resource-poor countries, whilst the average growth rate for the landlocked ones is slightly lower than for the coastal ones, the median is higher. Of course, the hypothesis that geography is important maintains that holding everything else constant, countries with “adverse” geographies perform worse. Ndulu et al. use econometric techniques to conclude that geography plays a more important role than is suggested by this data.28

At any rate, no matter how, to what extent, and in what ways geography is important, it does not eliminate the need for development strategies or policies. Geography may pose special issues: What can such countries do to compensate for these disadvantages most effectively? There is ample scope for such societal choices to make a difference in the growth performance of African countries. The analysis and the policy options presented in this volume are just as applicable to landlocked countries as they are to others.

Africa in the global context

The second strand of explanations focuses on what has happened to Africa. At independence, it was left with little human or physical capital; the colonial experience arguably weakened its institutional and social capital. Some suggest that Botswana’s success is not an accident: during the colonial period, it was bereft
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of resources, so benefited from benign neglect, which put it in a better position to grow when colonialism ended. In these interpretations, after independence, political colonialism was replaced by economic colonialism, as Western powers took resources, paying a fraction of what they were worth. The international economic institutions are alleged to have helped manage this new economic exploitation. Whatever the merit of such views, they are usually accompanied by the another perspective. The development strategies foisted on Africa emphasized liberalization and privatization, as well as static comparative advantage with its corollary of reliance on natural resources whilst neglecting structural transformation. In this view, it is these policies that account for the de-industrialization of Africa, noted in the statistics in the previous section, and led to heavy dependence on commodity exports, which made the countries of Africa vulnerable to global commodity prices. When prices were weak, as they were in the 1980s, Africa performed poorly. When prices were strong, as they were in the middle of this decade, Africa performed well.

These development strategies also included an almost exclusive focus on primary education at the expense of higher education, which inhibited the region’s ability to close the knowledge gap—as important as the resource gap in explaining the low level of per capita income. Adjustment programs often excessively limited public investment in a region that was suffering greatly from inadequate infrastructure. If East Asia’s success was partly because of the role of the state in promoting development—the developmental state—structural adjustment policies weakened the state, and hence the ability of the state to perform these vital functions.

Governance

The third strand of explanations of Africa’s growth experience focuses on governance and what Africa did to itself through flawed policies and weak institutions. It was perhaps not surprising that the adherents of the policies and conditionalities that failed would try to shift the blame for Africa’s failure to grow to Africa itself. There is a general consensus today that the Washington Consensus policies have failed, not only in Africa, but around the world. As a package, they were neither necessary nor sufficient for growth; and too often, even when they brought a modicum of growth, it was not inclusive with the benefits going to relatively few. One of the objectives of this book is to explain why, in the African context, these policies failed. Rather than enhancing long-term sustainable growth, they may have had just the opposite effect.

When it became increasingly apparent that the policies were failing, the adherents of neoliberalism or the Washington Consensus increasingly focused on “governance,” or institutions. They had, of course, a hard time defining what was meant by good institutions. They have an even harder time defining how one
creates and maintains good institutions. As we explain in the fifth section, the papers in this volume argue that the standard discussion of “good governance” is as misdirected as that of “good policies.”

One contribution in this volume, in particular, offers a fundamentally different perspective from the dominant one that informs most of the chapters: the one by Augustin Fosu as outlined below. His paper and the first of the two contributions by Mushtaq Khan make for a particularly interesting contrast. We included Augustin Fosu’s contribution as one of the more thoughtful elaborations of the alternative to the dominant perspective in this volume. That, we believe, is the spirit in which scholarly debates should take place.

Analytic studies: Explaining variability and differences in growth performance

Whilst both on average and in most countries, performance the areas of growth, structural change, and poverty reduction in Africa has been disappointing in the lost quarter century, the reversal of the trend of falling per capita income in the past decade or so has raised the question of whether this recent acceleration is mainly another turn in the familiar African cycle of boom and bust, reflecting trends in commodity prices and the international economy, or as some have argued, representing a belated vindication of the Washington Consensus or at any rate, its reformed version. The latter view implies that the dominant policy agenda does not need to be altered in any particularly radical manner. If there is a failure, it is because there has been an inadequate commitment to adopting Washington Consensus policies.

This volume contains several studies that try to parse out the relative roles of the various factors affecting African growth. The answers have strong policy implications. Augustin Fosu’s contribution to this volume argues that growth is the result of policy reforms. His paper arose out of a major research project, “Explaining African Growth,” of the Africa Economic Research Consortium (AERC). The work places considerable emphasis not only on the role of geography but also on what the AERC project refers to as “syndromes” in the growth experience of African countries.

Noting the stop-go history of growth in Africa, one strand of the AERC growth project seeks to look at what explains the ending and beginning of growth episodes. The anti-growth syndrome is said to consist of some combination of (a) excessive regulation (e.g. the “bad old days” in Ghana and Tanzania); (b) inappropriate redistributive policies (e.g. once upon a time in Burundi); (c) suboptimal inter-temporal allocation of natural resource rents (e.g. Nigeria); and (d) state failure (e.g. Zaire, Liberia). Avoiding this syndrome is deemed to be a “near necessary”
condition for growth and “near sufficient” for preventing a growth collapse. And it was estimated to add two percentage points to per capita growth.

Whilst this analysis was of considerable interest, several commentators questioned its value in providing answers to how to get on the path of sustained, rapid growth. One comment was that what we need is a better understanding of how to get and stay on the path of rapid growth, whilst what the anti-growth syndrome showed was that “if you stop doing stupid things you could get an extra 2 percent growth.” The “explanatory” variables, the components of the anti-growth syndrome, were themselves endogenous. A second critique emphasized the need to parse more carefully the different elements of the anti-growth syndrome. Many of the fastest growers in East Asia could be said to have at least some elements of the anti-growth syndrome, such as “excessive-regulation” (unless “excessive regulation is defined tautologically as regulation that adversely affects growth”). Extensive regulation marked not only the original four East Asian “miracle” economies but also latecomers such as Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia. And perhaps this was the case even more so in the biggest and brightest growth star, China, and the other two great success stories of the past twenty-five years or so, India and Vietnam. The World Bank’s business environment surveys, which focus on many aspects of the syndrome, consistently rate these countries poorly; China and India were ranked 91st and 115th, respectively, out of 155 countries in 2006. Moreover, in light of the global financial crisis, or even the East Asian crisis a decade earlier, insufficient regulation can be as much of a problem as too much regulation, so the issue is not so much whether regulation is excessive or not, but rather what constitutes an appropriate regulatory framework.

The other aspect of the AERC project that received a great deal of attention was the distinction it made among different African countries based on geography and resources. This strand of the AERC project is also reflected in the Ndulu et al. book referred to above.33 It distinguished three groups of African countries: (a) resource-rich; (b) resource-poor landlocked; and (c) resource-scarce coastal. Each of them roughly accounts for about one third of Africa’s population. For the first group, the central issue is said to be how to manage public expenditures and deal with the resource curse. The second group was said to be pretty much a distinctive African phenomenon with no particularly promising prospects. Their growth is especially dependent on their neighbors: they need to get their neighbors to get their act together. The third group was deemed to be the one with the option of attempting to emulate East Asia or pursuing “non-natural-resource-export-led” growth. While such taxonomies may be useful, they must be used with care. Ethiopia is among the landlocked resource-poor countries, and yet its growth in recent years—averaging about 11 percent during FY2003–9—has been among the most impressive in the world.

Two of the chapters in the recent anthology on Africa, edited by John Page and Delphin Go, support the view that policy reforms were central, though obviously
high export prices helped: “The analysis confirms a trend break in the mid-1990s, identifying a growth acceleration that is due not only to favorable terms of trade and greater aid, but also to better policy…. As a result the likelihood of growth deceleration has declined significantly. Nonetheless, the sustainability of that growth is fragile, because economic fundamentals, such as savings, investment, productivity, and export diversification remain stagnant.”34

The Go and Page analysis is an important contribution to the debate on the relative roles of endogenous (policy) and exogenous (commodity prices) factors in the acceleration of growth in the region, prior to the global crisis that broke out in 2009. The study focuses on the period 1975–2005 in identifying a break in the growth trend after 1995. It ascribes key importance to the policies; but the picture is likely to get muddier if one goes back to 1960 or 1965: 1960–75 was a period of reasonably good growth followed by a growth collapse in 1975–95, and then a resumption of fair growth after 1995. Over this longer period the story appears more complicated: the policies in the earlier period were “bad” (according to the standard classification) and yet growth was good. There are also more technical issues. In the shorter period of 1975–2005, there is a “trend break” in commodity prices corresponding to that in GDP, and that clouds the analysis.

In many countries, there have, of course, been important “improvements” in policies, notably with respect to macroeconomic stability and exchange rates. The two relevant policy questions are: (1) is the improvement in growth rates a result of the elimination of distortions caused by previous policies—implying a one-time gain—or the result of a policy environment that is more conducive to sustained faster growth (to the kind of learning that we focus on in the sixth section below); and (2) can the policies be further “bettered” (whatever that might mean)?

Suffice it to say that at this juncture, there is little consensus on these matters. The standard methodology used by economists for ascertaining quantitatively the relative importance of different factors has, itself, come under attack. Such studies look at the differences in performance (for instance, as measured by growth rates) in different countries and different periods and relate it to different “explanatory” factors. Critics focus on deficiencies in measurement both of the performance variables (GDP)35 and the explanatory variables, the problem of causation (does trade cause growth or growth, trade?), the problem of simultaneity (the oil price shock of the 1970s lowered the real income of oil-importing countries and resulted in inflation), and the problem of “omitted variables” (some third factor explains why some countries responded to the oil price shock by allowing more inflation; it was not the inflation itself, but this omitted third factor which is to blame for the poor performance). Advocates of the methodology say that, notwithstanding these concerns, it is the best or “least-worst” way of sorting out the relative roles played by different factors.
The state and the market in theory and practice

Development policy has been the subject of intense debate over the past quarter century. As we have seen, policies advocated by one group are seen by its critics as actually hindering growth. There are many issues in this debate (e.g. what are good macroeconomic policies?). But one overriding issue is the role of the state. What has been variously termed as “market fundamentalism,” “neoliberalism,” or the Washington Consensus saw the government more often than not as an impediment to growth. Its advocates worked to limit its role, and to strengthen markets. In its almost exclusive focus on government failure, it neglected market failures.

Indeed, as we noted in the preface, the standard “neoclassical growth theory” that underlay these policy prescriptions argued that markets by themselves would lead incomes of poorer economies to converge toward that of the richer ones. The scarcity of capital in the poor countries will attract investment, to the point where differences in returns—and per capita output—are eliminated.

Both theory and evidence have not been kind to the neoliberal version of the Washington Consensus. The underlying model was based on assumptions of perfect information, perfect competition, and a full set of markets (perfect capital and risk markets). None of these assumptions are good even for a developed country; they are particularly ill suited for most developing countries. More to the point, research during the past three decades showed that the results of the analyses—including the policy implications—were not robust. Even a small amount of imperfect information had very large consequences for the functioning of markets. Markets are not even in general constrained Pareto-efficient. In practice, convergence remains the exception rather than the rule.36

Governments, of course, need to play some role in all markets—creating the rules of the game that allow markets to function, including a legal system that enforces property rights (appropriately defined), and contracts (appropriately circumscribed) that ensure competition and that regulate financial markets. East Asia’s experience is similar to that of the countries that are now developed: The state has played a much more activist role than allowed by the neoliberal perspective.37

Advocates of the minimalist role for the state might agree on the theoretical importance of the government in dealing with externalities and providing public goods, but even these roles are often downplayed. (Coase, for instance, argued that these could be dealt with through bargaining arrangements.38) And the critics of government worry at least as much about government failure as about market failure; government interventions should, in their view, be exercised with great circumspection, and in general, the less the government does to hinder the “invisible hand” of the market the better.
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We agree that, yes, governments can fail too, but a “minimalist” role for government does not follow. The right question to ask is what sort of intervention is appropriate in what context—for governments of particular capabilities and for markets characterized by particular failures—and what should be the priorities of governance reforms to enhance the ability of government to perform various roles.

In the neoclassical models underlying the policy analysis or conditionality that became so influential in Africa during the lost quarter century, there is no room for technology acquisition or learning since technology and knowledge are assumed to be exogenous and freely available to all economies; hence the structure of the economy is irrelevant: whether an economy produces computer chips or potato chips does not matter. But if an essential part of development is closing the “knowledge gap” that separates developed and less developed countries, then what countries produce or export matters a great deal. Different activities have differing learning and technology intensities and linkages with the rest of the economy. Learning and acquiring technology is central to “catching up.” The externalities associated with learning and the public-good dimension of knowledge mean that the market will be inefficient: there will be too little investment in “learning,” and especially learning with significant spillovers. The potential returns to state interventions to correct this inherent deficiency of markets can be and often have been extremely high.

Thus, while the post-1980 policies focused on ensuring that a country’s resources were efficiently allocated—given a particular level of knowledge (and even here, the conclusions were also flawed because of the failure to take into account market imperfections), the impacts of economic structure on societal learning may be far more important, especially in the long run. Solow argued, for instance, that some seven eighths of all the increase in per capita output was the result of improvements in efficiency. There may be trade-offs between dynamic growth and static inefficiency. The Washington Consensus models were framed in such a way that the issue was never considered.

Given the pervasiveness and seriousness of market failures both in theory and in practice, the continued influence of the overly market-friendly orthodoxy in one of its many variants (emphasized, in particular, by the contributions of Wade, Mushtaq Khan, Meles Zenawi, and Jomo and von Arnim in this volume) is typically justified by the judgment that the risks and costs of government interventions to correct market failures, whether through restrictions (regulations) or through market-fortifying interventions (such as assistance in finance or technology) are greater than those of market failure.

The fact that the most successful countries have in fact used government intervention to increase growth implies that the conclusion that government failures inevitably trump market failures is simply wrong. Parsing out the extent to which advocates of market fundamentalism have had their judgments influenced by ideology and interests need not concern us. But we should note that it is not just
policies of interventionism but also of “non-interventionism”—market liberalization, deregulation, and privatization—that are susceptible to the political economy of “capture.”40 In the end, governance rules.

At any rate, when government intervention makes matters worse than they otherwise would be and what constitutes an appropriate balance between the roles of the market and the state is contextual: it depends above all on the type and varieties of market failures to be addressed, the particular policy of intervention, and the institutional framework, especially pertaining to governance. In countries at early stages of development, both market and government failures tend to be more common and more serious than in more developed countries.41 This suggests that there are both higher risks and rewards to correcting the errors of markets in such economies. Foregoing the rewards is hardly likely to be the answer to rapid development; rather, how to minimize the risks and maximize the rewards should be a central issue for policy design.

That this is an important lesson of history is one theme running through many of the essays in this volume. Another is that despite the recognition of its limitations and failures and attempts to curb some of its excesses, the Washington Consensus retains enormous influence. A radical overhaul of the policy options on the table and the perspective that informs them is necessary if African countries are to have the option of achieving sustained rapid economic growth and associated structural transformation. Beginning such an overhaul was indeed one of the objectives of the IPD Africa Task Force.

As noted above, Africa’s economic crisis did originally reflect, in large measure, mistaken policies that often went to the extreme of neglecting such fundamentals as a modicum of macroeconomic stability, avoidance of highly overvalued exchange rates, inappropriate and counterproductive interventions in markets, bloated public sectors, and disregard of government failure. In the end, “African socialism,” in most of its variants, was also disappointing. It did not bring the hoped-for benefits. As pointed out previously, to the extent that the African variant of the Washington Consensus served to correct these deficiencies and tilt the balance toward the market, it served a useful role, but it went too far in the other direction. Worse still, it undermined important capacities of the state, weakening its ability to perform the roles that it must in early stages of development.42

Whatever the content or merit of specific policy measures, the sequencing, packaging, and speed with which they are introduced are crucial for their success or otherwise. The reform packages that were imposed as conditionalities were also wanting on that critical dimension. In particular, they were prone to undertaking too many policy measures too quickly, overwhelming the capacity of the governments that were to implement them and of economic agents to absorb the signals and adding to uncertainty and to risk of investment. The 2008 global financial crisis underlined the importance of sequencing and packaging. Excessively rapid
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liberalization of finance without attention to regulatory reforms contributed in no small measure to the crisis.

Overly ambitious and poorly sequenced policy packages became all too common in Africa. Thus liberalizing interest rates in the absence or thinness of financial markets that could provide useful benchmarks often led to very high interest rates—often exceeding 15 percent in real terms—and they combined with the absence of term credit to dampen investment and overwhelm the effects of reforms aimed at improving the business climate. Similarly, the liberalization of agricultural prices typically was not accompanied by measures to increase the supply elasticity, measures such as provision of credit, improved seeds, fertilizer, and rural roads.

The dissatisfaction with the results of market fundamentalism and the ensuing debates are not, of course, confined to Africa. A new strand of literature was born out of the disappointing growth in many countries, especially in Africa and Latin America. We previously noted the earlier World Bank study on The East Asian Miracle (which itself was a slightly toned-down version of the background work by outside experts)\(^43\) and the Growth/Spence Commission report. Another important contribution to this literature is the World Bank study, Economic Growth in the 1990s: Learning from a Decade of Reforms.\(^44\)

However, the extent to which these studies are having an impact on the dominant policy discourse and practice, especially in IFIs, remains an open question. There is a risk that it might meet the same fate as the World Bank’s study on the East Asian miracle,\(^45\) whose implications for Africa were ignored in the policy prescriptions and conditionalities following its publication (see Chapter 8 by Robert Wade).

Other recent publications that have contributed to advancing the debate on policy options for sustained growth and structural transformation in Africa include the report of the Commission for Africa initiated by the UK government (also known as the Blair Commission;\(^46\) three of its members participated in meetings of the Task Force) and a study by JICA on Asian lessons for Africa\(^47\) (several of whose authors also participated in the Africa Task Force).

The Commission for Africa included a heavy representation of African policymakers and sought to mobilize increased aid, less conditionality, and an eclectic policy agenda in support of a more ambitious growth effort for Africa. The JICA report was prepared in the context of the Fourth Tokyo International Conference on Development (TICAD IV) in 2008, where there was also renewed interest in accelerating growth in Africa and the lessons for Africa from Asian experiences.

Our focus in this book is more narrow and selective, focusing on some key overarching issues for Africa’s growth agenda, especially (1) the appropriate role of “industrial policy” (or more accurately, learning, industrial, and technology policies); and (2) governance.
Noman and Stiglitz

The state and the market: Policy options for Africa

Learning, industrial, and technology (LIT) policies

In the fifty-odd years since Solow showed that the bulk of growth in advanced economies was accounted for by productivity increases, very little work has been done on learning, especially on how societies learn while in the process of developing and how that can be accelerated.48 This neglect is in marked contrast to the attention given to allocation of resources; and the neglect is particularly significant in policy analyses.

The nexus of issues around learning, technology transfer, the infant industry and infant economy arguments, externalities associated with “discovery” of what can be produced competitively in a particular context49 were all part of the rationale for state intervention designed to promote growth (as opposed to, for instance, state interventions to prevent adverse consequences of unfettered financial markets). Perhaps the neglect of learning reflects the fact that state-sponsored efforts to do so have been often related to or manifested in industrial policies, a term that has acquired a bad name, partly because industrial policies have become associated or equated with the “loser” policy of picking winners and of private rents without social rewards.

There are many dimensions to what is called “industrial policy” and it has taken markedly different forms in different countries. We mean that learning, industrial, and technology (LIT) policies are not those focused on picking winners or providing indiscriminate, unconditional, or everlasting rents. LIT policies are about dealing with issues of learning, and of infant industries and economies; they focus on externalities and knowledge spillovers; they typically (especially in Asia) consist of promoting exports and the private sector. They apply not only to manufacturing, but also to other sectors, such as agriculture, and to modern services, such as information technology or finance. In most cases, such policies are the result of government action; occasionally, non-governmental actors, and in particular foundations and universities, have played a key role.

Arguably, virtually every country that had achieved substantial development used some variant of LIT policies, not only Japan and some other East Asian countries.50 In the US such state interventions led to the development of the telegraph, the Internet, and such successful companies as Federal Express (which started with financing from a government-sponsored program of loans for small businesses).

Indeed, the green revolution in South Asia could also be said to be a prime example of LIT policy. (This highlights the broader meaning of industrial policies. While we prefer the terminology LIT policies, many of the authors use the older term.)
In Africa, there were also examples of accomplishments with LIT policies. Ethiopia has enjoyed significant success in promoting exports of leather goods, flowers, and sesame via instruments of industrial policy. The success in promoting leather is particularly noteworthy because it involved using policies that are highly controversial. The government banned exports of raw hides and skins and took additional measures to encourage a supply response through a package of support, including access to term credit at reasonable interest rates, infrastructure, and the establishment of a leather institute to promote acquisition of technological capability and skills. The government is now seeking to reinforce early successes by promoting further value addition by moving up the chain from processed leather to footwear exports. Similar comprehensive packages of support had spurred rapid growth in the non-traditional exports of flowers. As a result of industrial policies, the share of “high-technology exports” in manufactured exports, though still tiny, had gone up from zero to 3 percent between 2000 and 2007. Kenya too has had successful LIT policies, both in horticulture and tea, and Mauritius in promoting manufactured exports.

Other African examples of LIT policies are discussed in other chapters in this volume. The South African government’s efforts at LIT policies are the subject of Nimrod Zalk’s paper. Sen and Te Velde discuss state-business relations, an important aspect of East Asia’s successful industrial policies, in several African countries. (There is a simple rationale for this coordination: With market imperfections, prices do an imperfect job at “market coordination.” Other contributions in this volume that emphasize consultative mechanisms for exchange of information and coordination between the state and the private sector include the contributions of Oyeyinke and Sampath, Bailey, Lenihan and Singh, Ohno and Ohno, and Hanatani and Watanabe.)

What lessons can be learned from these experiences in Africa and East Asia? Under what circumstances or for what types of states, should what sort of LIT policies be put on the menu of policy options? What sort of “health warning” should they carry? How can one reduce the risks of picking losers? Is it better to focus on broad-based policies—promoting all exports through exchange rate policies—rather than particular sectors, let alone particular firms? Several aspects of Africa’s distinctive situation, noted earlier, give particular salience to these issues. Is it possible, for instance, for Africa to reverse de-industrialization and increase employment opportunities in the industrial or formal sectors without some form of LIT policy? Indeed, can Africa narrow its agricultural productivity gap with other regions without an LIT policy for agriculture? These are the sorts of questions on which several of the papers in this collection aim to shed light.

Broadly speaking, the conclusion of these studies is that Africa can benefit from appropriately designed LIT policies. These contributions, whilst calling for care and caution, illuminate ways in which the high rewards of LIT policies can be reaped and the risks reduced in countries that have the requisite governance capabilities.
or the ability to acquire them. More targeted policies may yield better benefits, but risk greater abuse. (The critical issue of governance is discussed in the next section.) Even if the degree of success achieved in the best-performing, full-fledged East Asian developmental states such as Korea or Taiwan may be difficult to replicate, the policies may enhance African growth. For a whole range of countries have managed to benefit from such policies; there have been notable successes in quasi-development or developmentalist states, such as those in South and Southeast Asia, including the post-1980 “miracles” of China, India, and Vietnam. The question is, how can some African countries join this list of successes?

**Market failures as a rationale for LIT policies**

Among the keys to success are understanding the rationale for industrial policies, on the one hand, and the downside risks of industrial policy on the other. There are several “market failures,” which explain why there is a role for government. It is widely recognized that when markets are incomplete, information is imperfect, and when there are externalities, markets may not work well. All of these factors are relevant for an economy in the process of “learning.” First, as we have already noted, knowledge itself is a public good; restricting the use of knowledge introduces an inefficiency. The potential conflict between dynamic and static efficiency is illustrated by patents. Patents restrict the use of knowledge; even worse, they can give rise to monopoly power. We accept (even “encourage”) these static inefficiencies because it is believed that they can give rise to “dynamic gains” by inducing firms to invest more in research. There are, of course controversies around patent policies centered on the best way of striking the trade-off. Neoliberal policies focused on the inefficiencies associated with, say, tariffs, without ever asking the question of whether there might be dynamic gains.

Even with patents, there is incomplete appropriability of the “learning” that occurs when a firm develops or introduces a new product in a country. There is thus an externality—an important externality that is at the center of development—and whenever there are such externalities, markets will not be efficient. But much of the learning that is associated with development is not patentable. A worker who is trained in the techniques of modern manufacturing can use this learning in another firm. A farm that discovers that the soil of the country is well suited for a particular crop for which there is a good market can easily be imitated. Indeed, matters can be even worse: if his “experiment” is successful, he will be imitated, to the point that profits may be driven down to zero; thus, he may face a no-win situation—if he is successful, entry will drive down profits; if he fails, he bears the loss. (See Hausmann and Rodrik 2003, and Hoff 1997 for the development of these ideas.56)

The same is true for a bank that is trying to identify who is a good entrepreneur. If someone proves himself to be good, he will be poached away by rival lenders—or
the threat of doing so will drive down the interest rates charged. But the bank may be limited (by risks of moral hazard—high interest rates can induce excessive risk-taking\textsuperscript{57}) in the interest rates it can charge, so that it can’t capture from good entrepreneurs enough returns to offset the losses from bad loans.\textsuperscript{58}

In each of these cases, private returns are not commensurate with social returns.

The “infant capitalist” argument is of special significance for Africa, where the organized/formal private sector is not only sparse but also heavily dominated by ethnic minorities of relatively recent vintage and by foreign investors. On this view, there is much to be said for the creation or strengthening of a class of indigenous African entrepreneurs.\textsuperscript{59} In this context, Malaysia’s experience may well be of relevance.

LIT policy can be a powerful instrument for socializing the risks of private investment. Such risk amelioration—important because of the imperfections of markets for key risks, even in advanced industrial countries—played an important part in Asia and is particularly salient in early stages of development, when a nascent class of proto-capitalists must be nurtured or created. This risk socialization function may be even more important in Africa; which is said to have an inherent particularly high-risk environment because of its vulnerability to exogenous shocks of weather and commodity prices. Is there a case for paying systematic attention to socializing risks? If so, what are the implications? Does that bolster the case for stylized East-Asian-type interventions of the trade, industry, and finance variety? Again, the answer provided in this collection of essays is broadly “yes,” but not in all cases; they have to be carefully tailored to specific country contexts and the existence or creation of relevant governance capabilities.

The critique of industrial policies

The neoliberal or Washington Consensus reforms have been particularly hostile to the sort of activist trade and other interventions that are the stuff of LIT policies and that were so widely used in East and South Asia. Whilst there is much to be said for doing away with irrational, highly distorted structures of protection that serve little purpose other then engendering rents to some privileged elites, LIT policies can be very effective in promoting technological change and encouraging shifts in production structures in agriculture, among other ways.

To be sure, while LIT policies have been at the center of sustained growth and successful development, there have been many failures, as well as varieties of LIT policies. But failure is by no means unique or even distinctive to such policies. Bad design and poor implementation can trump policy in any area. There have also been, for example, many failed programs of stabilization, agricultural research and extension, and financial reforms. That does not mean we give up on macroeconomic stability or improvements in agricultural productivity and in finance. The
point is to learn lessons of both successes and failures in elaborating policy options
and to examine how the risk–reward ratio can be improved.

Critiques of LIT policies focus on three issues: (1) learning doesn’t require
government intervention; (2) government intervention to promote learning dis-
torts resources by creating rents; and (3) special interests capture industrial poli-
cies, so that in the end, they serve those interests rather than the general interests,
and so that the distortions outweigh the benefits.

LIT POLICIES ARE UNNECESSARY
There has long been a discussion of government interventions to promote indus-
tries based on the “infant industry” argument. A criticism of that argument is
that a firm, knowing that it will be more productive in the future as a result of
“learning” today, could borrow—financing today’s losses with tomorrow’s profits.
But this argument fails if there are capital market imperfections—as there are,
inevitably, given information imperfections. But matters are even worse because
of coordination failures and other externalities. Some of the learning of one firm
spills over to others. Greenwald and Stiglitz argue that all economic policy should
be shaped by how policies affect the ability of economies to learn. For instance, if
some sector (say the industrial export sector) has greater capacity to learn technol-
ogy from abroad, and some of the benefits of that learning spill over to the rest of
the economy, then the government may wish to “distort” the economy toward
the industrial sector. They refer to this as the infant economy argument for
protection. By encouraging industrialization, growth can be enhanced as many
examples, not just in East Asia, demonstrate. The static inefficiencies were more
than offset by the dynamic gains (just as they are with well-designed patents).

This discussion highlights the point that the interactions of market failures
provide much of the impetus for these policies.

CREATING RENTS
A recurring theme of the critics of interventionist trade policies aimed at promot-
ing development is that they created rents. Some of the trade distortions failed to
promote dynamic industries. Trade reforms in Africa often took away such distor-
tions, but replaced them with nothing. The result was not an elimination of rents
but their diversion to other less useful or “growth-unfriendly” forms such as kick-
backs on government contracts.

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF LIT
The fact that LIT policies are associated with the creation of rents leads to the
danger of “capture” by special interests who will seek out these rents for them-
selves, cloaking their argument in the language of industrial policy. Such a danger
exists, of course, not just in developing countries but also countries such as the US
where the subsidy to biofuels could be seen as an example of “capture.” The trick is
to combine carrots with sticks and to cut one's losses early rather than allowing permanent subsidies to inefficiencies. Being clear about the purposes and pitfalls of LIT policies is crucial, as is having the requisite governance capabilities.

Opponents of industrial policies argue, moreover, that while there is the downside of capture, there is no upside: governments are unlikely to do a better job than the private sector in picking winners. But this way of putting the argument misses the point—the reason for government involvement is because of the externalities and other market failures. The case for government intervention is to support investment projects with large spillovers, which the private sector would not take into account in their investment decisions. (Wade makes a distinction between the state acting as a “leader” and trying to pick winners and as a “follower” that seeks to encourage nascent activities that have shown promise.) But clearly LIT policies have to be cognizant of the danger of lapsing into picking losers: the price of good economic management is eternal vigilance.

The risks of the absence of LIT policies

The consequences of abjuring any form or degree of LIT policy proved disappointing. They were reflected in the de-industrialization of Africa, manifested in the falling share of manufacturing in GDP that has been widespread over the past three decades or so. (Of course not all industry is desirable and the returns on investment in the sector may be negligible or even negative if value-added at world prices is minimal or negative.) Concomitantly, formal-sector employment has fallen as a share of total employment, often quite sharply in the face of rapid population and labor force growth (see the contribution of Aziz Khan). Moreover, rents are not exclusive to industrial policy or interventionism. Neoliberal reforms—and especially privatizations and concessions—also give rise to rents. The issue was not whether or not there were rents but how those rents are used or what activities they encourage; and what institutional arrangements minimized agency costs. Markets are not “technology-friendly” (for one thing technology is a public good) and rents are essential for the acquisition or development of technology.

A more nuanced policy would have asked: How does one prevent the associated rents from becoming a permanent subsidy to inefficient, uncompetitive enterprises that become addicted to the rents rather than growing up?

Some success cases

These questions inform the discussion of “industrial policy” that is the center of attention of several of this volume’s papers; Ohno and Ohno, as well as Hanatani and Watanabe aim to draw lessons from East Asia for Africa. They both emphasize the diversity of circumstances and LIT policies in East Asia and stress that there is no one-size-fits-all LIT policy.
A large part of the East Asian lesson is the method of policy formulation rather than specific measures. This style of policymaking is characterized by pragmatism and flexibility. As Ohno and Ohno note in such an approach, “the problem of weak policy capacity is overcome through focused hands-on endeavor to achieve concrete results, which we call dynamic capacity development, rather than trying to improve governance scores, generally vis-à-vis the global standard” (italics in original). This “dynamic capacity development” is akin to the “growth-enhancing governance” that we emphasize in the next section.

Bailey, Lenihan, and Singh underline the variety of LIT policies by extending the analysis of LIT policy to Ireland and arguing that that too has useful lessons for Africa. They remark that “Commonly adopted definitions of industrial policy are too narrow where the prime focus . . . has been on subsidizing firms and [on] interventions with respect to particular sectors. . . . good-practice industrial policy is in fact much more ‘holistic’ in its approach and focuses simultaneously on both demand and supply side factors . . . on microeconomics as well as macroeconomics” (italics in original).

The contribution of Sen and te Velde focuses on experience in several African countries with a vital element of LIT policy, state-business relations (SBR), and shows not only the possibilities but also successes that have resulted from such policy. More precisely, they find that there are a number of cases of varying degrees of success with establishing the sort of SBR that were so central to LIT policy success in East Asia and that these had a favorable impact on private investment and growth.

Nimrod Zalk’s case study of LIT policy in South Africa makes a case for such policy, paying attention to both the pitfalls and potential of LIT policy. The essays by Wade and by Oyeyinke and Sampath also serve to highlight the possibilities and potential for success of LIT policies in low-income or “latecomer” countries in general, which is of special relevance for Africa. Oyeyinke and Sampath emphasize ways to strengthen institutional capacity for LIT policy, whilst Wade examines the ways that LIT policy can help with “catching up” in today’s globalized world by making a case for open-economy LIT policy. Stein examines the African experience with one important tool of industrial policies, export-processing zones, that have had such success in some countries but have had only limited success in Africa. He attributes that to the fact that such economic zones in Africa have not been part of a broader LIT policy as they have in countries where the zones have been particularly successful.

Governance

A central question repeatedly raised with respect to the applicability of LIT policies that were so successful in East Asia to Africa is “governance.” The lack or inadequacy of governance capabilities is held to be a major, if not the central, cause of
the poor economic performance of Africa. By the same token, the problem of governance is said to preclude Africa from successfully emulating many of the interventions that proved so effective in other contexts, notably of the East Asian variety. Credible sunset clauses on rents are, it is argued, rare and difficult—beyond the governance capacity of most African countries.

This is one of the pivotal issues addressed in this volume; indeed it could be said to be at the heart of the constraints to and possibilities of economic growth and transformation in Africa. (Most of the papers in this volume touch, in one way or another, on governance. It is the focus of the contributions of Mushtaq Khan, Thandika Mkandawire, and Meles Zenawi. The nexus of governance and the state also feature significantly in the contributions of Fosu, Hanatani and Watanabe, Ohno and Ohno, Oyeyinka and Sampath, and Sen and te Velde.)

While the “governance” discussion is important—it is clearly one of the critical issues facing the countries of the subcontinent (and, in one form or another, virtually all countries around the world)—we argue that the “good governance” agenda as it has come to be defined and pursued in Africa has itself become a part of the problem. We propose a radically different approach—what Mushtaq Khan’s paper refers to as “growth-enhancing” governance and which is closely allied with the call for a focus on “transformative” rather than “restraining” institutions in Thandika Mkandawire’s contribution. We consider this to be necessary for Africa to achieve sustained, rapid, poverty-reducing growth.

Of course, corruption and lack of competence of state institutions can result in poor economic performance. However, the standard good governance package that has emerged confuses ends with means and, in as much as it is about means to development, it can be misleading and diversionary. There is no gainsaying that appropriately designed anti-corruption efforts, democracy, the rule of law, clear and credible property rights, and related elements of good governance are desirable in themselves. But such words often hide as much as they enlighten. As legal scholars have pointed out, there is more to the issue of property rights than the simplistic formula “defining clear and credible property rights” might suggest. Often these “prescriptions” have been used to promote a particular view of which institutions are the most important for development and how they should be designed, a view that is embedded in neoliberalism and its excessive faith in markets.

The first of the two contributions by Mushtaq Khan traces the roots of the good governance agenda and relates it to the wider literature on institutions and development. He finds a conflict between the conventional good governance agenda, which he calls “market-enhancing governance,” and what should be the agenda from a developmental perspective: what he refers to as “growth-enhancing governance.” He attributes the former as emanating from a particular methodology and view of history. This view is in fact profoundly ahistorical and conforms to the neoliberal take on the relative roles of the market and the state, e.g. by focusing on
institutions that are deemed to be hindrances to markets performing in the way they are presumed to in neoliberalism (e.g. property rights) to the neglect of other forms of government interventions to improve on or substitute for markets (e.g. by solving coordination problems). The standard argument for the importance of good governance is based on a statistical relationship between a measure of governance and a measure of performance. Mushtaq Khan points out that if you take developed countries out of the econometric study of the relationship between growth and governance, as measured by the standard indicators, there is no meaningful statistical relationship between governance and growth. More particularly, countries can be divided into high-growth economies and low-growth economies; and within each category, there is no relationship between growth and governance.

The conventional governance agenda starts with the question, why do markets fail? The answer it gives is, because of weak property rights, bad interventions, and high transaction costs. Given the seeming obviousness of the desirability of, say, having good property rights, the question arises: Why have so many countries failed to do what would seem to be in their interests? The answer given is because of corruption and rent-seeking. And to solve this problem, it is suggested that you need sweeping reforms and democracy to ensure accountable governments.

These are all highly desirable ends in themselves and may well facilitate and in turn be an outcome of development, but they are neither necessary nor sufficient for development (and they beg the question of priorities). For developing countries, this may be welcome news, because this good governance agenda may not be feasible, especially in countries at an early stage of development. No country has ever implemented the current good governance agenda before embarking on development—not the now-developed countries nor the rapidly “catching-up” countries of Asia, a point emphasized by several of the contributions to this volume.

So what should developing countries be doing? The answer is that successful development requires governance reforms focused not on this particular good governance agenda, but on “growth-enhancing” governance. It will certainly entail ex post flexibility and dealing with constraints as they arise. This more pragmatic approach would focus on a small number of measures at each stage directed at the governance capabilities required for dealing with the critical market failures holding back growth in a specific context.

In some instances in the past, growth-enhancing governance even entailed the protection and creation of property rights for the productive groups in society, at the expense of undermining the rights of unproductive groups. This happened commonly in settler colonies, where not just the property rights but often the lives of “pre-capitalist” indigenous groups were eliminated. In today’s world, such policies may neither be sustainable nor even feasible, without a level of oppression that would itself impair development.
Thandika Makandawire's essay argues that in the African discourse, the importance of institutions had long been recognized but the particular form that "institutional reform" took was counterproductive. It was only after the "good policy" agenda of "getting prices right" had failed that the multilateral institutions and donors turned to the "institutional" agenda. This disappointment was attributed to the failure of "governance." The "new paradigm" defined institutions and approached institutional reforms in an excessively narrow way. There emerged a "one-size-fits-all" approach to institutions or what Makandawire calls "institutional monocropping." This "monocropping" itself became part of the problem: the institutions focused upon were not the appropriate ones; they had not been integral to the development of the rich countries and were not so for Africa. The emphasis had been almost exclusively on "restraining" institutions to the neglect of the "transformative" institutions that development requires.

At the same time, there were increasing expectations of governments and a mismatch between institutions and tasks: governments deemed to be unable to intervene properly in markets are deemed to be capable of effectively implementing a highly demanding set of institutional reforms. Moreover, impractical and inappropriate institutional "imports" neglect to make use of and build on institutions that exist in a society—contrary to one of the lessons of East Asia for Africa.

Thandika Makandawire and Mushtaq Khan’s essays complement each other. They both worry that, the pursuit of overly ambitious and complex governance agendas risks making the pursuit of the best an enemy of the good. Khan and Mkandawire draw attention to and shed light on such questions as: What policies mitigate the developmental impact of corruption? Are there systematic ways of changing the way rents are accrued and shared in a manner that promotes or at least does not hinder growth? Are there ways of designing, for instance, systems of checks and balances, of monitoring, which reduce the scope for corruption? What governance capabilities need to be prioritized, when, and to what end?

The developmental state

The experiences in East Asia and elsewhere show that states can intervene with reasonable efficacy and can, for instance, influence the use of rents in the right direction. As we noted earlier, countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand did not have a developmental state with as much scope as that of Korea or Taiwan, but still succeeded in accomplishing rapid development. They intervened with a wide range of instruments. More complex was the "developmentalism" of South Asia: India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh at various points had achieved substantial success with developmentalist interventions, notably including the spread of the "green revolution."

The full-fledged developmental states of Korea and Taiwan did not emerge out of nowhere in a complete form. As several of the essays in this volume emphasize, the
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construction of the developmental state is a deliberate, messy, and complex affair. For example, Korea in the 1950s could be termed a highly incompetent, dysfunctional, and corrupt polity. Also, China could be thought of as having made a transition from an ideological, revolutionary state to a developmental one. And so could Vietnam. Being developmental or not is not a binary choice but there is a continuum, and states can aim to move up the chain rather than face the stark and impossible choice of being either developmental and able to intervene or non-developmental and confined to the minimalist roles assigned to them by neoliberalism.

The African development state

Mkandawire’s and Khan’s essays partly echo and also serve to lay the groundwork for Meles Zenawi’s contribution and his call for the pursuit of a developmental state paradigm in Africa. That is in contrast to the neoliberal paradigm with its limited or “nightwatchman” state. If Africa is to catch up, it will need to go beyond this limited vision of the state. Whilst it is too early to declare success for Ethiopia’s developmentalist strategy, there are positive signs as illustrated by the encouraging results of export growth and diversification aided by industrial policies; and by the fact that GDP growth exceeded 7 percent per annum during 2000–7, accelerating to 11.5 percent in 2006–8.

Ethiopia is not alone. African leaders and scholars have emphasized both the feasibility and desirability of a developmentalist state in Africa. In an earlier piece published elsewhere, Mkandawire comments, “most arguments raised on the impossibility of developmental states in Africa are not firmly founded either in African historical experience or in the trajectories of the more successful ‘developmental states’ elsewhere. Africa has had examples of countries whose ideological inclination was clearly ‘developmentalist’ and that pursued policies that produced fairly high rates of growth and significant social gains and accumulation of human capital in the post-colonial era.”65 Botswana’s success is perhaps the most notable. A developmentalist state cannot, of course, be imposed from outside; it has to emerge from within the political economy of a country. Even in Ethiopia, the project of building one has had to contend with divisions amongst the political party in power.

The right questions to focus on are what sort of state is able to intervene and in what manner? What are the critical requirements of governance and how does one go about acquiring them? What are the requirements and prospects of moving toward a developmental state? How can the risks of government failure be mitigated—failures that might make matters worse than market failures? How can countries ensure that they do not repeat the errors of failed etatism of the past?

 Whilst mistakes are unavoidable, it is important to emphasize the East Asian lesson of abandoning failures quickly; of constantly reviewing and modifying
policies, as emphasized by several contributions to this volume, including those of Ohno and Ohno, of Hanatani and Watanabe, and of Bailey, Lenihan, and Singh who remark that the “key is to adapt and tailor policies holistically to [the] stage of development.” At the very least, the options for an African government wishing and able to take the route to the developmental state paradigm and undertake the necessary governance reforms should be elaborated and put on the table, albeit with a warning about potential dangers.

The promise and possibilities in Africa are indicated by Sen and te Velde who conclude—in line with the case for a state that is “growth-enhancing” and “transformative”—that “our research shows that the creation and sustenance of effective state-business relations... may have a stronger impact on economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa than the conventional measures of governance reform such as improvements in the rule of law and stronger anti-corruption measures that have been stressed in the literature and the policy debate.

**Pro-poor growth and human capital**

A developmental state is concerned not just with promoting growth for its own sake, but because it can enhance the well-being of its citizens, especially the poorest. For Africa, increases in agricultural productivity have to be a central element of poverty reduction. Employment is another key issue, particularly in urban areas. In this volume, the paper by Azizur Rahman Khan notes that employment generation is perhaps the most important characteristic of pro-poor growth. Analysis of labor markets in Africa is hindered by paucity and indifferent quality of data. Nonetheless certain broad trends are fairly clear. Self-employment in family and subsistence activities hides unemployment, and low productivity in these activities means that the incidence of the working poor is very high in the region. In Africa, 55 percent of employed people earn less than PPP$1 a day, compared with 34 percent in the region with the next highest proportion, South Asia, and a range of 3–12 percent in other developing regions.

Whilst making employment in agriculture more productive and lucrative has to be an essential element of poverty-alleviating growth, it is unlikely that agriculture can provide reasonably high-productivity employment to perhaps even all the labor force already in the sector, let alone the additions to the labor force in the pipeline in the foreseeable future. This implies that reasonable progress in reducing poverty will require Africa to replicate what A. R. Khan labels as one of the most important lessons of East Asian development, viz. “rapid structural change leading to a transfer of labor from agriculture to industries and modern services by means of very high rates of growth of these sectors brought about by support for these sectors on a very broad front.” Sustained, rapid growth and structural change then is particularly important for poverty reduction in Africa. We have focused on some
fundamental policy requirements for such outcomes in Africa. A. R. Khan notes several others, including the importance of public investment in providing infrastructure and human capital.

Critics of “pro-poor” growth worry that the focus on poverty will reduce the overall growth rate, and thus long-term prospects for poverty reduction. This raises the question of whether countries with particularly poor growth and essentially stagnant or falling per capita incomes, should focus first only on growth? Is that a challenging enough task without overburdening the agenda, one that also influences the pattern of growth to ensure that it is pro-poor?

The experience of East Asia suggests that simultaneously focusing on distribution may actually contribute to sustained growth. Indeed, one can ask whether some African countries can afford to neglect the issue of making growth pro-poor? “Shared growth” facilitates, and may even be essential, for political sustainability of reforms.

Indeed, in low-income African countries, rapid growth in the initial stages, unless based on natural resources, is necessarily pro-poor: It is not possible to have strong overall growth without healthy growth of agriculture and small-and-medium enterprises (SMEs), precisely where the jobs for the poor are. The distributional impact of growth in low-income Africa should be of central concern where it is fuelled by natural resources. In such countries, inequality cannot be justified as a necessary consequence of providing incentives. It is striking that, nonetheless, such countries are typically marked by high levels of inequality.

The objectives of making growth pro-poor and acquiring technological competence may conflict: Some technical change may even hurt the poor. Hence it is also important to have the impact on poverty as an element of LIT policies, e.g. in the case of Africa paying particular attention to LIT policies that increase agricultural productivity and employment and encourage labor-intensive industrialization (as in East Asia).

Another essential ingredient of making growth pro-poor is, of course, investment in the human capital of the poor. That health, education, fertility reduction, and poverty alleviation are a seamless web has gained widespread recognition since this nexus was emphasized in The World Development Report 1980, the World Bank’s first such report on poverty. Since then these issues have received much attention in the literature. The World Development Report 1998, focusing on knowledge in development, acknowledged that it was a great mistake to neglect post-primary education in Africa. Investment in human capital of the poor is vital both as an end and as a means.

The paper by Ansu and Tan looks at the issue of higher-level skills for growth. In Africa there is the anomaly of a shortage of high-level skills, even though the region is a significant exporter of these skills; moreover those who remain in their countries are often underutilized, with high rates of unemployment for those with higher education and many of those employed being engaged in activities other
than those for which they were trained. A two-track approach to be pursued simultaneously is proposed. One is for quick results, utilizing those with higher education, and another is a longer-term effort at a systematic transformation of the education system.

A World Bank team working on this issue, looking at the experience of several East Asian countries, found much of relevance for Africa in adopting a short-term, quick-results strategy linked to attracting direct foreign investment in non-extractive activities. Singapore provides an example. The government invited India’s Tata Industries to invest in Singapore and offered to subsidize or pay for much of the costs of training whilst Tata supplied the equipment and trainers. It also worked with the French and Japanese governments to establish an electronics training and a higher technology institute, respectively. Malaysia and Ireland were also examples of countries that had successfully pursued public-private partnerships and established and subsidized technical training for skills needed by the private sector. In Africa there are beginnings of this type of approach, e.g. in Ghana, Mozambique, and Nigeria. There are then the longer-term challenges of raising the quality of training and relating the supply of trained people to the demand for them.

International context

Africa’s development, like that of so many developing countries, is greatly affected by globalization: both flows of goods and services, capital, and labor, and ideas about how development should proceed. “Impact of Globalization and Liberalization on Africa” is the subject of a wide-ranging review by Jomo and von Arnim. The issues raised included the problems of declining terms of trade for primary exporters (the Singer-Prebisch thesis), market access, capital outflows, debt, aid, and direct foreign investment. In their view, globalization and liberalization have not been nearly as beneficial to Africa as they could have been; indeed, it was not entirely clear that their impact on Africa had been positive.

There are two sets of questions: One is how to make the international system more Africa-friendly (e.g. by improving the quality and quantity of aid); the second is how Africa should respond to the changing global context.

A major change in the global economic scene in recent years has been the growth of China—now the world’s second largest economy—and India. The global financial crisis accelerated a trend already under way. Deepak Nayyar examines the growing importance of China and India as aid and trade partners of Africa, and the implications for Africa of the rising importance of China and India in the world economy. On the trade front, there are both substantial challenges and opportunities; they are formidable competitors as well as large and growing markets. China has also become a major source of foreign assistance, and though Western governments have expressed unease about the seeming lack of concern
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over human rights and governance issues, China’s commitment to non-intervention and its willingness to provide funds without the conditionalities that are typically imposed by Western donors has not only made such assistance particularly welcome, but in some instances, may have made it more effective.

Issues to be explored and concluding comments

A single volume, even one as wide ranging as this, cannot touch upon all of the issues that are of importance to transforming Africa and enhancing growth and poverty reduction. Particularly significant omissions concern (1) finance, (2) agriculture, (3) climate change, and (4) aid.

Sustained and reasonably rapid growth is hardly possible without businesses having adequate access to credit at reasonable real interest rates. The absence of such access to credit in Africa is in marked contrast to East Asia, and has been, arguably, one of the chief inhibitors of growth. In East Asia, governments took an active role in helping to create effective financial sectors. At critical stages in the development of the region, the government played a crucial role in allocation of finance—one of the main tools of LIT policy was access to finance, provided, for instance, as a reward for success in exports. Governments often exercised financial restraint—limiting entry, controlling interest rates—though they did so carefully, ensuring positive real interest rates.68

In Africa, dysfunctional, decrepit financial sectors that were common in the pre-reform period have been the subject of protracted reforms since 1980. A high degree of financial repression, often with negative real interest rates, was not uncommon. Nor was the abuse of development finance and other state-owned financial institutions by the politically powerful. Invariably, the reforms have been mainly about liberalization, deregulation, and privatization of the financial sector. The results have been disappointing, though not surprising to those not wedded to the neoclassical models that assume perfect information and perfect markets.69 Financial markets are especially prone to failure, particularly given the salience of information asymmetries and moral hazard in such markets.

The Washington Consensus reforms have often led to persistently high real interest rates (frequently in double digits), and huge spreads between deposit and lending rates, without a major improvement in access to credit and without significant increases in savings rates. The “reformed” financial sector was neither doing a good job of mobilizing savings nor of allocating them. Excess liquidity was common; high real interest rates to dampen demand for credit and high yields on government bonds reduced the banks’ desire to supply term credit to businesses. The rural areas, by and large, remained starved of banking services. This has led to a revival of interest in the role of the state in the provision of credit: Is there a role for development banks or directed credit that played such a vital role in accelerating growth not only in East Asia, but also at different times in different countries of

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South Asia (e.g. Pakistan in the 1960s) and Latin America (e.g. Brazil in the 1950s and 1960s and again more recently)? How might the details of policy design guard against relapse into the bad old ways of state involvement in the financial sector in much of Africa and elsewhere?

As noted above, agriculture is vital not only for growth but also for making growth pro-poor. This is another area where the insights of the successful developmental states of East Asia may be of relevance to Africa: Many of the East Asian countries began their successful developmental efforts with land reform.

Climate change is already having a large impact on many parts of Africa. Ultimately the sustainability of rapid growth and poverty reduction will depend on how this issue is addressed. Given Africa’s low income, widespread poverty, and small carbon footprint, any equitable sharing of the remaining carbon space ought not to constrain the region’s growth. Moreover, substantial monies need to be provided by the international community to help Africa adapt to climate change, as recognized at the Copenhagen summit on climate change in 2009.

Many African countries are highly dependent on aid, but there is a controversy over whether such aid is growth-enhancing. Some worry about aid dependency. Others about excessive and inappropriate conditionality. But there is no gainsaying that an adequate response in Africa to the challenge of climate change will require considerable foreign assistance, both financial and technological. Strong growth in the future will require that the developed countries not only live up to their commitments to provide aid, but redesign aid in a way that better supports the countries’ development strategies.

Concluding comments

At the time of the first meeting of the African Task Force at the Brooks World Poverty Institute in Manchester, the sense of the meeting was that whilst the recent revival of growth was welcome, it partly reflected the familiar African cycle of rising and falling growth, susceptible to changes in the external environment, particularly commodity exports and prices. That meeting concluded that there was little room for complacency: there were concerns about the sustainability of the higher growth path and that 5 percent was not nearly good enough, especially in light of continuing rapid population growth in the vicinity of 3 percent per annum. The last meeting of the Task Force prior to the publication of this book occurred after the global financial crisis, and reaffirmed the Task Force’s concern about sustainability: Africa had been badly hit, through no fault of its own. The growth of the subcontinent’s economy will be lower that that of its population in 2009. South Africa was especially badly hit, as GDP fell by some 2 percent. The rebound since then provides cause for optimism.

Africa has been afflicted with low growth expectations—and these expectations may have contributed to the subcontinent’s poor performance. The Task Force’s
emphasis on the need to break out of the “low growth expectations equilibrium” has received support from virtually every study of Africa’s future. Africa should be aiming for growth in excess of 7 percent. As we noted earlier, growth on this level will be necessary if the region is to achieve the Millennium Development Goals—aspirations that it is not on target to meet. In the light of the standards set by the successful developing countries in recent decades, including the African star, Botswana, such aspirations are not unreasonable. The recent improvement in growth in the years before the global financial crisis does not diminish the importance of the issue of enhancing sustained growth in Africa; and the impact of the global financial crisis has reemphasized the need to break out of its dependence on the export of natural resources.

It is our hope that this book illustrates how the experiences of the successful countries in other parts of the world may be of relevance to Africa as it seeks strategies for growth and poverty reduction that are more effective than those that have dominated in the past. There are no simple answers. We also hope that the outcome of that debate or ideas propounded and the policies recommended in this volume are not reduced to a formulaic fad. One of our messages is the importance of avoiding the sort of “absolutism” that previous strategies have been prone to. There is no policy package that fits all sizes.

Notes

3. As Kwesi Botchwey has remarked, “John Williamson… has said that he did not intend for the policy prescriptions he called the Washington Consensus to become a definitive, exhaustive framework to be applied in all developing countries. But quick fixes have a universal appeal and brilliant summaries and intuitions tend to be turned into broader formulas—often over the protests of their inventors…so it was that in Sub-Saharan Africa…development strategies in the 1980s and 1990s were defined by structural adjustment programs based on the policies that came to be known as the Washington Consensus” (Botchwey 2005: 44).
5. And the Task Force of the Initiative for Policy Dialogue, which organized the conference at which these papers were first presented (see the Preface).
6. The full-fledged development state refers to the state that governed the market—in Robert Wade’s memorable phrase—extensively and refers to Korea, Taiwan, and Japan. Other countries have grown rapidly with a less stringent version of interventionism (e.g. Malaysia, Thailand, Brazil) and could be referred to as “developmentalist states.”
7. These meetings benefited not only from the participation of the authors of the papers included here, other scholars, and staff of development agencies, but also from a number
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of distinguished past and present African policymakers. One of them, Kwesi Botchwey, formerly finance minister of Ghana, is a co-chair of the Task Force.


9. Refers to 2002, whilst in 2000 the area under cereals using improved varieties was 24 percent in Africa, 77 percent in South Asia, and 85 percent in East Asia. All these data are from World Bank (2007).

10. Total factor productivity growth (TFPG) is one indicator that could be used in principle, but in practice it is fraught with serious problems of data, especially in least developed countries, and is also sensitive to the specification of the production function. It is highly doubtful that reasonably reliable estimates of TFPG can be made in most, if any, African countries (with the possible exception of South Africa).

11. Whilst GSC devotes a chapter to country contexts, which looks at the implications of its analysis for Sub-Saharan Africa, small economies, and those rich in natural resources, it does so in a rather broad-brush manner (e.g. only seven pages on Africa), especially in comparison with its carefully detailed and nuanced general discussion of growth issues. The Report does not aim to fully engage directly with the growth debate in Africa, for example on the role of geography, it simply notes that many countries are landlocked, a muted suggestion that that is part of the reason for Africa’s disappointing growth performance, but does not examine the issue in any detail (we examine this issue later). This reflects the fact that its focus is broad, ambitious, and general—or at any rate considerably more so than that of the Africa Task Force. The Commission’s report is mindful of the dangers of excessive or excessively rapid capital account liberalization but does not pay much attention to other aspects of the financial sector (e.g. domestic financial restraint, directed credit, or the role of DFIs) (Commission on Growth and Development 2008).


13. In the GSC Report’s own words: “It reflects the views of 19 well-known and experienced policy, government, and business leaders, mostly from the developing world, and two renowned economists” (p. 1).


15. It is not clear what this means, of course, given that long term comparative advantage is itself endogenous. See Stiglitz (2010b).

16. See also Stiglitz (1996).

17. The published report appears to try to make its analysis conform as much as possible to the then-prevailing orthodoxy in the World Bank by going to great lengths to emphasize the difficulties for other countries in emulating East-Asian-style interventions (they were deemed to be particularly daunting for Africa) and to downplay the role of some interventions. For example, it argues that industrial policy did not make much of a difference in East Asia.


20. Ocampo’s many relevant writings include Cárdenas (2000).

21. This refers to Paul Volcker’s role, as Chairman of the US Federal Reserve Bank, in the sharp rise in interest rates in the US in the later part of the 1970s to fight inflation.

22. For a more extensive discussion of these issues, see Humphreys, Sachs, and Stiglitz (2007).

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25. This is discussed further below where we comment on the AERC research project that has spawned amongst other publications, Ndulu et al. (2008). See also Augustin Fosu’s chapter in this volume and Sachs and Warner (1997).
28. Presumably, the “geography school” would have similar explanation for why landlocked countries performed better than the coastal ones during the global recession in 2009. Alternatively, because such countries were not as globally integrated, they were less buffeted by the global storms. See Kasekende et al. (2010).
29. This also seems to us to be a clear implication of the Growth/Spence Commission Report (GSC) discussed above.
30. Before the crisis, if one had asked most IMF economists whether the central banks and regulatory agencies in the United States and Europe were good institutions, they would surely have said yes—so would many, if not the majority, of other economists. Afterward, as we have noted, it was clear that these institutions failed to effectively perform their central tasks. One of the explanations commonly put forward is that they were captured by financial interests. Capture is, of course, a mark of “failed” institutions.
31. Paul Collier, who also played a key role in this project, also made a presentation to the first meeting of the Task Force.
32. In addition to Augustin Fosu’s chapter here, see also Fosu and O’Connell (2005).
35. See, for instance, the recent report of the International Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress, appointed by President Sarkozy and published as Fitoussi et al. (2010).
36. See the contribution of Robert Wade in this volume. A more detailed discussion of the facts and implications of divergence in the world economy is found in Pritchett (1997).
37. See Chang (2002) and (2008). Chang also argues that even in the case of Britain’s industrial revolution the role of government was much more extensive than allowed in the interpretation of history that makes it conform to the neoclassical or neoliberal view.
39. A quote, apocryphally attributed to Michael Boskin, Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers under the first President Bush: “It does not make any difference whether a country makes computer chips or potato chips.”
40. This is a common allegation of the root causes of the financial crisis that erupted in 2008; there is a consensus that there was too little regulation of derivatives and that the policy of not regulating derivatives was a result of political capture of regulatory agencies, the Administration, and legislative processes. In many countries, privatizations represented large transfers of wealth from the state to particular individuals, and helped created new oligarchs. See Stiglitz (2002).
41. Some might dispute this claim, looking at say, the contrast between the US and Asia in contributing to both the current economic crisis and to the recovery from it.
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42. The orthodoxy did, on occasion, recognize market failures; but typically the market failures were blamed on government: *If governments would only get out of the way, markets would work as they were supposed to.* Thus, on this view, the absence of competitive middlemen in buying and selling agricultural products was seen to be the result of government marketing boards, which had “crowded out” the private sector. But when government marketing boards were abolished, the result often was that they were replaced by local monopolies; before, farmers were squeezed to help support the state, now they were squeezed, but by local mafias.

43. See, for instance, Stiglitz and Uy (1996).
44. See, in particular, World Bank (2005).
47. Hanatani and Kuroki (2008); also see Kuroki and Hanatani (2008).
48. In the years immediately after Solow’s classic study (Solow 1957), there were a number of studies analyzing “endogenous” determinants of the rate of technical progress and the allocation of resources to research and development. These include Kenneth J. Arrow (1962a,, 1962b) and work by Uzawa, Shell, Nordhaus, Atkinson, and Stiglitz; see, for example, Stiglitz (1975). In the late 1970s, there was a resurgence of interest in these topics, and in Schumpeterian innovation theory more generally, focusing on the integration of growth theory with the theory of industrial organization, with work of Mansfield; see, for example, Mansfield (1980), Stiglitz (1987), and Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980a, 1980b). A second revival occurred with the work of Romer (1990). Much of this work, though, was focused on innovation in advanced industrial countries. The process of learning and adaptation facing developing countries remained relatively undeveloped (see, e.g. Sah and Stiglitz 1985).
49. The importance of “discovery” had been emphasized in particular in the works of Karla Hoff (1997) and of Ricardo Hausmann and Dani Rodrik (2003).
50. See, for example, Chang (2002).
51. It was noted that restrictions on exports of raw materials can be used to offset the disincentive effect on processing in developing countries on account of tariff escalation in developed countries, though it can’t, of course, substitute for doing away with such tariff escalation.
52. These are defined thus in the data source: “High-technology exports are products with high R&D intensity, such as in aerospace, computers, pharmaceuticals, scientific instruments, and electrical machinery.” World Bank, World Development Indicators database, April 2009.
53. Industrial promotion combined with agricultural extension worked very well in Kenya, as did the partnership between the public and private sectors. Smallholders were persuaded to grow tea, a long-term investment, by a combination of extension services and roads (public-sector actions), whilst the private sector took up tea processing and marketing activities. This started in the 1960s and blossomed in the 1970s.
54. Also relevant are the efforts of a private firm, South African Breweries—sometimes working with the government—which claims to adapt to and encourage production of local raw materials in countries it had invested in; according to a presentation at one Task Force meeting of a representative of the firm.
55. This market failure provides the rationale for the indicative planning that was much discussed in earlier decades.
56. See note 49 above.
59. A lack of understanding of the depths of market imperfections may play an important role in some of the failures of industrial policies. Weakness or absence of critical support rather than culture or capture or governance accounted for some of the failures of industrial policy.
60. See Chang (2002).
63. The property rights agenda has been at the center of the work of Hernando DeSoto. For a critique of these views, see Kennedy (2003: 17-26) or Haldar and Stiglitz (forthcoming).
64. This is not to deny the vital importance of institutions, indeed it may well be that “institutions rule” as Rodrik et al. (2004) famously remarked. As Mkandawire reminds us, development economics from its inception in the early post-war years has emphasized the role of institutions.
66. The issue of pro-poor growth received more attention in the discussions of the Task Force than it does in this volume.
69. See World Bank (1999).
70. The meeting took place in Pretoria, on July 9–10, 2009.
71. IMF (2009), World Economic Outlook, October 2009.
72. This is the sort of growth that the Growth/Spence Commission focuses on. The Commission for Africa speaks of growth targets of 7+ percent in the region.
73. UN Economic Commission for Africa and African Union Commission (2008): “The continent’s average annual growth rate of approximately 5.8 percent still remains significantly lower than the 7 percent annual growth rate required to reduce poverty by half by 2015.” “It shows that progress is being made in a number of areas such as primary enrolment, gender parity in primary education, malaria deaths, and representation of women in parliaments. If this rate of progress continues, the continent will be on course to meet a significant number of the MDGs by the target date. This will still be disappointing since the objective is to reach all the targets by 2015.”

References

Introduction and Overview


Noman and Stiglitz