FREE HAND ABROAD, DIVIDE AND RULE AT HOME

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WHY did America invade Iraq? The glib answer is “because it could.” In the unipolar moment the immediate costs and risks of using military force against Saddam Hussein’s hollow, troublesome regime seemed low to U.S. leaders.¹

But this explanation begs the important questions. Disproportionate power allows greater freedom of action, but it is consistent with a broad spectrum of policies, ranging from messianic attempts to impose a new world order to smug attempts to insulate oneself from the world’s quagmires. How this freedom is used depends on how threats and opportunities are interpreted when viewed through the prism of ideology and domestic politics.

The exercise of a free hand in strategy is an enduring feature of American foreign policy. Unipolarity simply gave it unprecedented latitude. During the twentieth century, whether under multipolarity, bipolarity, or unipolarity, America enjoyed the luxury of disproportionate power and geographical buffering, which allowed—even required—ideology to define America’s strategically underdetermined world role. This ideology was normally liberalism, sometimes that of the disengaged “city on a hill,” sometimes that of the crusading reformer.² Writing in the wake of the Vietnam War, Stephen Krasner worried that the more powerful the United States became, the more this ideological leeway would express itself as imperialism: “Only states whose resources are very large, both absolutely and relatively, can engage in imperial

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policies, can attempt to impose their vision on other countries and the global system. And it is only here that ideology becomes a critical determinant of the objectives of foreign policy.”\(^3\) And yet when unipolarity arrived in the 1990s, skittishness about costs and casualties severely constrained American liberal idealism abroad.

This changed after September 11, 2001, not only because of the heightened fear of terrorism but also because of the domestic political and ideological environment that made the most of it. Three factors—America’s unprecedented international power, the opportunity presented by the World Trade Center attack, and the increased polarization of the American party system—combined to permit the Bush administration to reframe the assumptions behind American global strategy.

Since the late 1970s the American party system has become increasingly polarized, as Democrats have become more uniformly liberal on a whole range of issues and Republicans have become uniformly conservative. While the overall proportion of moderate voters did not markedly decline, party politicians increasingly took ideologically divergent stances that forced voters to choose between starkly different platforms.\(^4\) Republicans in particular developed an effective strategy of taking polarizing positions on noneconomic wedge issues to mobilize their conservative base and at the same time raid voters from the Democrats’ traditional middle- and working-class constituencies. Under President Ronald Reagan, the Republicans staked out divisive stances on social issues such as abortion, affirmative action for minorities, homosexuality, and religion, while also trying to consolidate ownership of the national security issue. Although the end of the cold war initially blurred the ideological distinction between the parties in foreign affairs, a hard core of neoconservatives worked to sharpen an ambitious, ideologically coherent program to exploit America’s potential for global primacy. By the late 1990s the Republicans’ electoral payoff from domestic wedge issues was fading.\(^5\) But September 11 presented an opportunity to create a new wedge issue: preventive war on global terrorism, very broadly defined.\(^6\)


We do not claim that the Bush administration invaded Iraq *in order to* reap domestic political benefits. And whatever political benefits it *did* gain were short lived due to the disappointing outcome of the invasion. Rather, we argue that party polarization interacted with America’s unipolar dominance and the shock of September 11 to create a situation in which preventive war seemed an attractive option to the Bush administration, both internationally and domestically. The Republicans’ long-term strategy of ideological polarization had fostered a confrontational foreign policy cohort that was eager to seize this opportunity to use military power decisively to solve knotty global problems. At the same time, the well-honed wedge issue strategy made taking a divisive position on Iraq seem like a plausible formula for partisan gain. As Colin Dueck puts it: “The idea of taking the ‘war on terror’ into Iraq offered something to Bush’s conservative supporters, kept Democrats divided, and maintained the focus of debate on issues of national security where Republicans were strong.”7

The U.S. since 1991 is the only case of a modern unipolar power. Our task is to place this unique case in a general conceptual framework, both to draw on general theory to explain it and to use the case to illuminate general propositions. To do this, we adopt several strategies of inference. First, we advance some logical arguments about the effect of domestic politics and ideology on the likelihood of discretionary war, such as the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, initiated by a great power under loose strategic constraints. Second, we examine the behavior of the United States in the twentieth century as a relatively unconstrained great power. Third, we theorize about the interaction of domestic regime type and the degree of international constraint in shaping strategic ideology. Whether the increased scope for ideology in the foreign policy of a strategically unconstrained state increases the likelihood of discretionary war depends on the regime type and the political incentives of the ruling coalition.

Finally, we look at the theoretical literature on American party polarization and derive from it more narrowly focused arguments about U.S. foreign policy under unipolarity. We argue not that party polarization in a unipolar power necessarily leads to doctrines favoring discretionary war, but rather simply that party polarization made discretionary preventive war a tempting wedge issue given neoconservative ideology and

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7 Colin Dueck, “Presidents, Domestic Politics, and Major Military Interventions” (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, September 1, 2007), 17. Dueck argues that domestic political considerations were at most secondary in several U.S. interventions.
habitual Republican political tactics. We treat rising public threat perception following September 11 as a facilitating opportunity to exploit this as a wedge issue, not as a necessary precondition (and certainly not as a sufficient one).

The initial sections of the article draw on a range of historical illustrations to probe the generality of our arguments. The remainder of the article looks more closely at the foreign policy implications of polarized American wedge issue politics in the unipolar period.

HOW DOES UNIPOLARITY AFFECT FOREIGN POLICY IDEAS AND CHOICES?

A logical and venerable proposition holds that states are more likely to succumb to the lure of ideology in foreign policy when they are geopolitically unconstrained—that is, when they are very strong, unthreatened, or distant from trouble. A corollary proposition, advanced by Krasner, is that disproportionate strength is likely to increase the temptation to pursue ideologically driven expansionism and the use of force. The Bush preventive war doctrine and Iraq policy seem to confirm these predictions. However, alternative consequences of unipolarity are also logically plausible and empirically supportable.

The absence of pressing material constraints may open the door to ideology in foreign policy for two reasons. First, it might allow the state to indulge its ideological preferences without fear of negative consequences for its survival and wealth. Humanitarian intervention, for example, might be a luxury consumption item for states whose own security and prosperity are not in doubt. Similarly, Stephen Walt has argued that states choose allies based on ideological affinity only if the threats they face are relatively weak.

Second, the national interest is always ambiguous, but this is especially so when material power is great and threats are indirect, distant, long term, or diffuse. In this situation circumstances do not force different observers to converge on a consensus view; ideology is indispensable as both a road map to action and a tool of persuasion. As Dean Acheson said about overselling the cold war containment strategy at a peak moment of America’s relative power, “We made our points clearer than the truth” to convince the mass public.

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10 Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation (New York: Norton, 1969), 374–75; see also Thomas
Plausible as these arguments may be, the opposite case may be equally plausible. States that are under intense international pressure may be especially vulnerable to myth-ridden foreign policies. Hostile encirclements heighten the enemy images, bunker mentalities, and double standards in perception that are common in competitive relationships of all kinds, especially in international relations. Nationalist and garrison-state ideologies are reinforced. Likewise, Charles Kupchan argues that declining empires typically adopt strategic ideologies of aggressive forward defense in an attempt to mask the truth about their growing weakness from their opponents. In contrast, diplomatic historians commonly applaud the pragmatism of powerful off-shore balancers, whose privileged position grants them the freedom to be selective and fact driven and to wait for developments to play out before committing troops. Whether powerful, unconstrained states are more ideological than weaker or highly constrained states depends greatly on their domestic politics, not simply on their position in the international system.

Krasner’s corollary hypothesis—that powerful or unconstrained states are likely to succumb to an ideology of expansionism—is also an oversimplification. Yes, powerful, secure states have the option of expressing their ideological values through coercion, but they also have other options. They might choose to engage with the world pragmatically, taking what they need and ignoring the global problems from which good fortune insulates them. Or they might adopt a highly principled foreign policy that increases humanitarian assistance abroad but eschews empire and declines to meddle in the internal politics of foreign peoples. Finally, they might be tempted by policies of limited liability, embarking on good works and moralistic hectoring abroad but then heading for the exit when backlash raises the cost of the intervention. Simply being powerful says little about whether or how ideology will express itself.

A further complication arises when the state is extraordinarily powerful but is threatened nonetheless—precisely the situation of the United

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14 Dueck (fn. 2), 26–30.
States after September 11. Unipolar power grants uncommon freedom to act, and the high level of threat rules out strategies of indifference. As the Bush strategists argued, this situation required an assertive strategy of self-defense. One need not invoke any distinctive characteristics of the Bush administration or its national security strategy to understand why the United States attacked Afghanistan to remove al-Qaeda training camps. But such necessary responses can sometimes be overgeneralized into an ideology that portrays the world as a place where ubiquitous threats must be countered by decisive, ongoing preventive action. Whether that framing prevails in policy debate will depend on the domestic political context, not just on the international setting.

American Power, Variations in Polarity, and Strategic Ideas

During the twentieth century America’s great power and geographical distance from threats affected its strategic ideas. However, variations in its relative power and in the polarity of the international system have not determined its strategic ideology in a simple or direct way. Instead, America’s prevailing strategic mindset has been a product of the interaction of its international position and its domestic politics.

Colin Dueck’s recent study of American strategic culture in the twentieth century describes an enduring tension between the ideological commitment to remake the world in America’s image and the countervailing urge to do it on the cheap. U.S. power and geographical isolation set up this tension but did not determine how it would be resolved. Dueck portrays an endemic contest among four schools of thought: assertive internationalist liberals such as Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman, and John Kennedy; progressive liberals such as Henry Wallace and George McGovern who seek to reform the world by example, not by intervention; nationalists such as Robert Taft and Jesse Helms who seek to limit international involvements and shun liberal rationales; and realists such as Richard Nixon and Henry Cabot Lodge who also set aside liberal ideals but are willing to use force to compete for dominance abroad. Dueck argues that the urge to limit liability abates under conditions of rising threat. In practice, he says, this means that foreign threats play into the hand of assertive liberal internationalists, because realism does not resonate with American political culture.  

15 Ibid., 31.
However, Dueck also shows how party politics shapes outcomes in ways that cannot simply be read from international circumstances or even from the strategic preferences of the various schools of thought. An example is the demise of Wilson’s plan for the U.S. to enter the League of Nations. As threats declined after the First World War, Americans’ ingrained inclination to limit liability undercut Wilson’s proposed automatic commitment to collective security. Realist critics like Lodge wanted a policy based on flexible, bilateral agreements with the powerful European democracies, a sensible outcome that would have been consistent with America’s liberal strategic culture. Dueck shows, however, that the realists’ rhetorical battle against the League had the unintended consequence of bolstering the position of isolationist elements in the Republican Party.16

Although the rise and decline of threats affected the fortunes of competing strategic ideas, this did not directly track variations in polarity. As one might expect, ideas of limited liability (a form of free riding or buck-passing) were prominent in the multipolar period. However, the U.S. ultimately balanced against rising great power threats under multipolarity during the two world wars. The U.S. often limited its liability under unipolarity, too: the elder Bush’s refusal to intervene in Bosnia, Republican attacks on Clinton’s “mission creep” in the Somali intervention, Clinton’s turning a blind eye to the Rwanda genocide, Clinton’s zero-casualty approach to resisting the expulsion of Albanians from Kosovo, and the younger Bush’s 2000 campaign promise of a “humble foreign policy” that would eschew “nation building” abroad. Unipolar America’s major military effort of the 1990s was the limited-aims war to reverse Saddam Hussein’s aggression in Kuwait, aggression that threatened the world’s oil supply. Carried out by a realist-packed administration, the Gulf War was realist in motivation and strategy, not an ideological crusade. Even after September 11 the younger Bush declined to apply the principle of preventive war to the problem of North Korean nuclear proliferation on the practical grounds that the North Koreans could level the South Korean capital in retaliation against a preventive strike.

Conversely, U.S. cold war strategy under the tight constraints of the bipolar nuclear stalemate was highly ideological, founded on the encompassing rationale of a struggle to the death of antithetical social systems. Military interventions anywhere and everywhere were

16 Ibid., chap. 3.
justified by the sweeping claims of the domino theory, which held that small setbacks in geopolitical backwaters would exert a ripple effect undercutting commitments to central allies. The cold war consensus was in part a reaction to the rising communist threat, but it was also a result of the selling of cold war ideology and the policy of global containment. This ideology was shaped by the domestic political project of reconciling various constituencies—the Asia-first Republican nationalists, the Europe-first liberal internationalists, and the realists—within government and among the broader public.¹⁷

In short, the degree of American power preponderance and the polarity of the international system are insufficient to explain how ideological or interventionist American strategy was in a given era. To understand those ideas and outcomes, it is also necessary to look at the domestic political setting.

**Strategic Ideology and Domestic Politics**

Different types of domestic political systems manifest different ideological propensities in foreign policy. They differ in the degree to which they are ideological, in the content of their ideology, and in the ability to correct their ideologically driven errors in foreign policy. Even the realist Stephen Walt notes, for example, that revolutionary states are prone to a highly ideological form of foreign relations, conflict-provoking images of their adversaries, and a comparatively painful process of “socialization” to the realities of the international balance of power system.¹⁸ As Walt explains, “Revolutionary ideologies should not be seen as wholly different from other forms of political belief,” but should be seen simply as an acute form of normal practices.¹⁹

Unipolarity—and more generally the lack of strategic constraint—may offer the freedom to indulge in a highly ideological foreign policy, but whether this leeway is exploited depends also on the features of the state’s domestic political system: its regime type, the interests of its ruling group, the domestic political incentives associated with foreign policy, and the role of foreign policy ideology in capitalizing on those incentives. In the case of the United States since 1991, the only modern instance of unipolarity, we argue that its democratic regime type is in

¹⁷ For two somewhat different ways of making this case, see Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991), chap. 7; and Christiansen (fn. 10), chaps. 2–4.


¹⁹ Ibid., 29.
general a factor moderating the impact of ideology on foreign policy but that variable features of U.S. domestic politics, such as its recent period of unusual party polarization, worked to undermine that moderation. In this section we discuss several general hypotheses on the interaction of the international distribution of power and domestic political structure in shaping strategic ideology. In the following sections, we look more closely at the more specific impact on strategic ideology of wedge issue tactics under conditions of party polarization.

A useful dictionary definition of ideology is “the integrated assertions, theories, and aims that constitute a sociopolitical program.” A strategic ideology includes assertions about goals and values (for example, all states should be democracies), categories for defining situations or problems (for example, the axis of evil, weapons of mass destruction), and causal theories or empirical hypotheses (for example, offense is the best defense; Saddam Hussein is undeterrible; the Arab street will bandwagon with whoever is most powerful). The more integrated these elements are in a coherent package that supports a political program and the more resistant they are to disconfirming evidence, the more pronounced is their ideological character.

Although virtually all periods of twentieth-century American foreign policy have been influenced to some degree by its liberal ideology, by these criteria the Bush strategy has arguably been more ideological than most. Neoconservative thinkers have been explicit about their aim of producing a coherent sociopolitical program that integrates assertions across the full range of domestic and international issues. Moreover, core supporters of this outlook have been unusually resistant to evidence that others have seen as disconfirming its foreign policy assumptions. Public opinion surveys found that six of ten Bush supporters in the 2004 presidential election believed that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction, and three of four believed that Iraq had provided substantial support to al-Qaeda. Public opinion scholar Steven Kull says this echoes Leon Festinger’s research on the psychology of cognitive dissonance in millenarian sects that believed more strongly in the impending end of the world after their prophecies had failed to

20 Webster’s Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary (Springfield: Merriam, 1969), 413.
materialize. But Democrats who had initially supported the war were far less prone to these misperceptions, suggesting that that partisan ideological framing reveals more than individual psychology.

The domestic political setting affects strategic ideas and ideologies at several levels. Most basic is the effect of regime type—in particular, whether the country is a well institutionalized democracy. The traditional view, articulated by Walter Lippmann, portrayed democratic publics as fickle, ill informed, and swayed by passions rather than reason. By contrast, scholars of the democratic peace now see democracies as strategically astute. The democratic marketplace of ideas evaluates strategies more effectively than do closed authoritarian cabals. As a result, democracies not only do not fight each other, but they also tend to win the wars they start, pay lesser costs in war, exercise more prudence in choosing conflicts than do nondemocracies, and learn lessons from imperial setbacks more astutely.

Such claims about the intelligence of democracy have been tarnished by the poor quality of the American public debate between September 11 and the Iraq invasion, especially the failure of the Democratic opposition and the media to mount sustained scrutiny of manipulated intelligence and dubious strategic assertions. Over the long term, however, the system worked more or less as democratic peace theorists would expect: congressional hearings and journalistic inquiries exposed errors, the disappointing strategic situation in Iraq shifted public opinion against the war, and Democrats exploited this skepticism to gain a congressional majority in the 2006 election. In this view, democracies make mistakes but eventually move toward correcting them or limiting the strategic damage they cause. By contrast, nondemocratic expansionist great powers like Germany and Japan have been more likely to keep pushing ahead when strategy fails and the costs of expansion rise steeply.

24 Democrats should have been under more pressure from cognitive dissonance than Republicans, who could rationalize their support for the war in terms of the partisan imperative to back their own team’s policy.
28 Snyder (fn. 17), 49–52 and chaps. 3, 4.
The quality of strategic ideas may be affected not only by the broad regime type but also by the specific character of the ruling coalition, elite divisions and consensus, and the dynamic of party competition. When the ruling coalition contains powerful groups with a bureaucratic, commercial, or ideological stake in military expansion, they may use the public relations resources and bully pulpit of national government to promote the “myths of empire”—that is, the assertions that security requires expansion, offense is the best defense, the enemy is undeterable but hollow, conquest is cheap and easy, dominoes fall, threats gain allies, and policies that benefit the ruling group also benefit the nation. Although such myth making is more blatant in undemocratic or semidemocratic regimes, a weaker version of the same dynamic may also color strategic debate in democracies. Where imperial interests (such as business, military, or colonial settler groups) were well positioned as veto players in democratic empires, they effectively advanced creative rationales to drag their feet on decolonization. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld revived the domino theory to explain why the U.S. could not withdraw from Iraq, telling the Senate Armed Services Committee that this would lead to a series of challenges from radical movements and that America would wind up fighting closer to home.

Unipolarity (or any preponderance of power) should be conducive to selling some of the myths of empire (for example, the argument that the conquest of Iraq would be, as one enthusiast claimed, “a cakewalk”), but it may complicate the selling of others (for example, the assertion that a small, distant rogue state threatens the fundamental security of the superpower).

Even in democracies the strategic ideas of the executive go essentially unchallenged unless leading figures of the opposition party speak out against them. Media critics and nongovernmental experts have little clout on their own. Bipartisan consensus behind the executive can reflect true agreement on policy, but it can also reflect the opposition’s fear of challenging a popular president who commands the advantages of information, initiative, and symbolism of national unity in a time of

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29 Ibid., chaps. 5, 7; Jack Snyder, “Imperial Temptations,” National Interest, no. 71 (Spring 2003).
31 According to Rumsfeld, “If we left Iraq prematurely as the terrorists demand, the enemy would tell us to leave Afghanistan and then withdraw from the Middle East. And if we left the Middle East, they’d order us and all those who don’t share their militant ideology to leave what they call the occupied Muslim lands from Spain to the Philippines” ; testimony of August 3, 2006, before the Senate Armed Services Committee; subject of a New York Times editorial, “The Sound of One Domino Falling,” August 4, 2006.
crisis. Only one Senate Democrat who faced a close race for reelection in 2002 voted against the resolution authorizing the use of force against Iraq. Consensus can also reflect a logroll in which potential opponents refrain from voicing their criticism in exchange for deference to their interests on other issues. In the late 1940s, before the forging of the cold war consensus, a large bloc of neoisolationist Midwestern Republicans and some conservative Southern Democrats were highly skeptical of economic and military commitments to Europe, though they were more inclined to back the Chinese Nationalists against the communists. Conversely, Eastern internationalists and realist foreign policy professionals like George Kennan had their eye mainly on the struggle for mastery in the power centers of Europe. Acheson’s NSC-68 global containment study, which argued that geopolitical setbacks anywhere would undermine containment everywhere, provided a rationale that forged a consensus among these disparate, mistrustful groups. Unipolarity does not guarantee such consensus, but the vast resources available to the predominant power in the international system can facilitate logrolls in which all objectives—neoconservative, assertive realist, humanitarian—are addressed simultaneously.

When partisan or intragovernmental divisions do emerge, the side with the greatest propaganda resources wins, according to Jon Western’s study of American military interventions. These resources include the uniquely persuasive platform of the presidency, the informational advantages of the contending sides (including access to facts, analytical expertise, persuasive credibility, and access to media), and the duration of the crisis (the longer the crisis, the greater the chance for critics of the executive to make their case). A successful advocate for intervention needs to convince the public that a credible threat exists and that there is a convincing plan to achieve victory. Unipolarity should make it easier to convince the public that victory is likely, assuming that the credibility of the threat is not in question.

Western points out that the plausibility of the case for intervention depends in part on the “latent opinion” of the audience, which is colored by expectations formed in the most recent relevant case. The case

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for attacking Iraq after September 11, for example, was assessed in light of previous confrontations that primed the public to think the worst of Saddam’s regime. Latent opinion may also be heavily conditioned by a prevailing strategic frame.\textsuperscript{35} For example, universally disseminated and widely accepted cold war assumptions primed reactions to the spurious Gulf of Tonkin incident and to other escalatory moves in the Vietnam conflict. When a ready-made consensual frame is not available, as was the case in the 1990s, the case for intervention is more difficult to make.\textsuperscript{36} The elder Bush tried out several frames for the 1991 Gulf War, starting with the threat to oil supplies, which fell flat, and subsequently emphasizing the danger from Saddam’s nuclear and chemical programs. What worked best of all was framing through fait accompli: Americans decided that war was inevitable once Bush had deployed half a million troops in the Saudi desert, so it was better to get it over with.\textsuperscript{37} Even discounting the short-lived “rally ‘round the flag” effect at the beginning of a conflict, a fait accompli allows the president to argue that American prestige is already at stake and that criticism undermines the morale of “our troops in the field.” Unilateral actions of this kind are easier to undertake under unipolarity because of their lesser risk.

Finally, partisan electoral incentives can affect the motivation and ability of politicians to propound foreign policy ideologies, including doctrines justifying military intervention abroad. International relations scholars have argued that leaders sometimes have incentives to launch a “diversionary war” to distract voters from domestic problems, demonstrate competence through easy victories, or gamble against long odds to salvage their declining reputations.\textsuperscript{38} Hard-pressed leaders of collapsing dictatorships or unstable semidemocratic states might “gamble for resurrection” in this way, but this is too cynical a view of foreign policy making in stable democracies. However, there may be subtler partisan political attractions of military intervention that do not require so cynical a view of leaders’ motives. We argue that national security


strategy played this role as a wedge issue for the Bush administration. Insofar as unipolarity increases the executive’s freedom of action in foreign affairs, it may create opportunities to reframe foreign policy assumptions to advance partisan projects in this way.

**National Security Policy as a Wedge Issue**

In the parlance of American politics, a party adopts a wedge issue strategy when it takes a polarizing stance on an issue that (1) lies off the main axis of cleavage that separates the two parties, (2) fits the values and attitudes of the party’s own base, yet (3) can win votes among some independents or members of the opposing party who can be persuaded to place a high priority on this issue.

It is worth stressing what this strategy is not. It is not just playing to one’s own base; it is also designed to raid the opponent’s base. It is not shifting the main axis of alignment, but adding an issue orthogonal to that axis. Indeed, a central purpose of the wedge strategy is to gain votes from the off-axis issue that allow the party to win office and thereby achieve policy dominance on the main axis of cleavage. This strategy does not necessarily involve moving toward the position of the median voter on the wedge issue. Wedge issues can work if they appeal to the party’s base, as well as to an intensely interested segment of the rival party’s constituency. And they can work even if the majority of voters disagree on the issue, so long as they do not switch their votes for that reason. Finally, a wedge issue is not what students of American politics call a “valence issue” on which there is consensus. It is what they call a “positional issue,” which partisans make salient in a voter’s decision by taking a stand that is distinctive from the opponent’s. In one type of positional issue one of the parties enjoys special credibility, such that highlighting the issue works in its favor even if the opposing party decides belatedly to copy its stance.

In many political systems the principal axis of partisan alignment has been economic. The richer portion of the voting population seeks to protect its property rights, limit progressive taxation and taxes on capital, and get state subsidies and protection for its business activities; the poorer portion seeks exactly the opposite. General theories of political development, including ones that are very much au courant, are based largely on this assumption. Since many of the benefits that the rich

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seek (for example, repealing the estate tax) would accrue only to a small minority of the voters, achieving a majority in favor of these measures is a daunting task in a political system based on universal suffrage. Extending such economic payoffs down to the second-highest economic quartile is costly, and economic propaganda aimed at the middle class can accomplish only so much. To get what they want in a democracy, economic elites have an incentive to pitch their appeal on the basis of a second dimension of cleavage that can attract voters who do not share their economic interests.

The quintessential example of this strategy is playing the ethnic card in order to divide and rule. In India, for example, the BJP is a Hindu nationalist party with strong representation among upper-caste Hindus. One of their motives has been to protect their economic position and career opportunities against the Congress Party’s affirmative action policies for lower castes and minorities. To succeed, the BJP needs to win votes from precisely the lower-caste constituencies that would benefit economically from its defeat. The BJP strategy has therefore been to convince lower-caste Hindus that the most important cleavage is not the economic one between lower and upper classes but rather is the religious and cultural one between Hindus and Muslims. To increase the salience of the religious cleavage, the party has promoted divisive issues such as the demand to tear down a historic mosque standing on an allegedly holy Hindu site and build a Hindu temple there. On the eve of close elections in ethnically mixed cities, upper-caste Indian politicians have repeatedly staged provocative marches through Muslim neighborhoods, spread false rumors of defilements perpetrated by Muslims, and hired thugs to start riots. When ethnicity is polarized in this way, the lower castes have voted with the BJP or other ethnically based parties, rather than as poor people with the Congress or class-based parties. Once the BJP has won office in a given state, many in the electorate have found its performance disappointing and voted to oust it in the subsequent election, but the strategy of emphasizing the noneconomic cleavage works for a time.

Different noneconomic issues can be used for this purpose as the circumstances require. In the American South the economic elite won the votes of poor whites by playing the race card. Today wealthy, conserva-

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tive Republicans try to appeal to voters who do not share their economic interests by stressing their stance on social issues like abortion, gay rights, and school prayer. Sectoral and regional economic interests can also be emphasized against class interests: sun belt versus rust belt; import-competing sectors against exporting sectors.

Foreign policy can also be used as a wedge issue. This is especially apt if the economic elite really does hold a significant foreign policy interest in common with the poorer classes. For example, the coalition of free trade and empire was held together in Britain for a century by the complementary interests of the City of London financiers in capital mobility and the working classes in cheap imported food.42

The most common strategy for using foreign policy as a wedge issue is to emphasize looming foreign threats that are alleged to overshadow domestic class divisions. This works especially well for elites when it can be combined with two other claims. The first is that concessions to elite economic interests are necessary on national security grounds. Thus, the Wilhelmine German elite coalition of “iron and rye” argued that a battle fleet and agricultural protection were needed in case of war with perfidious Britain. The second is the claim that domestic critics of the government are a fifth column for the external enemy. President George W. Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney, for example, attacked Democrats who accused them of misleading the nation about Iraqi weapons programs, calling their criticisms “deeply irresponsible” and suggesting that they were undermining the war effort and abetting terrorism.43 Although Democrats tried to neutralize this charge by supporting many of the Bush policies on terrorism and Iraq, the Republicans’ long-standing hawkishness initially gave them greater credibility as stewards of the “war on terror.” Thus, their wedge strategy was difficult to counter.

Assertive foreign policies can work as a self-fulfilling prophecy to create the foreign enemies that are needed to justify these rationales, whether cynical or sincere. Insofar as unipolarity gives the executive more room for engaging in unilateral action and creating faits accomplis, it should facilitate this strategy.

For a wedge strategy to achieve its purpose, it must leave the ruling elite free to carry out its economic policy agenda. This is easiest if the

43 On Bush, see Richard W. Stevenson, “Bush Contends Partisan Critics Hurt War Effort,” *New York Times*, November 12, 2005, A1, A10; Cheney said in Des Moines, Iowa, on September 8, 2004, that if Americans elect Kerry, “then the danger is that we’ll get hit again … in a way that will be devastating from the standpoint of the United States.”
economic policy rationale can be directly tied, as the Wilhelmine elites did, to the logic of the second cleavage issue. It is hardest if the foreign policy undermines the rationale for the economic policy, but even then creative rhetoric might sell it. For example, Ronald Reagan managed to reconcile tax cuts for the wealthy with a navy of six hundred ships by appealing to the logic of supply-side economics, which rationalized the resulting budget deficits as good for growth. The intellectual cohesiveness of this package was also enhanced by drawing the symbolic connection between free enterprise (that is, freed from tax-and-spend government) and the free world (militarily powerful enough to stay free from the communist threat), both well established tropes of cold war ideology.

Attracting votes by emphasizing a secondary cleavage works best if the underlying assumptions are well primed in public thinking as a result of a long-term campaign. The “Harry and Louise” television advertisements sponsored by a health insurance trade association undermined the Clinton health plan by piggybacking on well-established Republican rhetoric about the evils of big government, which resonated with an increasingly affluent middle class that had less need of a government safety net. However, priming can work too well, taking away the freedom of action of the governing elites. For example, the overselling of cold war containment ideology handcuffed Lyndon Johnson in dealing with the escalation dilemma in Vietnam.

A well institutionalized network of policy analysts helps the intellectual frame underpinning a wedge strategy to take hold and endure. Neoconservatives invested heavily in policy research institutes, human capital, and media presence that created and promoted an unusually integrated set of ideas across economic, social, and foreign policy questions. This effort explained how the noneconomic wedge issues were part of a coherent worldview that included the economic dimension as well, decreasing the risk that issues on the secondary axes would simply replace the primary one.

In short, a move to open up a secondary dimension of cleavage, such as one based on foreign policy, requires priming and institutionalization. It also requires an opportunity, such as a favorable shift in relative power or a new threat that calls attention to the issue. In that sense the convergence of unipolarity, September 11, and neoconservative ideological priming offered the perfect political opportunity.

Polarization and Wedge Issue Politics

Along a one-dimensional policy spectrum where voter preferences bunch toward the middle, parties must become more moderate to attract more votes. Since the mid-1970s American party competition has reflected the opposite strategy, despite the fact that the underlying distribution of voter preferences on issues and liberal-conservative ideology still follows a bell curve. Politicians and activists in both parties have declined to moderate their appeals to attract the independent median voter and instead have emphasized ideologically assertive stances in order to mobilize their party base. Karl Rove says, “There is no middle!”

As a complement to this strategy, they have sought to peel off target-ed constituencies from the opposing camp by emphasizing secondary cleavages. Until September 11 these wedge issues were mainly social or racial. Subsequently, foreign policy was added to the repertoire.

Unlike the competition for the median voter described in the theory of Anthony Downs, this approach works not through moderation but through polarization. To make a secondary cleavage salient, a party’s stance needs to be distinctive enough to make it worthwhile for a voter to choose on the basis of that dimension. Wedge issue politics is a politics of divisive position taking.

Students of American politics agree that the political parties’ stances on issues have become increasingly polarized in domestic issue-areas since 1975. Party identification has become increasingly correlated with ideology on the liberal-conservative dimension, defined both in terms of self-identification and in terms of attitudes on a set of salient issues including big government, the economy, race, social issues such as gay rights and abortion, and, recently, foreign and defense policy. This is true despite the fact that public attitudes are not substantially less moderate than before. What has happened is that the two parties put forward policy platforms that are more ideologically differentiated than they were in the past. The Republican Party has moved far to the right, and the Democratic Party has moved somewhat to the left. As a result, voters have been re-sorting themselves, with liberal Republicans becoming Democrats and conservative Democrats becoming Republicans. Elites, especially party leaders and activists, are more polarized

46 Lemann (fn. 6).
48 Fiorina (fn. 4), 167–82.
50 McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal (fn. 4), 11.
51 Fiorina (fn. 4), 57–77.
in their views than the public at large, which suggests that elites are taking the initiative in the polarization process.  

Contributing to this process was the breakup of the Democratic “solid South” as a result of the civil rights revolution. Gradually, southern whites who had remained in the Democratic Party under the log-roll of racial segregation and New Deal social programs moved into the Republican Party. White Republican southerners disproportionately embody a number of the characteristics of the polarizing conservative syndrome: increasingly affluent, traditional in religion and morals, resistant to increasing big government programs and regulatory measures to assist African Americans, and hawkish on foreign policy. Statistically, region accounts for a substantial proportion of the polarization effect. However, polarization has also occurred outside the South, so that is not the whole explanation. Several hypotheses are in play.

McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal argue that polarization was mainly the result of the large increase in the number of affluent Americans who no longer need the governmental social safety net. They have voted their economic interests at the expense of immigrants who use social programs but lack the vote to defend them. The result is a Republican coalition that blocks efforts to redistribute benefits to the less well off; that, in turn, leads to a dramatic increase in economic inequality. These authors also see soft money from ideologically extreme campaign contributors as a secondary cause of polarization.

Other authors point to the political turmoil of the late 1960s, which led to the increasing use of primary elections instead of conventions and caucuses to determine each party’s candidates for the general election. At the same time cohorts of ideologically motivated activists took over from an earlier generation of pragmatic politicians in both parties. Increasingly, the winning candidates appealed to the median voter in the party’s primary rather than the median voter in the general election. Mobilizing one’s own base with ideologically purist causes and attacking the opposition’s base with wedge issues became the prevailing strategy. With both parties doing it simultaneously, the median voter had no attractive options. As a result, some public opinion research

53 McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal (fn. 4), 108 and chap.4.
suggests a substantial decline in officeholders’ responsiveness to changes in public opinion over recent decades.\(^{55}\)

Polarization developed at different rates for different issue-areas. Polarization on economic issues was already central to the New Deal cleavage structure, and that has remained largely unchanged. Income level is the strongest predictor of the vote even of born-again evangelicals in the South.\(^{56}\)

Polarization based on economic issues presents an endemic problem for Republicans, because a majority of American voters always says it wants the government to “do more” on big-ticket items such as education, health care, and the environment. Even at the low ebb of support for big-government liberalism when Ronald Reagan was elected in 1980, about half of the public said the government was spending too little on such items and only one-tenth said it was spending too much.\(^{57}\) Even most Americans who self-identify as conservative are operationally liberal in the sense that they want government to spend more money on such programs.\(^{58}\) This conflicted group constitutes 22 percent of the entire electorate.\(^{59}\)

The fact that most Americans want liberal spending policies by an activist government puts Republicans in a chronic bind. One rhetorical solution has been to emphasize conservative symbols, including patriotism, which resonate more strongly than liberal symbols with the majority of voters.\(^{60}\) On the symbol of “big government,” most Americans agree with the Republicans, but on actual big-government policies, they usually agree with the Democrats.

A second solution has been to use noneconomic wedge issues to try to overcome the chronic Republican disadvantage on economic issues. The Republicans have experimented with various issues in attempts to increase the party fold without having to compromise on their basic economic platform. They exploited race and affirmative action between 1964 and 1980, after which they broadened their scope to include gender and abortion.\(^{61}\) Then in the 1990s polarization increased further over social and cultural values issues such as abortion, gay rights, and the role of religion in public life.

This strategy achieved mixed results. Larry Bartels calculates that

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\(^{55}\) Jacobs and Shapiro (fn. 36), chap. 2.

\(^{56}\) McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal (fn. 4), 108.

\(^{57}\) Stimson (fn. 54), 7.

\(^{58}\) Ibid., chap. 3.

\(^{59}\) Ibid., 90.

\(^{60}\) Ibid., 94–95.

\(^{61}\) Ibid., 71–74.
the Republicans’ electoral payoff from the abortion issue has declined among non-college-educated white voters since 1996. Among this group, the impact of seven cultural wedge issues—abortion, gun control, school vouchers, gay marriage, the death penalty, immigration, and gender—on voting in the 2004 election was about two-thirds that of a comparable set of economic issues. By contrast, defense spending and military intervention ranked near the top of the list of politically potent issues. Preventive war on global terrorism became the new wedge issue, picking up where social issues left off.

Foreign policy was for a long time the laggard in polarization. Support for the Vietnam War declined in lockstep among Democrats, Republicans, and Independents. Democratic support briefly declined more steeply when Vietnam became Nixon’s war in 1969, but the Republican trend caught up by 1971. The partisan difference averaged only 5 percent. Partisan differences in support for the Korean, Persian Gulf, Kosovo, and Afghanistan wars were also relatively small, with the Gulf War recording the greatest difference, averaging about 20 percent. The Reagan period widened the divergence in foreign policy views between Republicans and Democrats, but the gap closed again with the end of the cold war. Even at the time of peak divergence in the 1980s, the two parties remained “parallel publics”: their attitudes moved in the same direction over time in response to events.

There are two main reasons for the lag in partisan polarization in foreign policy. First, Democratic foreign policy establishment figures such as Zbigniew Brzezinski remained well within the cold war consensus in response to Soviet military buildups and Soviet adventures in Angola, Ethiopia, and Afghanistan. Although the Republicans had a post-Vietnam advantage as the more credible party on national defense, their politically exploitable wedge on this issue remained limited. Second, the end of the cold war left Americans without a convincing frame for foreign policy as a wedge issue, and notwithstanding the Gulf War, no sufficiently galvanizing threat triggered the formulation of a new one during the 1990s.

62 Bartels (fn. 5), 218.
63 Mueller (fn. 37), 119.
64 Jacobson (fn. 52), 132.
65 Ibid., 134–38.
Despite the neoconservatives’ ideological preparations in the 1990s for a more polarizing foreign policy, the initial months of the Bush administration still provided no opportunity for a push to implement it. The Bush administration took office with a mixed foreign affairs team of cautious realists like Secretary of State Colin Powell and National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, traditional cold war hawks like Vice President Cheney and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, neoconservative idealists like Undersecretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, and an uncommitted president who had argued for a restrained foreign policy during the campaign. The idea of unilaterally asserting American primacy to forestall the development of new post–cold war power centers in Europe or Asia was an old one for this group. Under the elder Bush, Wolfowitz had been too bold in putting that idea at the center of a draft defense guidance document, and the document was suppressed. During the 1990s neoconservative intellectuals and pundits wrote openly about the use of the “unipolar moment” to reshape global politics to America’s liking, by force if necessary. Still, the moment was not right: Republicans shied away from “nation building” in the developing world, associating it with quixotic do-gooder Democrats. Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz were on record as calling for regime change in Iraq, but so was Bill Clinton. Rice was prominent in arguing in favor of deterring Saddam from further aggression, implying that he was in fact deterrable. Nonetheless, after a decade of Iraqi defiance over no-fly zones and inspections, the public was well primed for the possibility of a renewed war with Saddam’s regime: in February 2001, 52 percent favored “military action to force Saddam Hussein from power if it would result in substantial U.S. military casualties”; 42 percent were opposed.

September 11 created the opportunity not only to depose Saddam but also to reframe American foreign policy in a dramatic new way that would unleash conservative Republican principles for purposes that would resonate broadly with the American public. The new doctrine, unveiled in the president’s West Point speech of July 2002 and codi-
fied in the September 2002 National Security Strategy memorandum, argued that in an era of global terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the United States must not wait to be attacked; it needed to attack preventively to transform states that harbor terrorists and other rogue states into cooperative democracies. The United States would act unilaterally if necessary: it would explain its ideas to the world, but it would not ask for a “permission slip” to “shift the balance of power in favor of freedom.” These ideas were presented as relevant not only to the struggle against al-Qaeda but also to the struggle against the “axis of evil” of Iran, Iraq, and North Korea, to an open-ended “global war on terror,” and even to promotion of democracy in China.

This was the ultimate wedge issue. The Bush doctrine was well prepared ideologically by neoconservative thinkers. It was grounded in the hawkish, unilateralist instincts of the Republican elites and their conservative base, including the traditionally military-oriented South. Ideologically and psychologically, it resonated with the Republicans’ instincts to be tough on domestic threats and evil-doers, for example, their characteristic hard-line stance on crime, the death penalty, and social deviance of all kinds. It neutralized criticism from liberal Democrats through its promotion of democracy. It exploited what scholars of public opinion call a “valence” (or consensus) issue—the overriding security issues of concern to all Americans after September 11—but it went far beyond that. The application of the doctrine to Iraq, well primed among the public, would demonstrate more effectively than the too-easy Afghan mission that this was a problem-solving concept of wide utility. Thus, Iraq was a “positional issue” that would differentiate Republican from Democratic policies, hold the Republican base, and gain some votes among Independents and Democrats who could be convinced of the high priority of this issue. To accomplish this, however, Iraq would have to be seen as part of the bigger picture. Asked how voters would view the Iraq issue in the 2004 election, Rove predicted: “They will see the battle for Iraq as a chapter in a longer, bigger struggle, as a part of the war on terrorism.”

Unipolarity helped to make the wedge issue feasible. America’s unipolar power made implementation seem low risk and low cost, especially important to Rumsfeld’s plan for a streamlined, more usable

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71 On valence and positional issues, see Stimson (fn. 54), 62.
72 Lemann (fn. 6).
army. If this worked—and the administration could see no reason why it would not—the strategy might transform the Middle East and at the same time give the Republicans a lock on American politics as the principled, problem-solving party.

An early glimpse of the political benefits that the strategy might bring was evident in the congressional elections of 2002. In preelection polls, notes Gary Jacobson, “most respondents thought that the Democrats would do a better job dealing with health care, education, Social Security, prescription drug benefits, taxes, abortion, unemployment, the environment, and corporate corruption” and that the Republicans would be better at dealing “with terrorism, the possibility of war with Iraq, the situation in the Middle East, and foreign affairs generally.”73 Bush’s popularity scared off well-qualified Democratic challengers: only a tenth of Republican incumbents faced Democratic challengers who had ever held public elective office, as opposed to the usual figure of a quarter.74 On the eve of the election Rove is said to have recommended pushing for a largely unconditional Senate endorsement of the use of force against Iraq, rather than accepting greater bipartisan backing for the somewhat more equivocal Biden–Lugar bill.75 In classic wedge issue style, Rove wanted the sharpest possible difference between Republicans and Democrats in order to heighten the political salience of the war vote relative to economic concerns. Overall, Rove’s private PowerPoint presentation on campaign strategy advised Republican candidates to “focus on the war.”76 Buoyed by a huge turnout among the Republican base, the Republicans picked up six seats in the House and two in the Senate, bucking the normal tendency for parties in power to slip in midterm elections.

These political benefits could not be sustained because of the failure to pacify Iraq and the unraveling of the central public rationales for the war—Saddam’s alleged WMD and support for al-Qaeda. In retrospect, it seems clear that Bush would have done far better politically by focusing on the “war on terror” and staying out of Iraq. The 19 percent of voters who said that terrorism was the most important issue voted heavily for Bush in 2004, but the 15 percent of voters who identified Iraq as the key issue voted disproportionately for Kerry.77 Despite the electoral

73 Jacobson (fn. 52), 89.
74 Ibid., 89, n. 30.
75 Packer (fn. 68), 388.
77 Jacobson (fn. 52), 191. See John H. Aldrich, Christopher Gelpi, Peter Feaver, Jason Reifler, and Kristin Thompson Sharp, “Foreign Policy and the Electoral Connection,” Annual Review of Political Science 9 (2006); the authors review the debate on the electoral impact of the Iraq issue.
drag of Iraq and in the face of skepticism about his economic agenda, support for Bush on the war on terror provided his margin of victory in 2004.78 Instead of exploiting the Iraq war as a wedge issue, the Bush administration had instead created the most polarizing issue ever in the history of American foreign policy—and one that ultimately worked to the Republicans’ disadvantage.

THE POLARIZING CONSEQUENCES OF THE WAR

After some initial months of bipartisan support, the partisan divergence in support for the Iraq War ranged between 40 percent and 90 percent, depending on the question asked.79 The gap between Republicans and Democrats also widened across a broad range of foreign policy issues, and their views sometimes moved in opposite directions in response to new information. In 1998, 31 percent of Republicans believed that the planet was warming, but by 2006 only 26 percent did, whereas Democrats increased from 39 percent to 46 percent and Independents from 31 percent to 45 percent.80 Partisans increasingly lived in conceptually different foreign policy worlds.

On the first day of the war, the Bush administration had the support of 73 percent of respondents, but support among Democrats remained soft and conditional: 51 percent of them said they supported having gone to war, but only 38 percent supported the troops and the policy, whereas 12 percent supported the troops but opposed the policy. If the war and Iraqi democracy had gone well, the weakness of the WMD and al-Qaeda rationales might not have mattered. In the brief moment in March 2003 when a cheap, quick victory seemed assured, the proportion saying that the war would have been worth it even if no WMD were found jumped 20 percentage points among Republicans, 10 points among Democrats, and 13 among Independents.81 Success might have


81 Jacobson (fn. 52), 130, 143.
been its own justification, strategically and politically. But this was not to be.

Attitude trends after the invasion confirm that Democratic and Independent support was conditional on the evidence behind the WMD and terrorism rationales, whereas Republicans were largely unaffected by new evidence. In February 2003, 79 percent of Democrats believed that Iraq had WMD, and fifteen months later only 33 percent did. By contrast, as late as 2005, Republican belief in WMD had actually increased to 81 percent. Between April 2003 and October 2005, belief in Saddam’s involvement in 9/11 declined among Republicans from 65 to 44 percent, among Independents from 51 to 32 percent, and among Democrats from 49 to 25 percent.\(^8^2\) Coinciding with these trends, an unprecedented 60 percent gap opened up between Republicans and Democrats during 2004 and 2005 on whether the war had been “the right thing to do” or “worth the cost,” with Independents in between but closer to the Democrats. In April 2004 Democrats were most skeptical of the two rationales for war: of the 58 percent of Democrats who believed neither, only 8 percent thought the war had been the right thing to do. In contrast, the 34 percent of Republicans who were white born-again evangelical Christians supported the war at an unchanged rate of 85 percent and accepted the administration’s rationales for it unquestioningly. Not surprisingly, self-proclaimed conservative ideology was also a strong predictor of support for both the war and the Bush rationales for it.\(^8^3\)

Were the Republicans becoming so ideological in their view of foreign affairs that they were impervious to information, or were they realistic, but dogged partisans sticking with their team as the best strategy in the face of adversity? And if they were increasingly ideological, was this a spontaneous reflection of grassroots thinking, a consequence of the Bush administration’s neoconservative framing of foreign policy ideology, or simply a measure of who was left in the party after three decades of polarized sorting? Is the highly ideological foreign policy stance of the Republican base a passing phenomenon of the Bush era, or is it has it become locked in by political strategy or ideological internalization?

These questions cannot be answered definitively, but an analysis of the unprecedented polarization of foreign affairs attitudes during the Bush presidency suggests an elite-driven ideological pattern. Demo-

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\(^8^2\) Ibid., 140–41.
\(^8^3\) Ibid., 144, 155–59.
crats increasingly self-identified as liberal and Republicans as conservative. Moreover, people increasingly decided their views on specific issues based on their prior partisan and ideological commitments. During the early 1990s, panel data had shown that changes in respondents’ attitudes on specific issues had a reciprocal effect on changes in their party identification, with a significant influence in both directions.\textsuperscript{84} By contrast, panel data including both domestic and foreign policy issues from 2000, 2002, and 2004 showed that the effect of changes of party identification and of general ideology on specific issue attitudes overwhelms the reverse effect. (See Table 1.) This finding is consistent with the view that Bush’s highly ideological framing of both domestic and foreign issues effectively polarized the way people evaluate these issues, whether positively or negatively, along partisan and ideological lines. Since this finding rests on data about changes in the attitudes of individuals rather than of aggregates, it would not seem consistent with the view that the changes are simply the result of sorting individuals into ideologically homogeneous parties through the polarized policies offered by the parties’ candidates.\textsuperscript{85}

A comparison of the 1998, 2002, 2004, 2006, and most recent 2008 Chicago Council on Global Affairs (formerly known as the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations) surveys of elite and mass attitudes shows an unprecedented level of partisan and ideological polarization on key foreign policy issues across the board, not just on Iraq.\textsuperscript{86} On several issues, the vectors of change correspond closely to policy leadership by the Bush administration, suggesting a top-down process of attitude change. The elite surveys show increasing polarization on maintaining superior military power worldwide and on spreading democracy abroad, goals that have become the centerpiece of the neoconservative agenda. In 1998, 31 percent more Republican than Democratic

\textsuperscript{84} Geoffrey C. Layman and Thomas Carsey, “Party Polarization and ‘Conflict Extension’ in the American Electorate,” \textit{American Journal of Political Science} 46 (October 2002).

\textsuperscript{85} While party identification and ideology appear to affect \textit{individual} issue opinions much more than the reverse, further data analysis could not reject the possibility of an effect on partisanship and ideology of simultaneous opinion changes on \textit{multiple} issues.

\textsuperscript{86} The surveys interviewed samples of the American public and a sample of leaders who have foreign policy powers, specialization, or expertise. The leaders include members of Congress or their senior staff, presidential administration officials, and senior staff in agencies or offices dealing with foreign policy issues, university administrators or academics who teach in the area of international relations, journalists and editorial staff who handle international news, presidents of large labor unions, business executives of Fortune 1000 corporations, religious leaders, presidents of major private foreign policy organizations, and presidents of major special interest groups relevant to foreign policy. Marshall M. Bouton, Catherine Hug, Steven Kull, Benjamin I. Page, Robert Y. Shapiro, Jennie Taylor, and Christopher B. Whitney, \textit{Global Views 2004: American Public Opinion and Foreign Policy} (Chicago: Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 2004). For a fuller analysis, see Shapiro and Bloch-Elkon (fn. 51). There was a public survey but no elite survey for 2006 and 2008.
elites thought maintaining superior military power was a “very important” foreign policy goal; this gap rose by 18 points to about 49 percent in 2004. In 1998 and 2002 more Democratic than Republican elites thought democracy promotion was a very important goal, but by 2004, after the Bush administration had increased its emphasis on democratization as a rationale for the Iraq War and the Bush doctrine, these opinions reversed, with 14 percent more Republican than Democratic leaders holding this view. The stance of the Bush administration against
the International Criminal Court has also led to a growing divergence among partisan elites, rising from 38 percent in 2002 to 50 percent in 2004. The gap on this issue between self-identified conservatives versus liberals rose in 2004 to 54 percent. Overall, for the sixty-two questions asked of elites, we find seventeen cases of partisan divergence and six cases of partisan convergence. Ideological divergence and convergence occurred in eleven cases each.87

Mass public respondents are somewhat less divided by party but more divided by ideology. Based on responses to 122 questions, Democrats and Republicans diverged by more than 9 percentage points on 19 questions between 1998 and 2004, and converged on only 4 questions. Self-identified liberals and conservatives diverged on 23 questions and converged on 9. Partisan divergence emerged in particular on defense spending, foreign military aid, gathering intelligence information about other countries, strengthening the United Nations, combating international terrorism, and maintaining superior military power worldwide. From 2002 to 2004 Republicans moved from 6 percentage points to 20 points more likely than Democrats to favor toppling regimes that supported terrorist groups. Figures 1–3 show some of the trends based on responses to the question: “Below is a list of possible foreign policy goals that the United States might have. For each one please select whether you think that it should be a very important foreign policy goal of the United States, a somewhat important foreign policy goal, or not an important goal at all: Strengthening the United Nations? Combating international terrorism? Maintaining superior military power worldwide?” The widening gap between Democrats and Republicans from 1998 continuing through 2008 is quite striking, with Democrats moving away from the opinions of Republican in the cases of considering maintaining superior military power and combating international terrorism as “very important” foreign policy goals. In the case of strengthening the UN as an international institution, by 2008 Republicans were 29 percentage points less supportive of this goal than were Democrats, at 23 percent to 52 percent, compared to an 11 point gap in 1998. This strong partisan divergence extends into global environmental issues as well. From 1998 to 2008 the percentage of

**Figure 1**
**Percentage by Party Affiliation Saying that “Maintaining Superior Military Power Worldwide” Is a “Very Important” U.S. Foreign Policy Goal**

Source: Chicago Council on Global Affairs surveys. The question asked was, “Below is a list of possible foreign policy goals that the United States might have. For each one please select whether you think that it should be a very important foreign policy goal of the United States, a somewhat important foreign policy goal, or not an important goal at all: Maintaining superior military power worldwide?”

**Figure 2**
**Percentage by Party Affiliation Saying that “Strengthening the United Nations” Is a “Very Important” U.S. Foreign Policy Goal**

Source: Chicago Council on Global Affairs surveys. The question asked was, “Below is a list of possible foreign policy goals that the United States might have. For each one please select whether you think that it should be a very important foreign policy goal of the United States, a somewhat important foreign policy goal, or not an important goal at all: Strengthening the United Nations?”
Republicans who thought global warming/climate change was a “critical threat” to the vital interests of the U.S. dropped, surprisingly, from 39 percent to 21 percent, down 18 points. In sharp contrast, the percentage of Democrats who gave the same response increased from 51 percent to 63 percent, up 12 points.88

In sum, there is evidence for increasing partisan and ideological differences among both elites and the public. This has occurred more widely and sharply among elites, but these divisions have penetrated the public as well, continuing well into 2008. Elite polarization seems directly driven by the policy commitments of the president. Mass-level polarization is harder to interpret. It might reflect a more diffuse impact of presidential framing of issues through broad ideology rather than through specific policies, but it might also be influenced by unrelated grassroots trends.

In a further effort to assess whether public polarization is mainly responding to presidential framing or to popular currents of opinion, we conducted a factor analysis to see which issues, based on the American National Election Study data, seem more tightly linked to party, ideol-

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88 Shapiro and Bloch-Elkon (fn. 87, 2006, 2005).
ogy, and each other. We found that issues that have been central to the president’s rhetoric and policy agenda—the Iraq war and tax cuts—were most tightly linked in this way. By contrast, attitudes on issues like the death penalty, which has not been central to the Bush administration’s framing efforts, were more loosely tied to the others. Although the Bush doctrine seems to have failed as an enduring wedge issue for Republican partisan advantage, its polarizing effect may be more long lived if it has become embedded in Republican grassroots ideology.

CONCLUSIONS: UNIPOLARITY, PARTISAN IDEOLOGY, AND THE LIKELIHOOD OF WAR

Does unipolarity per se free the United States to use force abroad cheaply and successfully and thus make war more likely? No. As the United States is learning, war can still be politically and economically costly for a sole superpower. However, under unipolarity, the immediate, self-evident costs and risks of war are more likely to seem manageable, especially for a militarily dominant power like the U.S. This does not necessarily make the use of force cheap or wise, but it means that the costs and risks of the use of force are comparatively indirect, long term, and thus highly subject to interpretation. This interpretive leeway may open the door to domestic political impulses that lead the unipolar power to overreach its capabilities.

Unipolarity opened a space for interpretation that tempted a highly ideological foreign policy cohort to seize on international terrorism as an issue that could transform the balance of power in both the international system and American party politics. This cohort had its hands near the levers of power on September 11, 2001, as a result of three decades of partisan ideological polarization on domestic issues. Its response to the terrorist attack was grounded in ideological sincerity but also in routine practices of wedge issue politics. From conviction and from tactical habit, successful Republican politicians had learned that polarizing on noneconomic issues is a political necessity in a country where most voters want costly welfare state policies that are at odds with the upper-income tax cuts that are the bread and butter of the Republicans’ central constituency. Because even America’s great power was not up to the task set for it by the Bush strategists, their wedge strategy was only briefly successful in winning elections. However, so far their approach seems to have had a more lasting effect in deepening the ideological polarization of American party politics.

If our theoretical analyses are right, what predictions follow for the
future of American strategy under conditions of unipolarity? The politics of foreign policy in the Bush era reflected the rare convergence of unipolarity with a galvanizing threat and a party governing with a highly distinctive domestic strategy of ideological polarization and wedge politics. Unipolarity is likely to look very different as those ancillary conditions change.

If party polarization diminishes and the parties increasingly compete by trying to attract the average voter, we would predict a lessening in the ideological character of American foreign policy and an increasing prudence in its use of force abroad. Party polarization over foreign affairs may continue for a time because of the lingering effects of sorting and ideological internalization, but polarization is not structurally inevitable. Polarization and wedge issue politics yielded the equilibrium that emerged from the particular legacies of the civil rights movement, the women's movement, and the Vietnam War. But they were not the only possible equilibrium that could have emerged. Even if the Republican Party retains some incentives to continue such a strategy, the success of a militarized, unilateralist foreign policy as a political wedge issue depends on the existence of a galvanizing threat and on devising a foreign policy that really works as an answer to it. After the sobering experience of Iraq, domestic social questions like religion or immigration may seem more attractive as wedge issues because their costs and risks can more easily be controlled.

Despite the temptations that come with unipolarity, the intelligence and prudence of democracy is far from exhausted. The U.S. hesitated to apply the preventive war doctrine to the cases of North Korea and Iran. Although Bush was reelected in 2004, shifting public views on the war played a central role in the Democratic victory in the 2006 congressional elections. At least among the majority of Democratic and independent voters, democratic checks on an overextended foreign policy are working more or less as the “democratic marketplace of ideas” theory expects. After the 2008 elections, it seems plausible that the domestic politics of unipolarity will cease to be dominated by the distinctive logic of polarized wedge issue politics and instead will reflect the more general prudence of democratic foreign policy.