Negotiating Gender Role Stereotypes:
The Influence of Gender Role Stereotypes
on Perceivers' Evaluations and Targets' Behaviors in Value Claiming Negotiations
and Situational Moderation by Representation Role

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ABSTRACT

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Emily T. Amanatullah

Salary negotiations are a consequential part of most workers’ careers, not only when they are first hired, but also during promotions, raises, and transitions to new firms. Understanding the individual predispositions and situational constraints impinging upon women in salary negotiations is important both in development of theory on the influence of gender role stereotypes in managerial contexts and in implementation of practical solutions to correct inequity.

This dissertation outlines a model of how women negotiate gender role stereotypes and how this influences their negotiations over salary. This process is illuminated by studies varying women’s representation role, whether they negotiate on behalf of themselves or other people. It is proposed that representation role matters because gender role stereotypes inhibit women from assertive tactics in self-promotion but not in promotion of others. Because self-promotion is characterized by masculine traits (assertiveness, independence, etc.) women who engage in these behaviors risk a backlash in which observers punish them for violating the female gender role. Yet eschewing self-promotion leaves women with lower outcomes. However, when negotiating on behalf of another individual, women are freed from the constraints of these
gender role stereotypes and the fear of backlash. Multiple methodologies are used to test
the theory and predictions including surveys, negotiation simulations, and controlled
laboratory experiments. Results from this series of empirical studies consistently show
the unique benefit of other-representation to women in single-issue distributive
negotiation contexts, while the behavior and performance of men remain unaffected by
representation role.
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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Research attempting to understand the influence of gender on negotiating behaviors and subsequent outcomes has received weak and sometimes conflicting empirical support (for reviews, see Kray & Thompson, 2005; Rubin & Brown, 1975; Thompson, 1990; Watson, 1994). Some assert that men definitively negotiate better outcomes than women (Stuhlmacher & Walters, 1999). Others argue that women are more cooperative affording better integrative outcomes, yet less competitive resulting in worse distributive outcomes relative to men (Walters, Stuhlmacher, & Meyer, 1998). Other research claims women unsuccessfully create value because of excessive other-concern (Calhoun & Smith, 1999). Additional research states that statistically significant sex differences in negotiation outcomes simply do not exist (Craver & Barnes, 1999).

One reason for these inconsistent findings could be that most past research has favored a direct-effect model, neglecting to sufficiently acknowledge the interactive potential of contextual factors. Given the wide array of contextual variation in negotiations, from distributive to integrative, dyadic to multiparty, single-issue to multi-dimensional, etc., it seems overly parsimonious to assume important contributors in one context would necessarily manifest themselves in the same manner in other contexts. Thus, some researchers argue that a contingency approach toward individual differences is necessary to understand the complex interaction of person and situation (Fry, 1985; Harnett, Cummings, & Hughes, 1968; Menkel-Meadow, 2000; Thompson, 1990). Hence, recent gender research has focused on the interaction between gender and situational factors to better understand conditions under which sex differences in negotiation
behavior and outcomes are heightened or suppressed (Kray, Galinsky, & Thompson, 2002; Kray, Thompson, & Galinsky, 2001; Stuhlmacher & Walters, 1999; Walters et al., 1998).

Recently, Bowles, Babcock, and McGinn (2005) have found that contextual factors, specifically situational ambiguity and representation role, may have significant inhibitory or facilitating effects on the extent to which individual differences, such as gender, manifest themselves in negotiations. Research on situational ambiguity, or in Mischel’s (1977) terminology situation strength versus weakness, has consistently documented the suppression of individual difference effects in strong situations where specific behaviors are deemed necessarily appropriate and the expression of individual differences in weak situations where behavioral responses can vary (Dovidio, Ellyson, Keating, & Heltman, 1988; Monson, Hesley, & Chernick, 1982; Wood & Karten, 1986). Given the substantial amount of research on situation strength, this paper instead extends the findings of Bowles et al. (2005) by focusing specifically on the less researched representation role construct and exploring the underlying mechanisms for why and how situational variation in representation role affects the impact of gender on negotiation behavior. Representation role defines who is being spoken for in a negotiation. Self-representation describes a typical negotiation where a focal individual negotiates on his/her own behalf. Other-representation refers to a negotiation where a focal individual negotiates on behalf of another person.

In order to study the interaction of gender and representation role, it is important to control for other potential variation in the negotiation context. For this reason, the focus of this paper is on one, specific type of negotiation context: a single-issue
distributive negotiation between two parties, specifically salary negotiations. Salary
negotiations are important both theoretically and practically. Theoretically, isolating the
context of study allows for more interpretable generalization of the empirical results.
Practically, salary negotiations are important because the poor performance of female
negotiators is likely a contributor to the current wage gap.

Despite women making up nearly half of the U.S. workforce (U.S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics, 2003) and the passage of the Equal Pay Act more than 40 years ago,
women still earn significantly less than men. Though slowly decreasing at a rate of less
than half a cent each year since 1963, the wage gap still exists and actually increased by a
full percentage point in 2003. Today women earn only 76 cents on the dollar compared to
men (National Committee on Pay Equity, 2004), which adds up substantially over the
course of a full-time working life. According to the Coalition of Labor Union Women,
the average 25-year old working woman will lose more than $523,000 to unequal pay
during her working life (Burk, 2005). In 1990, a study of the most highly paid officers
and directors in 799 major companies revealed that women comprised less than 0.5% of
these positions (Fierman, 1990). Every prestigious high-paying profession in the United
States is dominated by men, both numerically and based on who wields the power
(Catalyst, 2000; Gutek, 1993). Within academia, an influential assessment of the status of
female faculty at MIT found that, controlling for professional accomplishments, senior
female faculty members received significantly lower salaries compared to equally
qualified male professors ("A Study on the Status of Women in Faculty in Science at
Nearly every working person will engage in salary negotiations over the course of their working life, whether at first hire, job transition, or promotion within a firm. As such, understanding what causes gender differences in salary negotiation outcomes is an important step toward developing practical solutions for correcting the problem.

To explore the social psychological mechanisms affecting women in self- and other-representation negotiations, I will first discuss the literature on gender role stereotypes and how these stereotypes contribute to gender differences in negotiation behaviors and subsequent outcomes. I will then explore the reasons for and the manner in which other-representation uniquely influences the behavior and outcomes of female negotiators. Predictions will be made about the way in which gender role stereotypes impact negotiation outcomes both through influencing the evaluations made by perceivers as well as through influencing the behavior of target negotiators themselves. Data will be presented from a series of studies testing the influence of gender role stereotypes on negotiating behavior in self- and other-representation conditions using real-life negotiating behavior, negotiation simulations, and laboratory experiments. Finally, contributions and implications for future research will be discussed.

**Gender and Negotiation Outcomes**

The empirical literature identifying gender differences in negotiation outcomes has shown mixed results (Rubin & Brown, 1975). While many studies suggest that men negotiate monetarily better outcomes than women (Gerhart & Rynes, 1991; King & Hinson, 1994; Neu, Graham, & Gilly, 1988; Stevens, Bavetta, & Gist, 1993), others find no significant differences in negotiated agreements (Kimmel, Pruitt, Magenau, Konar-Goldband, & Carnevale, 1980; Pruitt, Carnevale, Forcey, & Van Slyck, 1986). A more
recent meta-analysis of objective negotiation outcomes documented a small though significant difference in the monetary agreements of male and female negotiators, with men negotiating higher profits than women (Stuhlmacher & Walters, 1999).

While the empirical support to date has been inconsistent, gender is still an important construct to make sense of in the domain of negotiations (Kray & Thompson, 2005). Part of the inconsistency of research could be that gender affects negotiations in multiple ways, both positively and negatively, in different contexts. A recent review of the literature on gender and negotiations sought to decipher the multitude of effects of gender by identifying the major theoretical approaches applied by researchers in this area in order to prescribe directions for productive research (Kray & Thompson, 2005). The theoretical perspectives are grouped by the hypothesized locus of gender effects: focal negotiator, negotiation partner, negotiating dyad interaction, situation, and interaction between focal negotiator and situation. While the majority of empirical research to date studies the influence of gender on the focal negotiator, usually by means of sex as an individual difference measure, each of these perspectives derives unique and potentially complementary predictions and assumptions about negotiation behavior.

Research examining the effects of gender on the focal negotiator attempts to understand how men and women differ across stable situations. The theoretical underpinning of this perspective lies in the differential development of men and women in terms of socialization, self-construal, and moral values. Empirical research guided by this approach seeks to identify the main effects of gender on the focal negotiator for such dependent variables as competitiveness, relationship valuing, fairness judgments, self-worth and entitlement, and subsequent negotiated outcomes.
The second theoretical approach identified by Kray and Thompson (2005) focuses on the negotiation partner as the locus of gender effects. This perspective does not hold that men and women are fundamentally different as is proposed by the theory above, but rather that based on expectations, discrimination, and deconstructionism, negotiation partners treat men and women differently, thereby affecting negotiation processes and outcomes. Thus, gender differences in negotiated outcomes emerge as a function of opponent behavior.

The third approach assesses how the focal negotiator and the partner interact to cause gender effects. Research in this area draws on behavioral confirmation (self-fulfilling prophecy) as the mechanism for gender differences. The stereotypes held by the partner influence his/her behavior, which subsequently influences the focal negotiator in a way that necessarily confirms the original expectations.

The fourth perspective negates the importance of individual characteristics and asserts that gender differences can be explained solely by situational considerations such as differences in power and status, structural position including tokenism, and experience.

Finally, the fifth theoretical approach attempts to integrate the vast amount of focal negotiator-based research with situation-based research in assessing the interaction of the person and the situation. This perspective allows for a more complex view of gender differences by taking into account and identifying situational moderators affecting the expression of gender differences in negotiation behaviors and outcomes.

Having categorized past research along important theoretical dimensions, Kray and Thompson (2005) set forth a series of directives for future research on gender in negotiations. In particular, they call for more research from the partner-based perspective.
as well as the interaction of partner behavior and the situation (Kray & Thompson, 2005). This paper heeds that call by exploring the influence of gender role stereotypes on partner expectations and the subsequent effects on partner behavior, focal negotiator behavior, and a situation which moderates these effects.

Additionally, their review also noted a dearth of empirical research measuring the mediating mechanisms between gender and negotiation performance. This paper again heeds their call in attempting to measure the psychological and behavioral precursors that mediate the observed gender effects on negotiation outcomes. What follows is a discussion of the content of gender role stereotypes and not only how they influence the evaluations made by perceivers but also how gender role stereotypes influence the expectations and behavior of target negotiators themselves.

**The Content of Gender Role Stereotypes**

Despite advancements made by our society, gender role stereotypes affecting people’s perceptions and expectations of female employees are still prevalent (Eagly & Karau, 2002; Rudman, 1998; Valian, 1999). These expectations influence the way negotiators are treated by counterparts as well as how they themselves behave. Gender refers to the behavioral, cultural, and psychological traits associated with a particular sex (Eagly, 1987). Females more often are characterized by communal traits, including concern for others, nurturance, affection, helpfulness, sympathy, and emotional expression (Broverman, Vogel, Broverman, Clarkson, & Rosenkrantz, 1972; Eagly, 1987; Spence & Sawin, 1985). Males are usually characterized by agentic traits such as assertiveness, aggression, ambition, goal-directedness, competitiveness, dominance, independence, self-reliance, self-sufficiency, and decisiveness (Bakan, 1966; Bem, 1974;
Spence & Helmreich, 1978; Spence & Sawin, 1985). As a result, communal traits tend to be categorized as “feminine” whereas agentic traits tend to be categorized as “masculine.”

Gender role stereotypes apply not only to people but also to objects, situations, and behaviors. For example, many children’s toys are gendered; trucks are stereotypically for boys while dolls are stereotypically for girls (Snow, Jacklin, & Maccoby, 1983). Situations can be similarly gendered (Howard & Hollander, 1997). Competitive negotiations are associated with masculinity. The tactics necessary to claim value in competitive negotiations often hinge on individualistic motives toward personal gain rather than cooperative motives which would be more feminine in nature. Subtle activation of the belief that masculinity is important to negotiation success has been shown to impair the performance of female negotiators (Kray, Thompson, & Galinsky, 2001). Because these competitive negotiation tactics are characteristically masculine, they act as gender triggers by signaling the appropriate and inappropriate behavior for men and women that is consistent with gender role stereotypes defined by this gendered context (Bowles et al., 2005).

**Effects of Gender Role Stereotypes on Perceivers**

Gender role stereotypes operate as socially shared expectations regarding the appropriate behavior of men and women in society (Eagly, 1987). Gender role stereotypes are normative in that people tend to express attitudes, emotions, and behaviors that are consistent with others’ expectations of their masculinity (for men) or femininity (for women) (Eagly & Karau, 2002). Despite the fact that gender is flexible—men can be feminine and women can be masculine—common stereotypes ascribe
femininity to women and masculinity to men (e.g., Eagly, 1987; Terborg, 1977). In addition, perceivers enforce these stereotypical expectations on targets. As described above, gender role stereotypes also attach to situations. In a negotiation context, the situation is marked by masculinity. For female negotiators, this gendering of the situation is in conflict with the feminine gender role stereotype they are expected to fulfill as women. Given that gender role stereotypes have such a strong social influence and that they attach not only to people but also to situations, the following sections attempt to unravel how this conflict between expectations of individual and situational gender role stereotypes creates unique social constraints on the appropriate behavioral expression of female negotiators.

**Role congruity theory**

An influential stream of research that can inform our understanding of how gender role stereotypes influence negotiations is the theory of role congruity. This theory delineates the difficulties women face in achieving leadership positions at the hand of gender role stereotypes (Eagly & Karau, 2002). It describes how gender role stereotypes result in two forms of prejudice toward female leaders due to the incompatibility of masculine definitions of leadership with stereotypical femininity. Similar to the association of positive leadership traits with masculinity, successful competitive negotiation tactics are also stereotypically characterized by masculine behaviors (assertiveness, self-promotion, etc.) (Kray & Thompson, 2005; Kray et al., 2001). As such, adopting a competitive negotiation strategy is similarly in conflict with the behavioral expectations defined by the stereotypical feminine gender role and will result in the same prejudices as described in role congruity theory.
The first prejudice delineated by role congruity theory is based on the descriptive function of stereotypes. Descriptive norms are consensual beliefs about the way members of a particular group are (Biddle, 1979; Cialdini & Trost, 1998; Sarbin & Allen, 1968). They function by setting baseline expectations of what targets are like and how they will behave. In the context of leadership, role congruity theory argues that the prejudice stemming from this descriptive function of gender role stereotypes is the devaluation of a woman's potential for leadership because leadership ability is more stereotypical of men (Eagly & Karau, 2002). People believe the sexes are characterized by different traits and behaviors, some of which predispose men more favorably as competitive negotiators (Bakan, 1966; Eagly, 1987). In the context of negotiations, because competitive negotiation tactics are associated with masculine characteristics, evaluators will perceive women as less skilled at negotiating. While this may influence how negotiation counterparts expect female negotiators to behave, I argue it is not always the mechanism contributing to the poor performance of female negotiators.

While overt gender discrimination may occur in some negotiation contexts, for example the negotiated sale of a new car (Ayres & Siegelman, 1995), in most conflict frames special care is given to minimize disparate treatment of focal groups (Pinkley & Northcraft, 1994). As evidence of the former, Ayres and Siegelman (1995) found that car salesmen do treat female customers differently but that this behavior is likely based on statistical inferences about the customer (i.e., the gender role stereotypes affecting how women are perceived as negotiators) rather than an overt desire to discriminate. Pinkley and Northcraft (1994) describe the distinction between conflict frames along three orthogonal dimensions: (1) relationship versus task, (2) emotional versus intellectual, and
(3) cooperate versus win. In the car sale context, the relevant frame is likely to win the intellectual task. In this context striving for the highest price is the most desired end state. However, in the context of a salary negotiation, the ongoing relationship with the counterpart is an important component of the interaction, as is the desire to cooperate in finding a mutually satisfactory agreement that addresses both intellectual and emotional needs.

Given the more complex framing of the negotiation context, a purely economic drive to win by taking advantage of gender stereotypical conceptions of how females negotiate is unlikely. As such, I predict that in the context of salary negotiations, preconceived notions of female negotiating style based on descriptive stereotypes are not sufficient in explaining the effect of gender on negotiation processes or subsequent outcomes. Rather, I argue injunctive stereotypes, defined below, are an important contributor to gender differences in these negotiations.

The second prejudice outlined by role congruity theory is that women who adopt masculine traits in order to be seen as better leaders are punished for violating the feminine gender role stereotype (Eagly & Karau, 2002). This represents the function of gender role stereotypes as an injunctive, or prescriptive, norm. Injunctive norms are consensual beliefs about how members of a group ought to be (Cialdini & Trost, 1998). People generally approve of the communal qualities associated with women and the agentic qualities associated with men (Spence & Helmreich, 1978; Williams & Best, 1990). Women are thus viewed more favorably when they align their behavior with the feminine gender role stereotype and take on consistent roles and responsibilities (Glick & Fiske, 1996; Spence & Helmreich, 1978; Wood, Christensen, Hebl, & Rothgerber, 1997).
When women violate these norms, it can result in a backlash (Rudman, 1998; Rudman & Glick, 1999).

While the content of descriptive and injunctive stereotypes may be similar, it is important to distinguish between the distinct repercussions for violating the unique functions of descriptive and injunctive gender role stereotypes. In the case of the former, the result for the target may merely be seen as an exception to the rule and the perceiver subsequently updates his/her aggregate conception as it defines the content of the stereotype (Kunda & Thagard, 1996). In the case of the latter, injunctive norm violation is met by social backlash from the perceiver resulting in negative consequences for the target (e.g., Heilman, 2001; Rudman, 1998). Because injunctive norms are expectations of how men and women should behave, a violation is seen as a threat to the social structure of stereotypes and is punished in order to enforce conformity. To explain the nature of these social consequences in more detail, I turn to the research defining and providing empirical evidence for the backlash effect.

The backlash effect

The backlash effect represents the dilemma women face when trying to manage incongruent gender role stereotypes in masculine contexts. By behaving assertively, women might successfully compete and claim greater value in negotiations, but might also elicit punishment from others for violating their gender role stereotype (Cialdini & Trost, 1998; Rudman, 1998). Women who behave assertively are not as popular as men who act the same way (Butler & Geis, 1990; Costrich, Feinstein, Kidder, Marecek, & Pascale, 1975; Heilman, Block, Martell, & Simon, 1989; Rudman, 1998). Although self-confident women receive higher performance evaluations, they tend to be less liked by
peers than less confident women (Powers & Zuroff, 1988). Assertive women are often viewed as more hostile and less rational than similarly assertive male managers (Heilman, Block, & Martell, 1995). In short, masculine behavior can enhance competitive negotiation ability but can also result in social rejection.

Rudman’s (1998) description of the backlash effect captures the outcome of gender role stereotype violation for women in the workplace. According to Rudman (1998), women who demonstrate masculine behavior simultaneously increase their perceived competence and decrease their perceived likeability. Displaying masculine characteristics enhanced others’ perceptions of a woman’s ability to the point that it was considered the equivalent of a man’s (Rudman & Glick, 1999). However, by violating the expectation of submissiveness that corresponds to the feminine stereotype, these women were considered socially unskilled and subsequently less worthy of hire. Perceptions of females’ social skills were undermined by their attempts to appear masculine. This perceived lack of stereotypical femininity contributed to lower hiring rates of masculine women.

Another study by Rudman (1998) explored the positive and negative components of self-promoting behavior of women. Boasting about oneself or one’s accomplishments is an important aspect of gaining value in salary negotiations. Because self-promoting behavior, including demonstrations of confidence and assertiveness, is more normative of men (Miller, Cooke, Tsang, & Morgan, 1992), women who engage in these behaviors violate the feminine gender role stereotype. Rudman (1998) found that women who engaged in self-promotion impression management tactics were perceived as more able and competent but suffered costs to their perceived social attraction and hire-ability. This
backlash against women who violate the feminine stereotype by engaging in typically masculine behaviors must have strong implications in salary negotiations, where aggressive and competitive tactics are necessary to achieve monetary success. I predict that perceivers will socially punish assertive negotiation behavior of females but not of males.

**Effects of Gender Role Stereotypes on Focal Negotiators**

While role congruity theory and the backlash effect provide a basis for understanding how gender role stereotypes at the negotiation table will influence the evaluations made by perceivers of target negotiators, they do not adequately address how the same gender role stereotypes will influence the other member of the negotiation dyad. An important extension of these approaches is analyzing how the attitudes and behavior of the focal negotiator are influenced by gender role stereotypes, specifically by anticipation of the likelihood of backlash from their negotiation counterpart.

Gender role stereotypes likely influence the behavior of target negotiators as much as they influence perceivers. It is not uncommon for individuals to conform to stereotypical expectations of behavior thereby further perpetuating stereotype maintenance. Stereotype threat describes a behavioral conformity that serves to maintain the content of the stereotype itself (e.g., Steele, 1998). As one example, studies have found that the math performance of women suffered merely when subjects were led to believe that the task was diagnostic of gender. When the task was described as not producing gender differences there were no performance differences on the task (Spencer, Steele, & Quinn, 1999). It seems targets of stereotypes are influenced by the presence of stereotypical expectations.
In addition, the behavior of targets may be affected by stereotypes indirectly as well. Rather than directly reacting to the stereotypical expectations as described in stereotype threat, there is also evidence to suggest that the behavior of targets is affected by the expected reactions of perceivers. Rejection sensitivity is an individual difference measuring a person’s sensitivity to social rejection (Downey, Feldman, Khuri, & Friedman, 1994; Feldman & Downey, 1994). It involves an element of anticipatory reaction to the behavior of others, a monitoring of their relationships in order to avoid negative treatment from a social partner. A similar anticipation of negative reactions from one’s negotiation counterpart is predicted to influence the behavior of female negotiators in contexts that require a violation of injunctive gender role stereotypes. While not directly testing this psychological mechanism, recent research has found that women are less likely to initiate internal negotiations and that this behavior is reinforced by the tendency of perceivers to penalize such counter-stereotypical behavior (Bowles, Babcock, & Lai, 2007).

Given the normative and injunctive functions of gender role stereotypes, it is predicted that female negotiators, expecting and conforming to the prejudice that women negotiate worse than men, will hedge their behavior by using less assertive negotiation strategies, thus setting themselves up for failure. In fact, research has shown that men do set higher pre-negotiation goals relative to women (Bowles et al., 2005; Kray et al., 2001). This effect on pre-negotiation behavior is consistent with research positing the role of individual differences on factors that predispose negotiation approach (Emmons & Diener, 1986). Thus, I predict that in anticipation of the expected reaction of perceivers to their negotiation behavior, female negotiators will behave less assertively and use fewer...
competing tactics relative to men, subsequently resulting in monetarily worse negotiated outcomes. The predicted mediating mechanism inhibiting women from successfully engaging in assertive negotiation tactics and claiming negotiated value is a fear of the negative backlash that will incur if they violate injunctive gender role stereotypes.

This prediction is also consistent with research on stereotype threat. Stereotype threat explains that in certain situational contexts activation of relevant negative stereotypes can result in impaired individual performance (Steele, 1997). The stereotype implicating women as ineffective distributive negotiators, when activated, will lead women to perform poorly in such contexts. This is not to say that stereotype reactance does not occur, but that women who do react rather than conform to the negotiator stereotype will ultimately end up incurring the negative backlash for violation of the feminine gender role stereotype.

**Moderation by Representation Role**

The theory and hypotheses presented thus far focus on the pressures women face when negotiating on their own behalf. The other important contribution of this paper is in understanding the unique situational moderator of other-representation and the psychological mechanisms that enable women to negotiate more successfully on behalf of other people as opposed to themselves. Other-representation, defined as negotiating as an agent on behalf of another, has the potential to moderate both the effects of gender role stereotypes on the behavior of the focal negotiator as well as the behavior resultant from a negotiation counterpart’s gendered expectations.

Being “direct” in negotiation often requires the use of tactics dominated by masculine characteristics such as assertiveness, independence, and aggressiveness. When
representing another, women are freed from the constraints imposed by gender role stereotypes. What was once difficult to accomplish on one’s own behalf becomes doable when negotiating on behalf of another. Because representing another could invoke stereotypically feminine characteristics such as nurturance and concern for others, it is likely that gendered expectations about female negotiation behavior will be markedly different in conditions of other-representation than conditions of self-representation (Wade, 2001). As such, negotiation partners will expect and thus be more willing to accept assertive behaviors from female negotiators which stem from concern for their constituent. Since partner expectations of negotiator behavior will not differ between male and female agents, women are no longer risking a backlash because their behavior will not violate that deemed appropriate for the context. As such, assertive female agents will not suffer from the negative social appraisals predicted to impair self-representing women in accordance with the backlash effect. In addition, because women are more comfortable exerting the power and influence that derives from other-representation (Wade, 2001), focal negotiators will be more likely to use competing behaviors in negotiations and less likely to set low aspirations and behave submissively in interactions. Thus, female agents will negotiate salaries no worse than those of their male counterparts.

While psychological theory suggests that negotiating on another’s behalf increases one’s repertoire of available strategies, empirical testing is scant. Preliminary evidence has found a unique benefit of other-representation for female negotiators (Bowles et al., 2005). When negotiating salary, female negotiators fared significantly better when negotiating on behalf of another versus on their own behalf whereas
representation role had no effect on the salaries agreed to by male negotiators (Bowles et al., 2005). However, this empirical support is limited to one study and it is the only empirical test of the effect of representation role published to date. Further empirical testing is necessary to replicate and elaborate on the effect of representation role on gender and negotiations.

Alternate Accounts

Although there is convincing evidence in domains other than negotiation, especially from role congruity theory and the backlash effect, suggesting that gender role stereotypes may be an important constraint on self-representing women in salary negotiations, there are alternative explanations that should also be addressed in order to isolate the true cause of this effect. By giving sufficient attention to these alternate accounts the evidence presented will provide a clearer and more supportive view of how the gender role stereotype account most reliably predicts gender differences in negotiation outcomes both through the effect on perceivers’ evaluations and on the behavior of focal negotiators.

Entitlement

One alternative involves feelings of entitlement. Some research has found women feel less entitled to larger salaries compared to men (Callahan-Levy & Messe, 1979) and that this lack of entitlement is self-centered, not extending to similar others (Major, McFarlin, & Gagnon, 1984). This translates into lowered expectations, which in turn negatively impacts actual salaries (Major, Vanderslice, & McFarlin, 1984).

This research would predict women perform poorly negotiating their own salaries because of lack of entitlement but perform well negotiating for similar others to whom
lack of entitlement does not extend. While this would yield the same pattern of results predicted by the gender role stereotype account, it suggests a completely different psychological mechanism. Entitlement would only predict individual differences in the behavior of the focal negotiator, and would not predict differences in the perceiver. In addition, entitlement would predict that feelings of entitlement would mediate the relationship between gender and poor negotiated outcomes, as opposed to an anticipation of social backlash. Using survey measures and experimental controls, these effects of entitlement will be empirically explored in the data in order to better isolate gender role stereotypes as the psychological mechanism of the observed effects of gender on negotiation outcome.

Self-construal

Another alternative explanation for gender differences in salary negotiations stems from the research on self-construal. Some researchers hypothesize that due to patterns of socialization based on gender roles women develop a more interdependent self-construal relative to the more independent self-construal that men develop (e.g., Cross & Madson, 1997). As such, women may be more motivated in situations where the concerns of others are at stake rather than personal self-interest. If this were the case, men should perform better than women in conditions of self-representation whereas women should outperform men in conditions of other-representation.

The predictions set forth by the self-construal account are qualitatively different from the predicted pattern of results of the gender role stereotype account. The self-construal account predicts a cross-over interaction of gender and representation role on monetary negotiation outcomes. Based on this account, men are more driven by
independent self-construal and will thus be more motivated to perform in self-representation contexts, thereby outperforming women in these negotiations. Conversely, women are more driven by interdependent self-construal and will thus be more motivated to perform in other-representation contexts, thereby outperforming men in these negotiations. This is distinct from the pattern of results predicted by the gender role stereotype account which similarly predicts that men will outperform women in self-representation conditions but that men and women will perform equally well when representing the interests of another because both are free to use the negotiation tactics that are necessary to claim distributive value.

In addition, this alternative account would not predict differential behavior of perceivers. It would also argue that measured self-construal category would mediate the relationship between gender and negotiation outcomes rather than anticipated fear of social backlash. Efforts will be made to rule out self-construal as a viable alternative account by demonstrating and replicating the pattern of results for outcome effects, perceiver behavior, and focal negotiator behavior as consistent with the predictions of the gender role stereotype account.

Summary of Predictions

Before proceeding to present evidence in support of the gender role stereotype account of gender differences in negotiations, the following section delineates the specific predictions set forth in this chapter and the order in which these hypotheses will be addressed in subsequent chapters. The predictions and data will focus exclusively on the context of a dyadic salary negotiation. By restricting the context of study to salary negotiations, more consistent predictions can be made across studies to provide a more
holistic perspective of the many ways in which gender role stereotypes influence negotiation outcomes and processes.

Figure 1 presents a visual depiction of the economic and social consequences of assertive negotiation behavior by gender and representation role. One of the clearest distinctions drawn in this model is that in the context of negotiations, only women suffer severe consequences, either economic or social, for the behavioral choices that they make. Men are relatively unaffected by behavioral or situational constraints. For women, there are tradeoffs to be made in the self-representation condition. She can either choose to deviate from stereotypical expectations, thereby claiming more distributive value but subsequently incurring social consequences. Alternatively, she can conform to stereotypical expectations, thus avoiding social penalties but settling for economically worse outcomes. When negotiating on behalf of another person, the expectations of stereotypically appropriate behavior for a female negotiator is now aligned with assertive negotiation tactics, thereby freeing her to succeed both economically and socially.

**Effects on outcomes**

Given some of the inconsistencies of past research in reliably linking gender to differences in negotiated agreements, the first set of hypotheses is an attempt to replicate that actual outcome differences between male and female negotiators exist (Stuhlmacher & Walters, 1999). Moreover, this relationship will be moderated by representation role such that gender differences in negotiated outcomes are only predicted to exist in self-representation negotiations. Consistent with the findings of Bowles et al. (2005), it is predicted that representation role will moderate the effect of gender on negotiation outcomes. Self-representing female negotiators will agree to monetarily worse outcomes.
compared to self-representing male negotiators, but there will be no gender difference in outcomes under conditions of other-representation.

Hypotheses 1: Self-representing female negotiators will agree to monetarily worse outcomes compared to (a) self-representing male negotiators, (b) other-representing female negotiators, and (c) other-representing male negotiators. There will be no differences in the outcomes agreed to by these three other groups.

Chapter 2 will address the effect of gender role stereotypes on negotiation outcomes in an attempt to replicate the past findings in the gender literature. Studies 1 and 2 will directly test this set of hypotheses using data from simulated salary negotiations where men and women are randomly assigned to negotiate on their own behalf versus on behalf of another person.

Effects on Perceivers (Negotiation Counterparts)

Provided there are observable differences in the outcomes agreed to by male and female negotiators, the question becomes why. Why do women agree to monetarily inferior outcomes to men in one context (negotiating on her own behalf) but are fully able to negotiate salaries as high as men in another context (negotiating on behalf of another)? The theory of role congruity and evidence from the backlash effect implicate the role of the perceiver, in this case a negotiation counterpart, in imposing gender role stereotypes on target negotiators. Perceivers socially penalize behavior that violates injunctive gender role stereotypes. In the context of a negotiation, the tactics necessary to claim value are strongly characterized by traditionally masculine traits (i.e., self-promotion,
assertiveness, competitiveness, etc.). These negotiation tactics are in direct contrast to the ideals of the feminine gender role stereotype (i.e., nurturing, protective, communal, etc.).

By engaging in assertive negotiation tactics, self-representing female negotiators risk social backlash for behaving in a counter-stereotypical manner. However, when negotiating on behalf of another person, female negotiators are able to successfully engage in assertive tactics without fear of backlash because it is consistent with the communal and protective aspects of the feminine gender role stereotype that a woman assert her position on behalf of another individual. As such, it is predicted that perceivers will only punish the assertive behavior of female negotiators who are negotiating on behalf of themselves rather than on behalf of another, and that male negotiators will not be punished in either condition. In addition, because of the inherently competitive nature of negotiation contexts, even if male negotiators choose to behave less assertively, it is predicted that this will not be seen as a violation of the male gender role stereotype because he is still engaged in the baseline assertive behavior inherent in the negotiation context.

Hypotheses 2a: Perceivers will socially punish assertive negotiation behavior in self-representing female negotiators.

Hypothesis 2b: Perceivers will not socially punish similarly assertive negotiation behavior in other-representing female negotiators.

Hypothesis 2c: Perceivers will not socially punish male negotiators for differential negotiation behavior in either representation role.

Chapter 3 will further discuss the effect of gender role stereotypes on the evaluations of target negotiators made by perceivers. Study 3 will provide preliminary evidence
suggesting the differential punishment of female negotiators who violate injunctive
gender role stereotypes. Study 4 will use a more controlled laboratory experiment to
thoroughly test the nature of when and how social backlash is imposed by perceivers.

**Effects on Targets (Focal Negotiators)**

It would be overly parsimonious to assume gender role stereotypes only
influenced individuals on one side of the negotiation. As such, the next set of hypotheses
addresses how gender role stereotypes influence the behavior of focal negotiators. First,
the basic prediction is that gender differences in negotiation behavior exist when
negotiating on one’s own behalf but that when negotiating on behalf of another person,
there are no differences in how men and women negotiate.

Hypothesis 3a: Female negotiators are less assertive than male negotiators when
negotiating on their own behalf.

Hypothesis 3b: Female negotiators are *not* less assertive than male negotiators
when negotiating on behalf of another person.

Chapter 4 will discuss the effect of gender role stereotypes on focal negotiator behavior.
Specifically, Study 5 will directly test these hypotheses using retrospective self-reports
from men and women on how they handle everyday conflict situations when negotiating
on their own behalf versus negotiating on behalf of another person.

Next, it is predicted that these differences in competitive negotiation behavior will
be mediated by an anticipation of social backlash. Specifically, negotiators are aware of
the likelihood of social backlash for violating injunctive gender role stereotypes; thus, in
contexts where gender role stereotypes are in conflict with the negotiation strategies
necessary to claim value, negotiators will hedge their assertive behavior to avoid a social backlash.

Hypothesis 4: Gender differences in assertive negotiation behavior as moderated by representation role will be mediated by anticipated social backlash.

This mediating relationship will be tested in Study 6 using a computerized negotiation experiment. The design of the experiment allows for a direct test of how pre-negotiation feelings of anticipated backlash mediate actual concessionary behavior during the negotiation.

The following three chapters (2-4) will provide empirical evidence testing the hypotheses in sequence starting with negotiation outcomes, then the effect of gender role stereotypes on perceiver evaluations of targets, and finally the effect of gender role stereotypes on focal negotiator behavior. Throughout these chapters due attention will be given not just to provide support for the gender role stereotype account but also to provide evidence against the alternative hypotheses set forth by the entitlement and self-construal accounts. Following the empirical evidence, broader implications for this research will be drawn in Chapter 5, both with regard to the theoretical and practical contributions in addition to addressing limitations through directions for future research.
CHAPTER 2

Negotiation Outcomes

The purpose of this chapter is to present evidence demonstrating the effect of gender role stereotypes on negotiation outcomes as moderated by representation role. It is proposed that women are uniquely constrained by expectations to behave in accordance with the feminine gender role stereotype, else they will reap social backlash for violation of the injunctive norm. Because successful value claiming requires characteristically masculine negotiation strategies (assertiveness, competing, etc.), constrained usage of these behaviors limits the negotiation abilities of females. As such, female negotiators will be ineffective in claiming value in negotiations relative to men. Moreover, this effect will only be present in situations where the injunctive norms of the feminine gender role stereotype are in conflict with the negotiation strategies necessary to claim value. In conditions of other-representation, where the feminine gender role stereotype is aligned with value-claiming negotiation tactics, gender will have no effect on negotiated outcomes.

A meta-analysis of the past research linking gender and negotiation outcomes concluded that women claim less value than men in distributive negotiations (Walters et al., 1998). In addition, more recent research has yielded preliminary evidence to suggest that, as predicted, female negotiators settle for monetarily better agreements when negotiating on behalf of another individual rather than on their own behalf (Bowles et al., 2005). Taking these past findings into account, the studies presented in this chapter will serve as replication and will extend the past research by providing initial insights on the psychological mechanisms driving this particular pattern of effects. Specifically, the two
alternative explanations of the psychological mechanism for gender differences in outcomes, the theories of entitlement and self-construal, will be tested.

Two hypotheses are tested in this chapter: (1) self-representing females settle for monetarily worse salaries than self-representing males and (2) other-representing females negotiate higher salaries than self-representing females. These hypotheses about the effects of gender role stereotypes on outcomes are tested by measuring gender, manipulating representation role, and observing differences across groups in negotiated outcomes. Study 1 uses a salary negotiation exercise to test outcome differences. The results are replicated in Study 2 using the same exercise across varying mediums of communication.

**STUDY 1**

A role-play negotiation exercise was used in Study 1 to control the context of the negotiation and measure the effects of gender on outcomes by manipulating self- versus other-representation conditions. The manipulation of role materials facilitated testing the qualitative impact of other-representation on gender differences in salary negotiations. The sample of executive-level management students provides a conservative test of the proposed hypotheses given the experience and expertise in negotiations of the men and women in this sample. The alternative mechanisms proposed by theories of entitlement and self-construal will be discussed.

**Method**

**Participants**
Data were collected from 56 students enrolled in a course on Managerial Negotiations as part of an Executive Masters of Business Administration Program. The sample consisted of 45 (80%) males and 11 (20%) females.

Procedure

Participants engaged in a negotiation exercise designed to simulate a meeting to negotiate the starting salary of a new hire. The day prior to the negotiation each individual was assigned to a role and given confidential role-specific information materials to read over in preparation for the exercise. For the full text of each negotiation role see Appendix A. Half of the class was assigned to the role of hiring manager and the other half to the role of new recruit. As the focus is on salary negotiated by the new hire, only males were assigned to the hiring manager role to help control for sex of the counterpart across conditions. While this design choice does limit the potential to explore differences across dyad composition, assigning all hiring managers to be male is both externally valid and allows for cleaner tests of the proposed hypotheses.

Individuals in the new hire condition were randomly assigned to the manipulated conditions: half were instructed to play the role of the new hire negotiating on his/her own behalf and the other half were instructed to play the role of a long-time mentor to the new hire negotiating on behalf of the recruit due to a scheduling conflict that prevented the recruit from being present. Because there is evidence to suggest that feelings of entitlement (or lack thereof) do not extend to similar others (Major, McFarlin et al., 1984); therefore, in order to provide an appropriate test of this alternative mechanism, individuals negotiating as agents were told that the person they were representing was of the same sex as themselves.
All other information in the role materials was kept constant across conditions including sample information about the market distribution of salaries in the industry. Subjects playing the role of the recruit (and the agent for the recruit) were given industry information reporting a median salary of $108,000 with 70% of salaries falling between $93,000 and $123,000, and a high of $127,000 and a low of $88,000. They were also informed of an alternate job offer made by a competing firm, which, while non-negotiable, was said to be commensurate with the industry standard. Based on this information, negotiators would likely set their reservation point (the lowest level of salary they would accept before walking away from the negotiation with an impasse and taking the alternative offer) at the median, $108,000. The negotiation counterpart (i.e., the hiring manager) was given different information on the industry standard in order to create a sufficiently large zone of possible agreements. Hiring managers were told the industry median was $133,000 with 70% of salaries falling between $99,000 and $157,000, and a high of $181,000 and a low of $83,500. The hiring manager's best alternative to the negotiated agreement was to hire a different candidate who would likely request the industry median. As such, the hiring manager's reservation point should be around $133,000. This created a range of possible agreements between $108,000 and $133,000.

Dyads were randomly assigned and given twenty minutes to negotiate over a single distributive issue: salary. All other factors having to do with the job offer (e.g., vacation days, job assignment, bonuses, etc.) had already been decided and could not be negotiated. If no agreement was reached during this time allotment, the new hire would accept the static, non-negotiable job offer from another company and the hiring manager would hire another job candidate.
Measures

*Gender.* Biological sex (coded 0 for males and 1 for females) was used as a proxy for gender in this and all studies to follow rather than actual sex-role identification (i.e., masculine, feminine, androgynous) (Bem, 1974). Although sex is used in measurement, the hypotheses and discussion focus on gender because while sex and gender are highly correlated, they are not the same construct. Sex refers to biological differences between men and women as “stable dispositions” while gender refers to socialized differences that manifest as “fluctuating patterns” (Deaux & LaFrance, 1998, p. 789). Thus, the ideas and predictions tested herein focus on gender role stereotypes and their influence in negotiation contexts.

*Representation Role.* As discussed in the procedure section above, representation role was manipulated by design and coded as 0 for self-representing negotiators and 1 for other-representing negotiators. Participants were randomly assigned to these two conditions. Individuals in the self-representation condition were instructed to play the role of a new hire negotiating their own starting salary with the hiring manager. Individuals in the other-representation condition were instructed to play the role of the new hire’s longtime friend and mentor filling in for the new hire that is unable to be at the salary negotiation with the hiring manager due to a scheduling conflict.

*Entitlement.* In order to rule out the alternative hypothesis that self-representing women negotiate worse outcomes for themselves because they feel less entitled than men do, participants were asked to report on their feelings of personal entitlement in negotiations. Individual differences in feelings of entitlement were measured amongst a variety of psychological scales administered to the students prior to the first week of
class. This measure of entitlement is a 4-item context-specific scale that assesses feelings of entitlement relevant to negotiations on a scale from 1 ("Strongly Disagree") to 7 ("Strongly Disagree") (Babcock, Gelfand, Small, & Stayn, 2005). The following are the four items in the measure: "I deserve to have my interests taken care of," "Just because I want something, it doesn't mean I'm entitled to get it" (reverse-coded), "I think situations should be changed to fit my desires," and "I usually feel I've earned the right to have things go my way." The mean score on this measure for this sample of participants was 3.84 with a standard deviation of 0.89.

Negotiation Outcome. The dependent variable used in the analyses was the salary agreed upon by both parties in the negotiation. Because analyses were conducted at the dyad-level from the recruit's perspective, a higher salary indicates greater success at claiming distributive value while a lower salary indicates less success at claiming distributive value. There were no impasses in this sample; all dyads reached a mutually agreed upon outcome.

Results

Figure 2 shows the negotiated outcomes by gender and representation role. The pattern of results replicates past findings and is consistent with the predictions proposed. A meta-analysis of the past research on gender and negotiations concluded that in distributive negotiations, such as the salary negotiation used here, women agree to worse monetary outcomes relative to men (Walters et al., 1998). When looking at the results within the self-representation condition, the same effect emerges in this data (women: $116,700 versus men: $124,610; \(t = -1.79; \) d.f. = 12; \(p < .10\)). While this effect is only marginally significant using a two-tailed significance test, given the directional nature of
the proposed hypothesis and its function in replicating results found in others' research, it is acceptable to interpret the statistical significance of this relationship using a one-tailed significance test in analysis of the results. In addition, consistent with past research on the moderating effect of representation role (Bowles et al., 2005), women agreed to significantly lower salaries when negotiating on their own behalf than when negotiating on behalf of another individual (self: $116,700 versus other: $128,170; $t = -2.72; d.f. = 9; \( p < .05 \)). There was no significant effect of representation role on the salaries agreed to by men (self: $124,610 versus other: $127,060; \( t = -0.44, \) d.f. = 15; \( p = n.s. \)).

While these relationships do replicate past findings, superficial comparisons of mean differences provides little insight about which psychological mechanism drives the outcome effects. Looking at the overall pattern of effects and comparing predictions between proposed mechanisms will help elucidate the psychological underpinnings driving these effects. It is unlikely that women are simply incapable of negotiating favorable distributive outcomes due to fundamental differences between men and women. Women performed as well as men in the other-representation condition (women: $128,170 versus men: $127,060; \( t = 0.20, \) d.f. = 12; \( p = n.s. \)); thus, it would appear that women do have the capacity to be successful. The question remains, why are women successful at claiming value in some contexts (other-representation) but not in others (self-representation)? An explanation based on self-construal would argue that women are more motivated in other-representation contexts than they are in self-representation contexts because they are socialized to have a more interdependent rather than independent self-construal. While the data does confirm that women perform better when negotiating on behalf of another than when negotiating on their own behalf, what is not
consistent with the self-construal hypothesis is the effect of representation role on the performance of men. The self-construal hypothesis would predict that men would be influenced by representation role in the opposite direction. For example, men should be more motivated in self- versus other-oriented contexts because men are more independent than interdependent. As such we should observe men performing better when negotiating on their own behalf versus on behalf of another person. However, the data does not support this prediction. What seems more likely is that there is a unique pressure on women in the self-representation condition (potential backlash for violating the injunctive feminine stereotype) that men are unaffected by.

Results from this study show that the entitlement hypothesis is also an unlikely mediator in this context. Given that lack of entitlement does not extend to similar others, it would be expected that women who feel less entitled perform worse when negotiating on their own behalf. Moreover, it would be anticipated that depressed entitlement feelings would not affect women's performance in the other-representation condition. In this sample there was no significant correlation between sex and feelings of personal entitlement \( (r = .04; p = n.s.) \). Given the lack of relationship between these two variables, entitlement could not be statistically tested as a mediator of the outcome effects because it did not meet the appropriate criteria for inclusion. Women did not have diminished feelings of entitlement relative to men in this sample, disconfirming the possibility that feelings of entitlement were driving the outcome effects. This helps demonstrate that the disadvantage women face when negotiating on their own behalf is not due to lowered expectations of deservingness or entitlement but more likely a function of the situational constraints imposed by gender role stereotypes.
Discussion

The results from this study demonstrate the influence of gender and representation role on negotiation outcomes. The results also provide evidence that this relationship is a function of gender role stereotypes as opposed to the alternative explanations based on self-construal or entitlement. The nature of these differences, with self-representing female negotiators agreeing to lower salaries than all three other experimental groups, suggests a unique social pressure impairing the performance of women in this type of situation. While theories of entitlement might predict this same pattern of results, data collected on feelings of entitlement do not support this alternative expectation. In addition, arguments that a disposition toward interdependent self-construal drives the success of female negotiators might explain the success of women when negotiating on behalf of another person versus on their own behalf but does not explain why representation role does not similarly affect men in the opposite direction. The proposed model of gender role stereotypes most adequately explains the observed results.

It should be noted that though the pattern of results is a stable replication of past findings and provided evidence to disconfirm the alternative mechanisms, direct evidence testing mediation by gender role stereotypes is not afforded in this study. Subsequent chapters will address this shortcoming through the use of more controlled experimental designs that rely on computer-simulated negotiations. In order to justify the transition from face-to-face negotiations to a less rich communication medium, Study 2 will provide evidence that computerized laboratory experiments are appropriate for the study of the psychological mechanisms leading women to claim less value in self-representation negotiations.
STUDY 2

The goal of Study 2 was to test the pervasiveness of gender role stereotypes across different media of communication. Are the social pressures created by gendered expectations only present in face-to-face contact or do they also manifest themselves in negotiations conducted through computerized media, such as email and instant messaging? Understanding whether outcome effects occur in negotiations under these forms of remote communication media will allow for the development of more controlled laboratory experiments to better test the psychological mediators of the outcome effects.

Method

Participants

Data was collected from a sample of 68 Executive Masters of Business Administration students enrolled in a course on Managerial Negotiations. Seventy-five percent of the students were male and twenty-five percent were female.

Procedure

The same salary negotiation exercise used in Study 1 was administered for this study. Half of the class was assigned to the role of hiring manager and the other half to the role of new recruit. As in the previous study, only males were assigned to the role of the hiring manager in order to provide some control for the counterpart in the negotiation. The subjects in the new hire role were randomly assigned to negotiate on their own behalf or as a close friend/mentor negotiating on behalf of the new hire who was unable to attend the meeting due to a scheduling conflict. Participants were given their role materials and counterpart assignments one week prior to the assignment deadline. In this time, they were to read the materials, prepare for the negotiation, and contact their
counterpart to arrange a convenient time to complete the negotiation via email or instant messenger. There were no statistical differences between dyads who chose to conduct the negotiation via email or instant messenger so the analyses that follow collapse across these two media. As in Study 1, all other factors concerning the new hire’s job offer are pre-determined and non-negotiable. Salary was the only item under consideration during this negotiation. All negotiation dyads reached a mutually approved agreement.

Measures

Gender. Biological sex (coded as 0 for males and 1 for females) was again used as the proxy measure for gender in this study.

Representation Role. Self- versus other-representation was manipulated in the role materials assigned to subjects in each condition. The same role manipulations used in Study 1 were used here in Study 2. The self-representation condition described the role of a new hire negotiating his/her starting salary and the other-representation condition explained how the new hire has enlisted the services of a close friend/mentor to negotiate on their behalf because of a scheduling conflict.

Negotiation Outcome. The final negotiated salary was used as the dependent variable in the subsequent analyses. Since the final negotiated agreement in this exercise is a single numerical value, interpretation of value claiming is straightforward. A higher salary indicates more successful value claiming on the part of the recruit/agent while a lower salary indicates less effective value claiming.

Results

The results from this study, presented in Figure 3, replicate the findings of Study 1, providing further evidence for the effect of gender on negotiation outcomes as
moderated by representation role. When negotiating on behalf of another person, women fared significantly better than when negotiating on their own behalf (other: $124,920 versus self: $108,000; t = 4.16; df = 7; p < .01). In addition, women negotiated significantly lower salaries than men in the self-representation condition (female: $108,000 versus male: $115,000; t = -2.20; df = 15; p < .05). Although visually the graph may suggest that in the other-representation condition the performance of the women surpassed that of the men, in actuality this mean difference was not statistically significant (male: $116,640 versus female: $124,920; t = -1.82; df = 8; p = n.s.). Finally, men were not affected by the manipulation of representation role because there was no statistical difference in the salaries agreed upon by men across self- and other-representation (self: $115,000 versus other: $116,640; t = -0.41; df = 23; p = n.s.).

Discussion

Overall, the pattern of results obtained in Study 2 mirrored the results from Study 1. These findings help demonstrate the robustness of the effect of other-representation on gender differences in negotiation as it replicates across a spectrum of communication media, specifically less rich, computer-aided forms of communication. In addition, it provides the same implications as derived in Study 1 about the underlying mechanisms of the outcome effects. Specifically, Study 2 further disconfirms the likelihood that self-construal is driving the observed outcome effects as the pattern of results is inconsistent with the predictions set forth by that alternative hypothesis.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

The two studies comprising this chapter sought to demonstrate the effects of gender on negotiation outcomes. The studies also explored moderation by representation
role in order to gain an understanding beyond the question of if gender affects negotiation outcomes to when these gender differences manifest themselves. The results of both studies provide support for the prediction that women are disadvantaged relative to men in self-representing negotiations. Women in this condition agreed to monetarily worse outcomes as compared to men. However, when negotiating on behalf of another, this gender disparity in outcomes disappeared. Men and women negotiated equally favorable outcomes in conditions of other-representation. It is argued that this pattern of results provides preliminary evidence that gender role stereotypes impede the performance of women in self-representation conditions and disconfirms the alternative accounts provided by entitlement and self-construal.

Contributions

There are three major contributions of the studies presented in this chapter. First is the replication of past findings. Scientific research depends not just on demonstration of effects but also on replication. If observed effects cannot be replicated across studies there is considerable doubt as to the validity of any claims to be made. Given a bias toward the publication of novel findings in the academic press, replication is often overlooked as an important contribution to the development of solid scientific research. Because of this, concerted effort was given to replicating the basic effects reported in the literature. Specifically, a comprehensive meta-analysis found that in distributive negotiations, men negotiate better outcomes than women (Walters et al., 1998). Results from both studies replicated this direct effect of gender on distributive negotiation outcomes. Women, in the traditional self-representation condition, agreed to lower
salaries than men in both studies. In addition, the second study replicated the effects of
the first study across a more diverse set of communication media.

A second contribution of this research is an exploration of the boundary
conditions for these outcome effects by looking at situational moderation. Recent
research has introduced representation role as a potential moderator of gender effects in
negotiations. Preliminary evidence has shown that women agree to better outcomes when
negotiating on behalf of another compared to negotiating on their own behalf (Bowles et
al., 2005). The studies here buttress this evidence in providing additional support for this
relationship. Viewing this in conjunction with the replication of the basic outcome effects
provides a more comprehensive view of when gender differences emerge in distributive
negotiations.

A third contribution of this chapter is the attention given to comparing and
contrasting the predictions of alternative accounts for the observed findings. Value is
added when research not only demonstrates the viability of an account but also gives due
attention to analyzing the alternative explanations to provide disconfirming evidence.
While the nature of the data collected in these studies cannot be used to directly test the
part of gender role stereotypes as a contributor to the outcome effects, the pattern of
results does provide insights about the causal relationships that serve to rule out the
alternative explanations. Specifically, the account given by theories of self-construal
predicts patterns of results inconsistent with the findings presented here. Additionally,
entitlement was found to have no correlation with gender and thus cannot explain the
observed results. Through the process of elimination, the gender role stereotype account
remains a potential mechanism for the outcome effects that will be tested with greater methodological rigor in the upcoming chapters.

**Limitations**

Despite the contributions of this research, there are important limitations of the studies to be acknowledged and addressed in subsequent studies. First, while evidence against the alternative mechanisms points to the potential for gender role stereotypes as explanation of the outcome effects, the studies did not directly measure or test this psychological mediator. Furthermore, these two studies do not differentiate the locus of the cause. In merely presenting outcome effects it is uncertain whether one individual, the other or both members of the dyad contribute to the differences in negotiated outcomes. The following two chapters will rectify this shortcoming in testing how gender role stereotypes influence negotiated outcomes by examining the tendency of perceivers to engage in social backlash against injunctive norm violators (Chapter 3) and how anticipation of this social backlash affects the behavior of the focal negotiator (Chapter 4).

Another limitation of this research is that though the unit of analysis is the individual, the context of a negotiation is inherently dyadic, adding considerable noise to the data. While role materials helped to strictly define and control the negotiation context, there remains considerable variation in the negotiation as a function of the social interaction between the two negotiators. Each dyad is a unique interaction between two separate individuals, so understanding how one negotiator contributes to differences in outcomes is difficult to statistically test when each individual is likely experiencing a unique negotiation interaction. While this dyadic interaction is an important aspect of the
negotiation, especially in contribution to the dynamics of gender role stereotypes (imposing and conforming to injunctive gender norms), it is difficult to statistically control. As such, controlling one side of the negotiation dyad will yield more interpretable differences across individuals to see how individuals behave or react differently to equal treatment. Given this, some of the studies to be presented in later chapters will attempt to reduce the external variation in dyads by experimentally controlling a confederate and measuring how subjects react to the exact same negotiation counterpart.

Another limitation of both studies is the small sample size used. While the power in these studies was sufficient to obtain statistical significance in the analyses, an increased sample size will be necessary when including more variables to test the psychological mediators of the outcome effects. To address this, most of the studies to be presented in the following chapters will employ larger samples for hypothesis testing.

Conclusion

This chapter demonstrated that female negotiators agree to monetarily worse outcomes compared to men but only when negotiating on their own behalf. When negotiating on behalf of another individual women claim as much value as men. The next two chapters will more directly test the psychological mechanisms contributing to these outcome effects. Chapter 3 will explore how perceivers impose injunctive gender role stereotypes on self-representing female negotiators by differentially punishing this group for violating gendered expectations of behavior. Chapter 4 will examine how anticipation of this backlash effect affects the negotiation strategies and behavior of the focal negotiator.
CHAPTER 3

Perceiver (Negotiation Counterpart) Behavior

The purpose of this chapter is to apply role congruity theory (Eagly & Karau, 2002) and research on the backlash effect (Heilman, 2001; Rudman, 1998) to the context of negotiations in order to understand how perceivers differentially impose injunctive stereotypes on female negotiators and how this contributes to gender differences in negotiation outcomes. The literatures on leadership and managerial potential/competence define a context in which the behavioral demands of the situation are in conflict with behavioral expectations governed by socially construed gender role stereotypes. Similar to the masculine definitions of leadership, value claiming negotiation tactics are characterized by behaviors typically considered masculine (e.g., assertiveness, dominance, self-promotion, etc.). These behaviors are in conflict with the behavioral expectations defined by feminine gender role stereotypes (e.g., nurturance, submissiveness, communal-orientation, etc.).

This conflict can manifest itself in two different ways based on the social function of stereotypes. Perceivers may approach the negotiation with the expectation that female negotiators will be worse at claiming value and subsequently behave in ways to take advantage of this perception. Alternatively, perceivers may punish female negotiators who violate the feminine stereotype by using competitive negotiation tactics to claim value. I predict that the latter function is why female negotiators are performing worse in distributive negotiations, because there are social consequences for female negotiators but not male negotiators. Also, when the context is altered such that competitive tactics are no longer in conflict with the feminine gender role stereotype, these social penalties
will disappear. For example, negotiating on behalf of another alters the interpretable content of the same behaviors. In this context it could be seen as socially appropriate for a woman to assert the interests of another because this is consistent with the communal, nurturing, and protective aspects of the feminine gender role stereotype.

The predictions to be tested in this chapter are that perceivers (negotiation counterparts) socially punish assertive negotiation behavior in female negotiators but not in male negotiators. In addition, this relationship is moderated by representation role. Other-representation modifies the content of the injunctive gender role stereotype such that perceivers find assertive negotiation behavior acceptable and subsequently do not socially punish other-representing women for behaving assertively in their negotiations.

**STUDY 3**

The purpose of this study was to assess whether perceivers differentially punish female negotiators for engaging in overtly assertive negotiation behaviors. It is predicted that female negotiators are socially penalized for behaving in the characteristically masculine ways that define successful value claiming strategies because it is a violation of the injunctive norms of the feminine gender role stereotype. It is also argued that when negotiating on behalf of another the injunctive norms against assertive behavior are no longer salient because in this context competitive negotiation strategies are not in conflict with the communal aspect of the feminine gender role stereotype.

**Method**

**Participants**
Data for this study were collected from 36 Masters of Business Administration students enrolled in a class on Managerial Negotiations. Eighty-one percent (81%) of subjects were male.

Procedure

A salary negotiation exercise similar to that used in Studies 1 and 2 was administered during the second week of a course in negotiations. As before, only males were assigned to the role of hiring manager and those assigned to the new recruit role were randomly assigned to one of two conditions based on representation role. Individuals in the self-representation condition played the role of a job candidate negotiating the value of their starting salary. Individuals in the other-representation condition played the role of a longtime friend and mentor to the new hire who is filling in to negotiate this starting salary due to a scheduling conflict that prevents the candidate from attending the meeting. The variation between this study and the two prior was that all participants in this sample were instructed to aggressively use the value claiming negotiation tactics they had learned during the class session. Encouraging all subjects to behave in a similar way and engage in similar negotiation tactics helped reduce variability in behavior in order to better understand how perceivers may differentially punish that same behavior when enacted by different individuals. Following the negotiation, counterparts (the hiring managers) were asked to report on the impression they formed of the candidate/agent.

Measures

Gender. As in the previous studies, gender was measured using biological sex with males coded as 0 and females as 1.
Representation Role. The same salary negotiation exercise used in the previous two studies was used in this study. The manipulation of representation role was also the same.

Social Backlash. Social backlash was measured by asking perceivers to report on a scale from 1 (“Extremely negative”) to 7 (“Extremely positive”) the type of impression they formed of their negotiation partner. Less positive impressions were interpreted as greater backlash against the assertive behavior negotiators were encouraged to engage in.

Results

Prior to testing whether perceivers socially punished the assertive behavior of female negotiators, I first tested whether encouraging negotiators to aggressively use value claiming negotiation tactics influenced their approach to the negotiation. Indeed, this coaching resulted in equalizing negotiation outcomes across all experimental groups. Unlike in Studies 1 and 2 where negotiators were not coached in how to behave, there were no statistical differences in the salaries agreed to by male and female negotiators in either representation role condition (self-representation: male $119,250 versus female $121,667; t = -0.57, p = n.s. and other-representation: male = $124,300 versus female $124,500; t = -0.03; p = n.s.). Nor was there a statistical difference within female negotiators across representation role (self-representation $121,667 versus other-representation $124,500; t = -0.29; p = n.s.). These statistically equivalent outcomes were taken as evidence that participants followed the coaching directives and made a conscious effort to negotiate assertively.

Given the overtly assertive negotiation behavior of all subjects, the question became whether perceivers would react differently to this same behavior based on
whether it was a man or a woman engaging in these tactics. Did self-representing female negotiators suffer social backlash at the cost of this financial gain? Figure 4 shows the post-negotiation impression formed of target negotiators based on gender and representation role. As predicted, self-representing female negotiators were socially penalized for behaving assertively while self-representing males were not (4.33 versus 5.25; $t = 2.25, d.f. = 5, p < .10$). Further, within female targets, only the self-representing negotiators were viewed negatively as seen in a mean comparison of the impressions formed of females in the self- and other-representation role conditions (4.33 versus 5.33; $t = -2.12, d.f. = 4, p < .10$). While these effects are only marginally significant using a two-tailed significance test, it is acceptable to interpret the statistical significance of these differences using a one-tailed test in this relationship because of the directional nature of the hypothesis. Other-representing female negotiators did not receive lower impression scores in comparison to either of the male groups (5.33 versus self-representing males 5.25; $t = 0.21, d.f. = 5, p = n.s.$ versus other-representing males 5.00; $t = 0.50, d.f. = 4, p = n.s.$). These findings provide evidence that perceivers uniquely punish, through less favorable personal impressions, self-representing female negotiators for engaging in overly assertive value claiming negotiation tactics.

**Discussion**

The results from this study provided preliminary evidence that perceivers react negatively to female negotiators who violate the feminine gender role stereotype through the impressions they form of the target. Perceivers formed less positive impressions only of assertive self-representing female negotiators. Assertive behavior was not punished in men or in other-representing female negotiators. It is argued that this disproportionate
punishment is a function of the injunctive norms of gender role stereotypes limiting the repertoire of socially acceptable negotiation behavior for females. When negotiating on one's own behalf, the feminine gender role stereotype is in conflict with assertive value claiming negotiation tactics, but when negotiating on behalf of another person, assertive value claiming is aligned with the communal, nurturing and protective aspects of the feminine gender role stereotype. Thus, women are punished for norm-violating behavior in the former condition but are not punished in the latter. Perceivers do not punish assertive negotiation behavior of men in either condition because the negotiation context, in general, is inherently defined by masculine properties. Assertive male negotiation behavior is consistent with the masculine gender role stereotype regardless of representation role.

While the pattern of results obtained in this study provide initial evidence about how perceivers enforce injunctive norms through social punishment, the small sample size and variable behavior of the target negotiators somewhat limits the internal validity of the data in this study. To rectify this, the following study samples a larger number of participants and imposes more experimental control to isolate how perceivers react to similarly assertive or non-assertive behavior in targets that vary in gender and representation role.

**STUDY 4**

The purpose of this study is to test, with greater experimental rigor, the nature of perceivers' social backlash against female negotiators who violate the injunctive norms of the feminine gender role stereotype. It is predicted that perceivers socially punish assertive female negotiators in contexts where the use of aggressive value claiming
negotiation tactics is in conflict with the injunctive norms of the feminine gender role stereotype. Specifically, assertive female negotiators are punished when negotiating on their own behalf but not when negotiating on behalf of another person. This is because under conditions of other-representation, assertive value claiming tactics are no longer in conflict with the feminine gender role stereotype because they reinforce the image of a nurturing and communal woman aggressively pursuing the interests of another party.

These predictions assume the reactions of perceivers to focal negotiators are influenced more by the injunctive rather than the descriptive functions of gender role stereotypes. To test this assumption, this study will attempt to distinguish between how the descriptive and injunctive functions of stereotypes influence behavior and perceptions. Ultimately the data will show that perceivers are minimally influenced by the descriptive aspect of gender role stereotypes and are extremely predictable in their maintenance of the injunctive norms through social punishment of norm-violating target negotiators.

In addition to testing when perceivers socially backlash against targets, this study will also explore the nature of how perceivers impose these social consequences. Is the backlash effect merely rooted in personal feelings of liking toward the target or does this backlash pervade into work-related contexts as well?

**Method**

**Participants**

Data for this study were collected from 226 subjects recruited on campus at Columbia University. The sample consisted of 112 (49.6%) male participants and 114 (50.4%) female participants with a median age of 22 years old.
Procedure

A vignette-based five round negotiation simulation was used to collect data on how perceivers react to the assertive behavior of target negotiators based on gender and representation role. The experiment was conducted on the computer through the internet. Upon entering the lab, subjects read and signed an informed consent document before beginning the experiment. They were then seated at a computer and told to follow all on-screen instructions. Participants read a brief introduction explaining that they were to imagine themselves in the role of a hiring manager during the following negotiation. They read through confidential role materials describing the nature of the salary negotiation complete with sample industry statistics and information about the other party in the negotiation.

Subjects were randomly assigned to negotiate against Mark or Mary who was either the new recruit negotiating on their own behalf or as an agent on behalf of the recruit. After reading through the role information, participants were asked to think about and report on some basic pre-negotiation measures: reservation point, target point, and opening point. The reservation point represents the most the hiring manager is willing to pay before walking away from this negotiation in an impasse and resorting to the alternative option, hiring another equally appealing candidate. The target point represents the number they would ideally like to settle on. The opening point is the first offer they would likely make.

The actual negotiation simulation took place through a series of vignettes. In the first round, subjects were told:

"During the first exchange in the negotiation, you offered a salary of $30,500. While you recognize this number is ambitious, you believe it is a reasonable
salary given Mary’s lack of experience and young age. Mary does not agree to your offer. She explains, ‘Your offer is insulting, it is way too low for me.’ Instead, she proposes a counteroffer of $50,000 saying, ‘You would be foolish not to seriously consider this counteroffer.’”

The underlined statements were used as the manipulation of assertive and non-assertive negotiation behavior. In this example, the target negotiator is assertive. In the non-assertive condition the statements read, “Thank you for that offer, but I was hoping to earn more,” and “I believe this salary is fair to both you and me.” Assertive and non-assertive statements were validated with pre-testing to determine both their categorization into these two distinct groupings as well as the likelihood of use in a negotiation context. The numerical offers and counteroffers made by each party in the negotiation were static across manipulations. Following each round of the negotiation, subjects were asked to report using Likert-type response scales the impressions they were forming about the target negotiator.

The experiment continued in this same pattern of vignette followed by impression questions for a total of five rounds at which point the participant was informed that a mutually agreed upon salary had been reached. Following the end of the negotiation, participants were asked to answer a series of questions about their satisfaction with the outcome, overall impressions of the target negotiator, and intent to socially backlash against the target negotiator.

**Measures**

*Gender.* Gender of the target negotiator was manipulated in this study. Participants were randomly assigned via a computerized random number generator to negotiate against Mark (male) or Mary (female). These names as well as gendered
pronouns (he versus she) were used to signal the gender of the target to the study participant.

*Representation Role.* Representation role was also manipulated in this study. Participants were told to imagine themselves negotiating either against a self-representing target or an other-representing target. Self-representing targets were new recruits negotiating salary on their own behalf. Other-representing targets were colleagues within the same organization who had referred the new hire for the job. This manipulation was used in order to equalize the future relationship with the negotiation partner across conditions so that reputation concerns would not be confounded with representation role. Targets in the other-representation condition were either negotiating on behalf of a woman (Sarah) or a man (Josh). However, in the data there were no differences based on gender of the principle so the subsequent analyses collapse across this manipulation.

*Negotiation Behavior.* As described above, target negotiator behavior was manipulated through the verbal accounts given by the target for refusal of the offer and worthiness of the proposed counteroffer. Participants were randomly assigned to negotiate against a target that behaved either assertively or non-assertively during the negotiation. The statements used for this manipulation are presented in Appendix B.

*Social Backlash.* Intent to socially backlash against violators of injunctive norms was measured following the negotiation interaction using scale items developed to capture both work-based and personal social punishment. Effort was made to distinguish between these separate domains of social backlash in order to better understand how perceivers enforce injunctive norms of gender role stereotypes, in a domain-specific manner or generalized across domain. The items used to measure social backlash are
presented in Appendix C. The wording of the items is such that a lower score actually indicates a greater tendency to social backlash while a higher score indicates greater social acceptance of the target individual. Both subscales had high Cronbach’s alphas (work-based: $\alpha = .88$; personal: $\alpha = .87$). The subscales were also very highly correlated with one another ($r = .74, p < .001$). Due to this high correlation and because the pattern of results were similar for both scales, they were collapsed into a single measure of generalized social backlash for the following analyses ($\alpha = .91$).  

*Competency Backlash.* To test the pervasiveness of negative evaluations made by perceivers, participants were asked to report on the leadership competence of the target negotiator. Specifically, participants were asked to indicate on a Likert-type scale from 1 (“Not at all”) to 7 (“A great deal”), “To what extent do you believe Mary would make a good leader?” and “Would you like to be on a project team lead by Mary?”

*Exploitation of Stereotypes.* In order to test whether perceivers treat male and female negotiators differently based on the descriptive function of gender role stereotypes, pre-negotiation measures of reservation point, target point, and opening point were collected. If perceivers are influenced by these descriptive stereotypes of how men and women behave, they would expect women to be poor negotiators relative to men.

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1 Additional data was collected from all participants on their personal adherence to gender role stereotypes through both explicit measures of Ambivalent Sexism (Glick & Fiske, 1996) and Modern Sexism (Swim, Aikin, Hall, & Hunter, 1995), and an implicit association test (Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003). These measures were included as potential moderators of the likelihood to backlash against injunctive-norm violation. It was predicted that perceivers with stronger gender-biased beliefs would be more likely to enforce injunctive norms of the feminine gender role stereotype against assertive female negotiators. To test whether strength of gender prejudice heightened likelihood of a perceiver to backlash against a target, each of the operationalizations of sexism were included separately as moderators in regression analyses. No evidence was found for statistical moderation by any of the measures of sexism. Individuals with sexist beliefs did not punish women more for violating the feminine gender role stereotype; rather, all perceivers, sexists and non-sexists alike, enforced these injunctive norms through social backlash. It should be noted that non-results obtained from the IAT, which are inconsistent with some past research, are likely a function of a ceiling affect given the limited variability of scores within the population.
Taking advantage of this difference, we should expect to see perceivers setting more ambitious pre-negotiation aspirations when paired with female negotiators than with male

**Results**

Table 1 presents means and standard deviations of pre-negotiation aspirations set by subjects based on the experimental conditions defined by representation role and gender of the target negotiator. These numbers serve to test the extent to which descriptive gender role stereotypes influence the bargaining behavior of perceivers. Mean comparisons using t-tests reveal no significant differences in the pre-negotiation aspirations set by perceivers when paired against male or female negotiators in either the self- or the other-representation conditions. These null results are interpreted as an indication that perceivers are not taking advantage of or differentially treating male or female negotiators based on the descriptive function of gender role stereotypes.

To test whether the injunctive norms of gender role stereotypes are influencing perceivers, subjects' reported intent to socially punish targets were compared across experimental conditions. The prediction was that self-representing female negotiators would incur negative appraisals for assertive negotiation behavior but that other-representing female negotiators would not suffer backlash for the same behavior because it would no longer be perceived as counter-stereotypical. Figure 5 depicts the mean reports by perceivers of social backlash for all experimental groups. This pattern represents a significant triple interaction of gender, representation role, and assertive negotiation behavior (Interaction coefficient: $B = 1.56$ (0.63); $t = 2.47; p < .05$; Model: $F(1, 219) = 3.08; p < .01$). Within the assertive condition, as predicted, self-representing female negotiators were socially punished compared to all three other groups (female
self: 3.61 versus male self: 4.17, t = 1.80, p < .10; versus female other: 4.39, t = 2.37, p < .05; versus male other: 4.43, t = 2.60, p < .05). Interestingly, in the non-assertive condition, other-representing female negotiators were punished for not asserting themselves compared to the remaining three conditions (female other: 3.80 versus female self: 4.71, t = 3.16, p < .01; versus male self: 4.49, t = 2.08, p < .05; versus male other: 4.62, t = 2.42, p < .05). This provides strong support for the contention that representation role moderates the extent to which gender role stereotypes are imposed in a given situation because the manipulation not only relieved the pressures faced by self-representing women but rather imposed new injunctive norms on the other-representing women. Other-representing females are similarly constrained by the feminine gender role stereotype to behave in ways that align with the injunctive norm of the stereotype. In this context, women are expected to aggressively pursue the interests of the other party and when they fail to do so, as captured by the non-assertive negotiation behavior manipulation, they are socially punished for violating the injunctive expectations of the feminine gender role stereotype.

While the evidence of social backlash against female negotiators engaging in norm-violating behavior, in both the self- and the other-representation conditions, provides a clear and consistent story about the force of gender role stereotypes inhibiting negotiation behavior, alternative explanations are possible. Some might argue that in the assertive behavior condition, other-representing females remain unpunished socially because although their behavior is still counter-stereotypical, as the agent, they are not the appropriate target for social punishment. Instead the person they are negotiating on the behalf of could be the one punished for the agent’s assertive behavior. However, this
is not the case. Subjects in the other-representation condition were asked the same 6-item social backlash measure not just in reference to the target negotiator, but also the candidate for whom they were negotiating. Contrary to the alternative explanation, clients of assertive female agents were not socially punished either (client of assertive male agent: 4.28 versus client of assertive female agent: 4.43; \( t = -0.68; p = n.s. \)). In addition, that alternative account does not sufficiently explain why female agents are socially punished for counter-stereotypical behavior in the non-assertive negotiation behavior condition.

Data from the competence backlash measure were used to test whether generalized social backlash extended into domain-specific competency evaluations. There was no direct effect of the manipulated conditions on leadership evaluations. Past research has found that assertive women are rated higher on dimensions of leadership and competence (Rudman, 1998; Rudman & Glick, 1999; 2001). This research also shows that assertive women are seen as less attractive, thus despite the high competency ratings are less likely to be hired. These effects may not have been directly replicated in this dataset because the leadership questions administered confounded these two components of competency and likeability. The evidence that perceivers preferred to be led by non-assertive females compared to assertive females (4.37 versus 3.79, \( t = 1.79, p < .10 \)) demonstrates the extent to which feelings of liking may have confounded impressions of leadership competency. Nonetheless, these results are still interesting, and consistent with the past research.

In addition, there were strong correlations between social backlash and both leadership competency measures (Good leader: \( r = .52, p < .001 \) and Desire to be led by:
This finding suggests that though competence appraisals were not directly influenced by norm violation, there are residual indirect effects through generalized social backlash. However, this result could also be interpreted as a consistency or halo effect (Thorndike, 1920) in that feelings of liking pervade into attributions of competence. To check this assumption, the correlation between liking and competence was compared for male and female targets in the assertive and non-assertive conditions using Fischer Z-transform (Papoulis, 1990). While liking and competence were positively correlated for all groups, the link between the two was the smallest for assertive females ($r = .29$ versus assertive males: $r = .56$, $p < .10$; versus non-assertive females: $r = .68$, $p < .01$; versus non-assertive males: $r = .57$, $p < .10$). The assertive female target was perceived to be a good leader despite being liked less, which is consistent with past research (e.g., Rudman, 1998; Rudman & Glick, 1999, 2001).

**Discussion**

The findings from this study provide evidence that gender role stereotypes constrain the socially acceptable behaviors of female negotiators. Perceivers are more likely to socially backlash against violators of the injunctive norms than individuals who behave in congruence with gender role stereotypes. The results also showed that manipulating representation role modified the content of perceiver expectations of stereotypical behavior. Not only did perceivers backlash against assertive self-representing female negotiators as predicted, but they also socially punished non-assertive other-representing female negotiators for not conforming to expectations of stereotypical female behavior. Because negotiating on behalf of another is congruent with the feminine gender role stereotype, women in this condition who do not assertively
conform to this behavioral expectation are socially punished for violating the gender role stereotype.

Further, evidence was presented that distinguished between the descriptive and injunctive functions of gender role stereotypes in this negotiation context. The pre-negotiation behavior of perceivers was not affected by the descriptive function of gender role stereotypes, but rather their post-negotiation evaluations of target individuals were enforcing the injunctive norms of gender role stereotypes. This is an important distinction to be aware of because though the content of the stereotype is similar, the function and ultimate effect of that stereotype is different when based on descriptive versus injunctive norms.

The results of this study also provide evidence about the nature of social backlash against violators of injunctive norms. Specifically, perceivers intended to reduce social interaction with norm-violating targets in both work-based and personal domains. This shows that the penalty for violating injunctive gender role stereotypes is not domain-specific, but rather universally affects a perceiver’s basic social evaluation of the target individual. Also, there was no direct effect of stereotype violation on perceptions of leadership competence; direct backlash was purely social in nature.

**GENERAL DISCUSSION**

This chapter sought to better understand how gender role stereotypes influence the evaluations made by perceivers of target negotiators. The first study offered preliminary evidence suggesting that perceivers are not socially accepting of female self-representing negotiators who engage in overtly assertive negotiation strategies but that this same behavior is acceptable when exhibited by a male negotiator or even a female
negotiator who is negotiating on behalf of another individual. It is argued that the differential punishment of this one group is due to the violation of injunctive norms of gender role stereotypes.

As an inherently masculine context, value claiming negotiations demand the use of characteristically masculine strategies involving assertiveness, self-promotion, and dominance. This is in conflict with the feminine gender role stereotype deeming that women are kind, gentle, and communal. In a situation where gendered expectations of behavior are in conflict, women who engage in counter-stereotypical ways risk social backlash for violating behavioral expectations. This is why women negotiating on their own behalf were punished for being assertive. However, when negotiating on behalf of another individual, being assertive in the negotiation is no longer in conflict with the feminine gender role stereotype because it is congruent with the expectation that women are protective, nurturing, and communal. As such, other-representing female negotiators were not socially punished for engaging in assertive negotiation tactics.

The second study in this chapter offered further refinement of how gender role stereotypes influence perceivers. By experimentally controlling the behavior, gender, and representation role of the target negotiator, more interpretable results were obtained in comparing how perceivers differentially evaluate targets based solely on these manipulations. Gender role stereotypes do not influence how perceivers plan to behave toward targets in the negotiation; perceivers did not set any different pre-negotiation aspirations when paired with male or female, or self- or other-representing negotiation partners. Instead, the injunctive aspects of gender role stereotypes seem to affect how perceivers evaluate targets. The data showed that perceivers only socially punished
targets in conditions where negotiation behavior was incongruent with behavioral expectations defined by gender role stereotypes. Specifically, assertive self-representing female negotiators were socially punished for behaving in a counter-stereotypical manner. Additionally, non-assertive other-representing female negotiators were also socially punished because the content of the gender role stereotype is altered in this condition. When negotiating on behalf of another it becomes counter-stereotypical for a woman not to aggressively assert the interests of the other party because it violates the protective, nurturing and communal aspect of the feminine gender role stereotype.

**Contributions**

There are many theoretical and practical implications for the research presented in this chapter. The first goal of the chapter was to apply the research on leadership and managerial potential in the newer context of negotiations. Research in the leadership domain has argued that the advancement of women up the corporate ladder is stifled by the incongruity of the masculine ideal of leadership and the feminine gender role stereotypes. Like the masculine conception of an ideal leader or manager, value claiming negotiation tactics are characterized by overly masculine qualities and traits: being assertive, aggressive, dominant and self-promoting. As such, it was predicted that the prejudices toward female leaders would be similarly imposed on female negotiators. The results reported here were consistent with the predictions and findings in the leadership literature on role congruity theory (Eagly & Karau, 2002), biases toward female leaders (Heilman, 2001), and the backlash effect (Rudman, 1998). Not only does this represent a successful application of theory from one domain (leadership) into a completely new domain (negotiations), but more importantly it suggests even wider applications to any
contexts where the behavioral demands of the situation are in conflict with stereotypical expectations of the target, even beyond gender.

Another important contribution of this research is the moderation of injunctive gender role stereotypes by representation role. It was predicted and found that representation role moderated the likelihood of a perceiver to punish a female negotiator for behaving assertively. Self-representing assertive female negotiators were socially punished while similarly behaving other-representing female negotiators did not incur social backlash. Instead, perceivers socially punished other-representing female negotiators for not being assertive enough. This latter finding is especially influential in supporting the role of injunctive gender role stereotypes in negotiations because it demonstrates how behavioral expectations based on gender role stereotypes can be altered based on the situation. When representing oneself, assertive negotiation behavior is incongruent with the feminine gender role stereotype. When representing another, that same behavior is no longer in opposition; it is actually congruent with the feminine gender role stereotype, specifically the characteristics of being nurturing, protective and communal. This implies that women are not necessarily doomed to suffer from gender role stereotypes indefinitely but rather that there are situations, even within a masculine context, where the behavioral demands of the situation are compatible with the feminine gender role stereotype.

Another contribution of this research was the exploration of the nature of the backlash against female negotiators violating the feminine gender role stereotype. The results showed that the perceivers’ evaluations were not domain-specific but rather were pervasive, affecting more generalized social acceptance influencing both work-based and
personal social desirability of the target individual. However, social backlash did not extend into perceptions of leadership ability as there were no differences across experimental conditions in the degree to which perceivers evaluated targets as good leaders or as someone who they would personally want to be led by. From this finding it appears that injunctive norm violations affect perceivers’ evaluations of target individuals with regard to social desirability and acceptance rather than leadership-based competence assessments. However, there are indirect effects of stereotype violation on competency evaluations as witnessed by the strong correlations between perceivers’ reports of social backlash intentions and leadership competencies. This linkage demonstrates an important practical implication of this research, that generalized social evaluations are detrimental not only within social domains but also pervade into other types of attributions and evaluations made by perceivers.

Limitations

While the studies in this chapter provide clear evidence of the influence of gender role stereotypes on the evaluations made by perceivers in negotiations, there are still limitations that warrant acknowledgement. First, the manipulation of assertive negotiation behavior in Study 4 changed only the behavior of the target negotiator. In reality, these behavioral differences would be confounded with the value of the counteroffers. For example, less assertive negotiators likely ask for less in addition to behaving in less competitive ways. Because only one means of aggressive negotiation was manipulated, future research would benefit from exploring how purely monetary concession-making, either small concessions or large ones, may influence perceivers’ evaluations of the target negotiator and the tendency to socially backlash against
injunctive norm violators. If future research finds that only counter-stereotypical assertive behaviors, as measured here, rather than assertive outcomes result in social backlash, many practical implications and remedies for female negotiators could be developed.

Another limitation of these studies is that while they provide a clear and consistent demonstration of how gender role stereotypes influence the perceptions made of target negotiators, they do not duly address the target negotiators themselves. A negotiation is a social interaction between two or more individuals. As such, it is incomplete to assess effects from only one side of a dyad. Thus, the following chapter will switch focus to the target negotiator in an effort to understand how anticipation of the backlash effect demonstrated in this chapter influences the actual negotiation behavior of the target.

**Conclusion**

This chapter intended to demonstrate how gender role stereotypes influence the perceptions made of female negotiators. Because competitive value claiming negotiation tactics are characteristically masculine, they are incongruent with the stereotypical feminine gender role. Female negotiators risk suffering social backlash for behaving in a manner that violates this injunctive feminine gender role stereotype. Indeed, the data show that self-representing females who negotiate assertively are perceived less positively and are less socially accepted relative to men who display the same assertive behavior. When negotiating on behalf of another, women are also freely able to negotiate assertively without social repercussions. This is because assertive negotiation is no longer incongruent with the feminine gender role stereotype in this context. Negotiating assertively on behalf of another actually confirms the feminine gender role stereotype.
specifically the qualities of nurturance, communion, and being protective. Having demonstrated how perceivers are affected by gender role stereotypes, the next chapter will switch focus to the target negotiator to show how anticipation of social backlash for injunctive norm violation affects the behavior of female negotiators.
CHAPTER 4

Target (Focal Negotiator) Behavior

Chapter 2 established that women negotiating on their own behalf consistently agreed to monetarily worse outcomes relative to men and other-representing women. Chapter 3 demonstrated that these differences in outcomes could be caused by the tendency of perceivers to socially punish female negotiators who behave in counter-stereotypical ways. This chapter seeks to understand how this social backlash against stereotype violation — specifically, anticipation of this backlash — may lead target negotiators to behave less assertively and subsequently settle for monetarily worse outcomes.

The theories of incongruent gender role stereotypes in the leadership literature (Eagly & Karau, 2002; Heilman, 2001; Rudman, 1998) and the negotiation-based application presented in Chapter 3 provide detailed accounts of how descriptive and injunctive norms influence evaluations made by perceivers. However, there is less work addressing how this potential social backlash in turn affects the target. Specifically, how does expecting an adverse reaction for behaving in a certain way alter the focal individual's behavior? There is some research exploring how individuals differ in their construal of how perceivers will react. Rejection sensitivity is an individual difference concerning the degree to which individuals are concerned with, and anxious about, the potential that others will reject them (Downey & Feldman, 1996). Self-monitoring is another individual difference construct, capturing a unique social acuity in determining the most situationally appropriate behavior and acting accordingly (Snyder, 1987). Both of these individual differences represent internal models of one's personal construal of a
situation. Given the evidence in Chapter 3 of the actual social pressures against gender role violation, does awareness or anticipation of that specific potential for backlash in the situation affect the behavioral choices of the target negotiator?

Recent research has shown that negotiators are influenced by how they believe their assertive behavior will be perceived. Ames (2007) found that expectations about the social and instrumental outcomes of assertiveness affect negotiator behavior. Looking more specifically at assertiveness in females, Bowles, Babcock, and Lai (2007) predicted that females would be less likely to ask for benefits from their organization if they anticipated negative consequences for doing so. While the empirical results obtained in their study did not fully support the model, there was evidence that perceivers punished females who asked for benefits and that the nervousness of female negotiators affected their tendency to ask.

Rudman and Fairchild (2004) directly explored how backlash and specifically anticipation of backlash by gender deviants, contributes to stereotype maintenance. They found that both men and women who were led to believe they had behaved counter-stereotypically through false feedback on a task in a cross-sexed domain, feared negative backlash and tried to hide their deviant behavior from others. This research suggests that individuals are aware of how counter-stereotypical behavior is perceived by others and subsequently react to avoid negative backlash.

The two studies comprising this chapter seek to assess the influence of gender role stereotypes and representation role on the negotiation behavior of target individuals. It is predicted that men and women negotiate differently due to the situational constraints imposed by gender role stereotypes and that representation role moderates this effect.
These studies will answer the following questions: Do self-representing women negotiate differently than men and differently than when negotiating on behalf of another person? Why do self-representing female negotiators behave this way? Is it in reaction to their counterpart or a preemptive hedging of assertive behavior? Mediation analyses are used to test the psychological mechanisms underpinning the observed behavioral differences.

STUDY 5

Study 5 tested whether the conflict resolution styles of target negotiators vary based on gender and representation role. The results show that when negotiating for themselves, men and women differ in conflict mode choices. When negotiating on behalf of another, however, there are no differences in self-reported behavioral tendencies. Efforts were made in this study to rule out the alternative hypothesis that a lack of entitlement might explain why women are less competitive. Research has documented that in certain contexts women may feel less entitled to higher salaries than men (Callahan-Levy & Messe, 1979) and that those feelings of lack of entitlement do not necessarily extend to similar others (Major, McFarlin et al., 1984). If this is the case, feelings of entitlement should mediate the effects of gender on conflict resolution style choices in at least the self-representation condition. A specific measure of entitlement in the context of negotiations was included in this study to rule out this alternative explanation for the observed effects.

Method

Participants
Data for this study were collected from 115 students enrolled in a Managerial Negotiations course as part of their participation in an Executive Masters of Business Administration program. This sample consisted of 85 men (74%) and 30 women (26%).

**Procedure**

Students were instructed to complete an online survey as part of their course requirement. Included in this battery of questions was the Thomas-Kilmann Conflict Mode Inventory (TKI), which measures an individual’s conflict-handling modes in everyday conflict situations (Thomas & Kilmann, 1974). Some students were directed to complete this survey according to the original instructions. Others were given modified instructions that queried their behavioral tendencies specifically in conflict situations where they were negotiating on behalf of another person. Because the majority of students in this sample were full-time managers, their negotiation experience was extensive. Thus their responses to this survey can be interpreted as actual retrospective reports of how they engage in conflict resolution situations in their everyday lives. All students returned usable results from the survey: 60 in the self-representation condition (41 male, 19 female) and 55 in the other-representation condition (44 male, 11 female).

**Variables**

*Gender.* Biological sex was used as the proxy measure of gender with males coded as 0 and females as 1.

*Representation Role.* Two variants of the instructions to the TKI were used to manipulate representation role in this study. Individuals completing the task in the self-representation condition followed the standard instrument instructions: “Consider situations in which you find your wishes differing from those of another person. How do
you usually respond to such situations?” In the other-representation condition, respondents were asked to, “Consider situations in which you find yourself negotiating on behalf of another person as opposed to negotiating for yourself. For example, negotiating a raise for a subordinate, defending the opinions of a spouse, advocating on behalf of a friend, etc. How do you usually respond to such conflict situations where you are negotiating on behalf of another person?” The behavioral choice options were the same for both conditions with the exception of slight wording adjustments when necessary for clarification in the other-representation condition.

Conflict Resolution Style. The TKI is a 30 item scale with each item representing a forced choice decision between two potential behavioral responses to everyday conflict situations. Respondents are instructed to choose which of the two options best describes how they actually behave in conflict situations. Each of the five dimensions measured by the TKI are paired against the other four dimensions three times yielding a possible score for each dimension that ranges from 0 to 12.

Using the standard scoring key for the TKI, measures were obtained for five conflict resolution styles (Competing, Collaborating, Compromising, Accommodating, and Avoiding). Of particular interest is the Competing dimension which measures assertive (high self-interest) and uncooperative (low other-interest) tactics. This typography is characteristically masculine and is in conflict with the feminine gender role. It is predicted that self-representing female negotiators will report less tendency to use Competing conflict resolution styles relative to men but that there will be no differences in the Competing scores of men and women in the other-representation condition. Compatible with the former prediction, a recent large-sample study found that
women score lower than men on the Competing dimension across all organizational levels (Thomas, Merriam, Schaubhut, Donnay, & Thomas, 2006). The mean Competing score in this sample was 5.80 with a standard deviation of 3.06.

Another variable was also used as a dependent variable in some of the analyses to follow. This measure is computed by subtracting Accommodating from Competing and is meant to map on to the Jungian personality dimension of decision-making (thinking-feeling) (termed Distributive Index by Chanin & Schneer, 1984; Kilmann & Thomas, 1975). Individuals that tend toward thinking as a preferred method for decision-making rely on pragmatism and make logical impersonal decisions. By contrast, those who tend toward feeling are more person-oriented and make decisions based on personal values (Myers, 1962). If the fear of social backlash for stereotype violation affects women’s choice of appropriate conflict behaviors, it would be expected that this motivation would stem from the feeling end of the decision-making continuum: women may fear the social repercussions of their actions and consequently choose to behave in a more person-friendly manner. As such, it is expected that self-representing women will score lower than men on this measure of thinking versus feeling negotiation style but that this difference will not exist in the other-representation condition. The mean score on the Thinking-Feeling Index was 0.14 with a standard deviation of 4.52.

*Entitlement.* To discount the role of entitlement as an explanation for differences in conflict resolution style, individual differences in feelings of entitlement were measured as part of a battery of psychological scales administered to students. This measure of entitlement is a 4-item context-specific scale assessing feelings of entitlement relevant to negotiations and asking for that which one feels they deserve (Babcock et al.,...
2005); it is the same scale as used in Study 1. It includes items such as, “I deserve to have my interests taken care of,” and “Just because I want something, it doesn’t mean I’m entitled to get it” (reverse scored). Responses ranged from 1 (“Strongly Disagree”) to 7 (“Strongly Agree”). The mean score of the sample was 3.75 with a standard deviation of 0.89.

Results

The correlations presented in Table 2 demonstrate significant differences in the conflict resolution styles employed by men and women when negotiating on their own behalf. Women reported being less Competing in their everyday conflict situations than men ($r = -0.35, p < .01$). This is consistent with other research that has also found that women, even those high on the corporate hierarchy, tend to rely less on Competing conflict resolution styles than men (Loo, 1999; Thomas et al., 2006). As predicted, in the other-representation condition there was no significant correlation between conflict modes and gender. Table 3 presents means and standard deviations of conflict resolution styles by gender and representation role. Mean comparisons using t-tests revealed a significant difference between the Competing scores of men and women in the self-representation condition with women reporting significantly less proclivity to rely on Competing conflict resolution styles (females: 4.39 versus males: 6.73; $t = 2.83; d.f. = 57; p < .01$). However, there was no significant difference between the Competing tendencies of men and women in the other-representation condition (females: 5.10 versus males: 5.68; $t = 0.58; d.f. = 53; p = n.s.$).

Consistent with the results on the Competing dimension, the same pattern of results emerged in analyses comparing scores on the Thinking-Feeling Index. Figure 6
presents the mean Thinking-Feeling Index scores by gender and representation role. As predicted, and in concert with the Competing results, there was a significant difference between scores of men and women in the self-representation condition (females: -2.39 versus males: 0.41; \( t = 2.50; d.f. = 57; p < .05 \)) but there was no difference in the other-representation condition (females: -0.27 versus males: 1.03; \( t = 0.79; d.f. = 53; p = n.s. \)).

These results show that when negotiating on behalf of another, both men and women tend to use the same conflict resolution styles. The finding that gender differences exist in negotiating style when representing oneself but disappear when negotiating for another suggests that there are unique constraints on women in the former situation. This lends support to the contention that the ability of women to negotiate competitively is constrained by gender role stereotypes but that this constraint is lifted under conditions of other-representation.

Feelings of entitlement were measured to test the alternative account that differences in the self-representation condition were a function of women's sense of lacking entitlement. However, similar to Study 1, gender did not correlate significantly with lack of entitlement \( (r = .08, p = n.s.) \). These null findings make mediation testing impossible and cast doubt on the alternative explanation that it is a mere lack of entitlement driving differences in behavior between the sexes and across conditions of representation role.

**Discussion**

The results presented in this study provide evidence about the nature of gender differences in conflict resolution style under conditions of self- versus other-representation. Consistent with role congruity theory and the backlash effect, mostly
likely due to the negative backlash women will incur for violating the feminine gender role, women are less likely than men to use Competing conflict resolution modes in everyday conflict situations when negotiating on their own behalf. To further support this explanation, when women no longer have to fear the backlash of assertive behavior because they are negotiating on behalf of another rather than themselves, there are no differences in conflict resolution preferences. In contrast to the entitlement explanation, the data showed that feelings of personal entitlement did not mediate the tendency of women to use less competing tactics.

Although the TKI provides real-world accounts of negotiation experience in everyday life, this method is somewhat uncontrolled because women may end up being agents in slightly different ways in their work roles. As such, more controlled experimentation is necessary to help reduce noise introduced by contextual variation in order to better isolate the psychological mechanism for the observed effect.

STUDY 6

Study 5 demonstrated the effects of self- versus other-representation on women in retrospective reports of real-life conflict resolution behavior. This study builds on the previous by gaining more experimental control in measuring the psychological mechanisms through use of a laboratory-based negotiation experiment. Using computer software to simulate a dyadic salary negotiation, subjects were led to believe they were negotiating through the computer with a randomly assigned counterpart. In actuality, the moves and behaviors of the counterpart were a controlled and experimentally manipulated confederate (the computer program itself). By constraining the behavior of the counterpart, this study allows for clearer interpretation and understanding of how men
and women react to and engage in negotiating behaviors in self- and other-representation conditions when treatment by the perceiver is held constant. The major contribution of this study was to show how pre-negotiation anticipation of backlash mediated differences in actual negotiation behavior of female negotiators as moderated by representation role.

Method

Participants

Data for this study were collected from 59 subjects recruited on campus at Columbia University. The sample consisted of 31 (53%) males, 28 (47%) females (of which 26 (44%) were Caucasian) and the average age was 22.6.

Procedure

A computerized negotiation was created to collect data for this study. It was designed to feel like a real negotiation for study participants, incorporating photographs, voice messaging and turn-taking to heighten the realism of the experiment. While subjects were led to believe that they were negotiating against another individual, in reality all subjects were negotiating against the static computer program. This deception was convincing as very few subjects reported any suspicion that their negotiation counterpart was not another subject negotiating with them in real time through the computer.

Upon entering the laboratory and signing a consent form, each participant had his/her picture taken with a digital camera, which was then uploaded onto the computer. They were told that the picture would be used by the computer application as a way to introduce them to their randomly assigned counterpart. At this time the computer application was opened which guided subjects through basic instructions about the
After going through the steps of a sample e-negotiation interaction, participants were directed to a screen with a status bar asking them to wait while the computer randomly assigned them to a negotiation role. After a predetermined amount of time lapsed, the subjects were presented with one of two negotiation roles: the recruit (self-representation) or the agent (other-representation). No subjects were assigned the role of the hiring manager, because the counterpart was a static component of the computer program. After reading through their role information, subjects were given a hardcopy of their role to keep with them for reference during the negotiation. On this hardcopy, subjects were asked to report on some pre-negotiation preparation numbers such as reservation point, target point, and anticipated opening point.

After feeling confident in their negotiation role, participants indicated when they were ready to begin the negotiation. The computer presented another screen with a status bar indicating that it was searching for a negotiation counterpart (at another university). In reality, there were no counterparts waiting at the other university, as the counterpart was embedded in the computer application. When the computer had “randomly assigned” counterpart pairings the subject was presented with a screen showing their picture and a picture of their supposed counterpart. For control, the experimental confederate was always male. Partners were introduced using first names and told it had been randomly decided that the hiring manager would make the first offer. In actuality the program was hard-coded so that the hiring manager would always make the opening offer.

The computer presented a low opening offer from the hiring manager accompanied by an audio message of the experimental confederate giving his reason for this offer. The subject would receive this number, listen to the audio message and then
choose how to respond: either accepting or declining the offer. If the subject accepted, the negotiation was over. If the subject declined, s/he was asked to record a message to send back to the counterpart explaining the decline. In order to maintain the believability of the counterpart’s recorded statements, subjects were given a limited set of response options to send by audio message to their counterpart. Subjects were asked to choose from one of five response options, read it out loud into the computer microphone and send the audio message to the counterpart. After this, subjects were asked to send a numerical counteroffer and record another audio message from a provided list of responses explaining their offer. The counteroffer and audio messages were supposedly transmitted to the hiring manager who was given the opportunity to respond. The negotiation continued in this manner for a maximum of five rounds. Upon termination of the negotiation, subjects were asked to fill out a post-negotiation questionnaire reflecting on their experiences and impressions formed.

Variables

Gender. As in the previous studies, sex was used as a proxy for gender with males coded as 0 and females as 1.

Representation role. Self- and other-representation were manipulated by way of the role information assigned to the subject. Because the sample targeted was undergraduate students rather than MBA students as in the prior studies, the role information was changed to be more relatable to the subjects: the salary figures were shifted downward and the role-play characters were undergraduate students or recent graduates. Individuals in the self-representation condition played the role of a senior in college negotiating the salary of an attractive post-graduation job offer. Individuals in the
other-representation condition played the role of a recent graduate who referred a friend, a senior at the university, for a job, and was now responsible for negotiating the friend's starting salary. This manipulation makes the future relationship with the counterpart more similar to the self-representation condition than if the subject negotiated as an external agent. All other information was constant across conditions including sample statistics on the market of salaries. All subjects were given information to suggest that the average starting salary in this field is $40,000 with around 70% of new consultants earning between $33,000 and $50,000, and a low around $31,000 and a high near $54,000. Subjects were also told that the job candidate had another offer from another company which was non-negotiable and likely near the market mean. Given this information all subjects were expected to enter the negotiation with a similar BATNA of $40,000. Full texts of both roles are available in Appendix D.

Pre-negotiation aspirations. Basic pre-negotiation measures, including reservation point, target point, and anticipated opening offer were collected to measure negotiation goals. To measure reservation point, participants were asked, "What is the lowest salary you are willing to accept in this negotiation? In other words, what is the least you would agree to earn at Alpha before choosing to take the alternative job offer at Lambda?" Target point was measured by asking, "What is the highest salary that you will strive to get in this negotiation? In other words, what is the ideal salary you want Alpha to agree to?" Opening point was measured as a hypothetical first offer with, "If you are given the opportunity to make the first offer in this negotiation, how much will you suggest Alpha pay for your salary?" These measures were used to operationalize the extent to which subjects conformed to the descriptive stereotypes about male and female
negotiators. If the descriptive stereotypes were activated, similar to stereotype threat (Steele, 1997), it would be expected that female negotiators, regardless of representation role, would set less ambitious pre-negotiation aspirations.

*Anticipated backlash.* As part of the pre-negotiation questions presented to subjects while they waited for a counterpart match, subjects were asked to answer two questions about perceived partner expectations: “How much do you think you can reasonably ask for without the hiring manager perceiving you to be a pushy person?” and “How much do you think you can reasonably ask for without causing the hiring manager to punish you for being too demanding?” Because these two items were highly correlated \( r = .91; p < .001 \), they were averaged into a single measure of anticipated backlash. Due to the wording of the questions and the response format (a dollar value), a lower score actually represents greater anticipation of backlash as it represents a lower threshold of how much one can ask for before incurring negative social consequences.

*Concessionary behavior.* The counteroffer from Round 1, in reaction to the hiring manager’s low opening offer, was used as the primary measure of concessionary behavior. It is predicted that self-representing female negotiators will counter with a lower salary than the other three experimental groups. Additional analyses will explore the pattern of concessionary behavior across all five rounds of the negotiation using the counteroffer proposed by the subject in each round of the simulated negotiation.

*Negotiation behavior.* As described in the procedure above, during each round of the negotiation, subjects were given two opportunities to record audio messages to be sent to their counterpart. These messages were chosen from a list of five options presented to the subject. The degree of assertiveness varied in these five options. Pretests
were used to select response options that were rated highly on likelihood to be used by this sample population during a negotiation and to fit within the following categories: assertive, entitled, qualification-based, cooperative, or dejected/hopeful. During each opportunity to record an audio message, participants were provided one statement from each of these five categories. The order of the five statements varied with each exchange. It is predicted that self-representing females will be less likely to choose assertive responses relative to the three other experimental groups.

**Negotiation style.** Following the negotiation, subjects were asked to indicate, on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (a great deal), the extent to which they believed a set of adjectives described their negotiation behaviors and style in the current experiment. Such adjectives included entitled, weak, competitive, collaborative, etc. The analyses will focus on retrospective self-reports of “competitive” negotiation style. It is expected that self-representing female negotiators will rate their style as less competitive relative to the other three experimental groups.

**Results**

To test whether female negotiators fall victim to stereotype threat, the pre-negotiation aspirations as measured by reservation point, target point, and opening point were compared across the four experimental groups. Table 4 presents the means and standard deviations for these variables by gender and representation role condition. There were no significant mean differences in any of the pre-negotiation measures across any of the experimental groups. This null finding provides some evidence that the basic descriptive stereotypes are not influencing the behavior of focal negotiators.
To test the predicted account that injunctive stereotypes influence the behavior of focal negotiators, self-reported perceptions of anticipated backlash were compared across experimental groups. Results from these pre-negotiation reports indicate that female negotiators anticipated stronger backlash effects. As seen in Figure 7, self-representing females perceived a lower threshold of how much they could ask for without being perceived as pushy or being punished for overly demanding behavior. Mean differences were compared using t-tests and revealed that self-representing female negotiators perceived backlash earlier than each of the three other experimental groups (female self: $43,250 (1139.63) versus male self: $50,813 (2795.78), t = 2.38, d.f. = 28; p < .05; versus female other: $48,577 (1412.91), t = 2.96, d.f. = 25, p < .01; versus male other: $47,357 (1114.87), t = 2.58, d.f. = 26, p < .05). To supplement these analyses, regression analyses were run to test the interaction of sex and condition on anticipated backlash. As predicted, there was a significant interaction of sex and representation role on anticipated backlash with self-representing women anticipating a harsher backlash than the other three groups (Table 5, Equation 2, $F = 3.01, P < .05$, $R^2 = .15, \beta = 0.52, P < .05$).

Since the evidence suggests that self-representing female negotiators did perceive greater potential for social punishment against injunctive norm-violating behavior, the next set of analyses tested whether these pre-negotiation feelings translated into actual differences in negotiation behavior. To test the likelihood of self-representing female negotiators to concede more heavily in the negotiation, Round 1 counteroffers were compared across conditions. Figure 8 depicts mean counteroffers by gender and representation role. Self-representing female negotiators proposed counteroffers in Round 1 that were significantly lower than each of the three other experimental groups (female
self: $42,000 (1153.11) versus male self: $48,441 (1794.54), t = 2.88, df. = 29, p < .01;
versus female other: $49,107 (1169.88), t = 4.33, df. = 26, p < .001; versus male other:
$49,821 (982.83), t = 5.16, df. = 26, p < .001). The regression analyses presented in
Table 6 demonstrate the same effect. Females negotiating on their own behalf were
willing to accept marginally significant lower salaries following the first round of
negotiation relative to all three other groups (Equation 2, $F = 5.41, p < .01, R^2 = .23, \beta =
0.36, p < .10). This interaction also shows that men were unaffected by the representation
role manipulation. This situational moderator uniquely affected female negotiators.

Given the differential negotiation performance of self-representing women, the
next important step was to test for mediation of this effect, through the feelings of
anticipated backlash. Following the steps to test mediation (Baron & Kenny, 1986),
negotiation behavior was first regressed on the independent variable (the interaction of
gender and representation role) as reported above. Next, negotiation behavior (Round 1
counteroffer) was regressed on anticipated backlash yielding another significant, positive
effect ($F = 68.47, p < .001, R^2 = .56, \beta = 0.75, t = 8.28, p < .001). Also presented above,
in Table 5, are the results regressing the mediator (anticipated backlash) on the
independent variable (the interaction of gender and representation role). Both the
independent variable and the mediator were then entered simultaneously into a regression
equation. The effect of anticipated backlash remained significant ($\beta = 0.67, p < .001)
while the effect of the interaction term dropped out of significance ($\beta = 0.03, p = n.s.$),
providing evidence for full mediation ($F = 23.58, p < .001, R^2 = .64). The result of this
final step of the mediation test is presented in Table 7. To test the indirect effect of the
interaction on concessionary behavior through anticipated backlash, a Sobel test (Sobel,
1982) was used. The z-value resultant from the Sobel test was 2.28 which is significant at the p < .05 level. This data support the hypothesis that anticipating a negative backlash causes women to limit their assertive negotiation behaviors in self-representing situations.

**Supplemental Analyses**

While the above analyses focus on the first counteroffer and the subsequent extent to which subjects were anchored by their counterpart’s low opening offer, the structure of the experiment allows for analyses of concessionary behavior across the entire five rounds of the negotiation. The hiring manager was constructed to behave consistently across subjects, always sending the same audio responses and making the same offers. The offers made by the hiring manager over the five rounds were $28,500, $30,750, $31,500, $32,250, and $33,000. Subjects’ counteroffers across the five rounds define their concessionary behavior throughout the negotiation. The chart in Figure 9 shows the average counteroffers made by gender and representation role during each round in the negotiation. As demonstrated in the above analyses, self-representing female negotiators anchored the most heavily on the hiring manager’s initial low opening offer. It is also notable that female recruits dropped quickly below the mean salary level ($40,000, which should be their perceived BATNA). All other groups consistently remained above this mark.

Similar to the results presented above for the Round 1 counteroffer, in each of the other rounds, the interaction of gender and representation role was significant, though only marginally so for Round 2 counteroffer (Round 2: \( p < .10 \); Round 3, 4 and 5: \( p < .05 \)). Mediation and Sobel tests also revealed that anticipated backlash mediated the
relationship between the gender and representation role interaction and concessionary negotiation behavior during each round.

Analyses of the slopes of concessionary behavior across the five negotiation rounds reveal that though there was a scalar difference between the magnitudes of counteroffers, the degree of concessions made by men and women within representation role was the same. There is no significant difference in slopes between genders within representation role (self-representation: \( t = 0.07, d.f. = 29, p = n.s. \); other-representation: \( t = 1.06, d.f. = 26, p = n.s. \)). However, individuals in the other-representation condition have steeper slopes than individuals in the self-representation condition (\( t = 3.85, d.f. = 57, p < .001 \)). This may be because it is less painful for agents to continually concede across rounds whereas individuals negotiating on their own behalf have a more salient limit they choose not to concede below. This result provides an interesting insight into the dynamics of the negotiation. Female negotiators are not conceding more, or to a greater degree than male negotiators; instead, they are anchoring more heavily on their counterpart’s signals, leaving them with less room to claim value and even pushing them below their rational BATNA.

Following the negotiation, subjects filled out a questionnaire to assess their own impressions of their negotiation styles during the experiment. One of the dimensions they reported on was their levels of competitiveness. While the numerical counteroffers provide an objective assessment of how competitive subjects were, this self-report of negotiation style provided an estimation of each individual’s own subjective self-perception. Results from these subjective appraisals were consistent with the objective measures. As presented in Figure 10, self-representing female negotiators reported
behaving less competitively during the negotiation relative each of the three other experimental groups (female self: 3.86 (.44) versus male self: 5.06 (.37), $t = 2.10, d.f. = 29, p < .05$; versus female other: 5.14 (.33), $t = 2.33, d.f. = 26, p < .05$; male other: 4.93 (.29), $t = 2.03, d.f. = 26, p < .10$). Using regression analyses to test these same relationships reveals a significant interaction of gender and representation role in prediction of self-reported competitive negotiation style ($F = 2.90, p < .05$; $R^2 = .14$; $B (SE) = 1.49 (.73), \beta = .45, t = 2.06, p < .05$). These results demonstrate that self-representing female negotiators are aware that they are hedging their competitive negotiation behavior. Significant relationships did not emerge for any of the other self-reported negotiation style measures (accommodating, weak, aggressive, entitled, etc.).

It was expected that the audio messages chosen by subjects from the response set would reflect the tendency of self-representing female negotiators to shy away from more assertive statements in favor of weaker ones relative to the other experimental groups. However, analysis of this data revealed no such interpretable differences across gender and representation role. It may be that numerical and verbal assertiveness are two separate but interrelated components of negotiation behavior. For example, because self-representing female negotiators conceded numerically they felt more freedom to vary their behavior. If this is the case, it would be expected that an experimental design constraining the ability to concede numerically might lead self-representing negotiators to hedge their assertiveness in the behavioral domain. Future studies should explore this difference between procedural and outcome assertiveness further.
Discussion

The results from the controlled laboratory experiment in Study 6 provided consistent support for the contentions made in this paper. Study 6 demonstrated that self-representing female negotiators made larger concessions more quickly than male negotiators or other-representing female negotiators. Beyond merely demonstrating this direct effect, Study 6 measured and tested the mediating effect of anticipated backlash in this relationship between gender and representation role on negotiation behavior.

The pattern of effects supported the prediction that gender role stereotypes impede the performance of female negotiators when negotiating on their own behalf. Women in this condition perceived a lower threshold for how aggressively they could negotiate before incurring social punishment for their counter-stereotypical behavior. These pre-negotiation fears of social backlash mediated the likelihood of self-representing female negotiators to concede more heavily in response to their counterpart’s aggressive opening offer. These gendered effects were moderated by representation role in that only women in the self-representation condition behaved this way. Women in the other-representation condition neither feared social backlash for overly assertive negotiating nor did they hedge their assertive negotiation behavior. In fact, the attitudes and behaviors of other-representing female negotiators were more like male negotiators than self-representing female negotiators.

In addition, the supplemental analyses provided greater refinement of the relationships under scrutiny. By examining concessionary behavior across the entire negotiation, it was shown that women did not concede more often or more heavily than male negotiators. Rather they heavily anchored with the counterpart’s first offer. Also,
these analyses showed a main effect of representation role on the slope of concessions, such that self-representing negotiators' offers approached a limit while the concessions of other-representing negotiators' were more linear. Post-negotiation reflection also revealed that self-representing female negotiators were aware of their less competitive negotiating styles. However with regard to actual negotiation behavior, they were less competitive numerically with the counteroffers they proposed but not with the verbal explanations they sent to their counterpart. While Chapter 3 demonstrated that counterparts punish assertive behavior, not assertive numbers, the data from this study suggest that female negotiators are more likely to hedge with less assertive numbers than behaviors. It is possible that if experimental controls were imposed to restrict the variability of numerical counteroffers that self-representing female negotiators would choose less assertive behaviors in this context.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

The studies comprising this chapter sought to demonstrate the effects of gender role stereotypes on target negotiator behavior under conditions of self- and other-representation. Consistent with past research, it was predicted that female negotiators would behave less assertively than male negotiators but that this effect would be moderated by representation role. Results from both studies supported this prediction. Using a measure of real-life conflict resolution tendencies, Study 5 found that, when negotiating on their own behalf, female negotiators relied less on Competing negotiation styles and relied more on Feeling than Thinking approaches to distributive negotiation. By contrast, there were no differences in the conflict resolution styles used by men and women in everyday conflicts when negotiating on behalf of another individual. Similarly,
Study 6 found differences in assertiveness between male and female negotiators only in the self-representation condition. When negotiating on behalf of another there were no differences in how men and women behaved.

Additionally, Study 6 showed that this difference in assertiveness between men and women when negotiating on their own behalf was statistically mediated by fears of social backlash for violating gender role stereotypes. Specifically, self-representing female negotiators anticipated social consequences for negotiating too assertively, and these feelings subsequently caused them to behave less assertively in the negotiation experiment.

Using a computerized negotiation experiment, Study 6 was able to capture measures during all phases of the negotiation process: before the negotiation with anticipation of counterpart reactions, during the negotiation with actual behaviors, and after the negotiation with subjective, retrospective reports. The analyses revealed that pre-negotiation reports influenced actual negotiation behavior, which subsequently led to real differences on post-negotiation subjective reports of the negotiation itself.

Overall, the studies presented in this chapter and the results analyzed provided a consistent view of how gender role stereotypes are a likely cause of gender differences in negotiation behavior and outcomes in conditions where there is conflict between the behavioral demands of the situation and the injunctive norms of gender role stereotypes. These gender role stereotypes have both intrapersonal effects, influencing the evaluations made by perceivers, as demonstrated in Chapter 3, as well as interpersonal effects, influencing the expectations and behaviors of the focal individual.

**Contributions**
This chapter makes many important contributions to the study of gender and negotiations. One important contribution is its focus on intrapersonal effects that stereotypes have on targets rather than just the interpersonal effects on perceivers. Gender role stereotypes not only affect the evaluations made by perceivers but also the targets’ anticipated reactions to counter-stereotypical behavior and, by extension, the targets’ negotiation behavior. Most research on gender and negotiations that attributes outcome effects to the target individual has focused on stable individual differences in personality or motivation and how these inherent differences between men and women contribute to outcome differences. The perspective presented and evidenced here provides a different and more comprehensive view of the dyadic interaction.

In acknowledgement that a dyad is a functional interaction between at least two parties, it seems overly parsimonious to expect that one party will be the sole cause of behavioral or outcome effects with no regard for the other party. As such, this chapter provides a missing link in the gender role stereotype explanation. While research in leadership and managerial potential has theorized how gender role stereotypes influence the evaluations and prejudices held by perceivers, there is a dearth of research exploring how anticipated evaluations have intrapersonal effects on the targets themselves. Chapter 3 provided evidence situating the work in the leadership literature within the negotiation domain, and this chapter provided evidence on the target-side of the negotiation. Evidence was presented showing that target negotiators anticipate social backlash for norm-violating behavior and that these feelings of anticipation mediate their actual negotiation behavior.
Additionally, an important contribution of this chapter is that it measures negotiation behavior and processes rather than simply outcomes. Because of the dyadic nature of most negotiations, it is often difficult to measure negotiation processes without disrupting the natural flow of the interaction. Given this empirical complexity, Study 5 compared the real-life conflict resolution tendencies of male and female negotiators through retrospective reports. The advanced experimental design of Study 6 then afforded testing of negotiation processes before, during and after the negotiation itself while maintaining a natural flow to the interaction. Prior to beginning the negotiation subjects were asked to report on their goals, aspirations, and, most importantly, the anticipated reaction of their counterpart to specific, assertive negotiation behavior. These latter feelings were then shown to mediate the relationship between gender, representation role and actual negotiation behavior. The round-based turn-taking of the negotiation allowed for data to be captured during the actual negotiation in order to gain insight into the actual behavior of focal negotiators. Additionally, post-negotiation retrospective reports were collected to compare subjective awareness of the objectively measured negotiation processes. This data collection allowed for a comprehensive view of how gender role stereotypes influence negotiation behavior at various points.

Similarly, an added contribution of the study designs was the measurement of actual negotiation behavior. Especially in Study 6, the negotiation processes were actual counteroffers made during the course of the negotiation, not proxy measures or post-negotiation recollections which are potentially confounded by inaccurate recall or biased by the negotiation outcome.
Another valuable aspect of the empirical evidence in this chapter was the experimental control over the negotiation dyad while maintaining the believability and flow of the negotiation experience. Most of the participants in Study 6 were fully convinced by the experimental deception that they were negotiating in real time against another study participant. By controlling the behavior of the negotiation counterpart, the reactions and behavior of the participants become much more interpretable and comparable across conditions because much of the noise of a typical negotiation dyad is reduced. Experimental groups can be compared with confidence that the only differences between them are those manipulated or inherent in the individual because there are no differences in the hard-coded negotiation counterpart.

Finally, an important contribution of this research is the measurement and testing of statistical mediation. In order to evaluate causal relationships, mediation tests are necessary. Too often research relies on direct effect modeling with mere speculation about mechanisms, instead of testing and appropriately measuring these psychological mediators. In the attempt to be empirically rigorous this chapter was particularly aimed at demonstrating through statistical mediation the function of gender role stereotypes as the psychological mechanism influencing the assertive behavior of female negotiators as moderated by representation role.

**Limitations**

Despite the numerous contributions of this chapter, there are nonetheless limitations to be noted and addressed in future research. Most apparent is the exclusive focus on one party in the negotiation. The negotiations being studied are dyadic encounters and significant effort has been focused on implicating the role of both parties.
in the maintenance of and conformity to gender role stereotypes. However the empirical tests of how each party is influenced were one-sided, looking first at how perceivers differentially evaluate targets (Chapter 3) and then at how targets directly alter their behavior based on anticipations of this reaction (Chapter 4). However, the studies presented herein do not simultaneously explore the effects on both members of the dyad. Complexities of the interaction likely unfold during the course of the negotiation that warrant studying both parties simultaneously rather than empirically controlling the behavior of one to test variation in the other. While the purpose of testing the predictions in this paper were better served through experimental control and manipulation in order to test psychological mechanisms, more generalizable results would require a less controlled, more naturalistic negotiation environment.

Another potential limitation of the studies in this chapter is the distinction made between assertive behavior and outcomes. In Chapter 3 it was found that perceivers tended to backlash toward assertive behavior that violated gender roles, not assertive numerical requests. However, in this chapter it was found that female negotiators hedged their assertive negotiating not through behavior but instead in the numerical counteroffers they presented. Future research might benefit from restricting the ability of female negotiators to vary their numerical offers, to see if target negotiators will default to hedging their assertive behaviors instead. It seems from the combination of the two chapters that being assertive in one domain (behavioral versus numerical) does not necessarily impair potential in the other. An important implication of this finding is that coaching systems could be developed to teach female negotiators how to assert
themselves numerically but maintain stereotype-consistency behaviorally in order to balance the need to effectively claim value while avoiding social backlash.

**Conclusion**

The empirical tests provided in this chapter help to develop a hitherto missing link in the effect of gender role stereotypes on negotiations. Much of the research to date has overlooked how anticipated reactions of perceivers influence the behavior of targets themselves. Acknowledging the importance of this alternate perspective, the focus of this chapter was on demonstrating behavioral differences in targets under conditions of self- and other-representative negotiations. Study 5 offered preliminary evidence that target negotiator behavior does vary based on representation role. Typical gender differences, whereby male negotiators engage in more competitive tactics relative to female negotiators, were present only under conditions of self-representation. When negotiating on behalf of another, differences in competing behavior (and specifically negotiating rationally rather than emotionally) were no longer present between male and female negotiators.

While these conflict resolution tendencies offered preliminary insights into behavioral differences between men and women across representation role, a more controlled experimental design was necessary to more directly test gender role stereotypes as the psychological mechanism contributing to these behavioral tendencies. Study 6 provided this empirical test. A computer-based negotiation simulation was developed with the realism and richness of a naturalistic negotiation but with the experimental controls to afford appropriate empirical testing of the predicted relationships. The results supported the prediction that the behavior of target negotiators
is influenced by gender role stereotypes. Specifically, self-representing women negotiated less assertively, and this behavior was directly mediated by their anticipation of social backlash for gender role violation.
CHAPTER 5

Discussion

The purpose of this final chapter is to summarize and discuss the contributions of the preceding chapters. Chapter 1 reviewed the relevant literature on gender and negotiations and identified a need for understanding not only when gender differences will manifest themselves in negotiations but more importantly why; what are the psychological mechanisms driving the effect of gender on negotiation behavior and outcomes? Applying theory and research from the managerial potential and leadership domains, a model was developed detailing when and why female negotiators are inhibited by gender role stereotypes in certain contexts. This inhibition is not the fault of one negotiator or the other but rather is an interpersonal, situational constraint involving the interaction of the dyad, and particularly (a) perceivers’ reactions to assertive female negotiators and (b) women’s perception of how they will be perceived by others if they negotiate assertively.

The specific contextual variation examined was representation role. Theory and preliminary empirical work suggest that negotiating on behalf of another individual, as opposed to for the self, is advantageous to female negotiators (Bowles et al., 2005; Wade, 2001). The gender role stereotype account describes this situational moderator in terms of the conflict or congruency between injunctive gender role stereotypes and the behavioral demands of the situation. When negotiating on one’s own behalf there is a conflict between the assertive negotiation tactics necessary to effectively claim distributive value and the feminine gender role stereotype. Women who violate the injunctive gender role risk incurring social backlash from their counterpart. However, when negotiating on
behalf of another, the communal and protective aspects of the feminine gender role stereotype are actually reinforced by assertive, "other-protecting" negotiation behavior. Specifically, women are expected to look out for the interests of others, which is facilitated by assertive negotiation tactics. Thus, in this latter context, social backlash for stereotype violation is no longer present. Indeed, women may actually experience social backlash for not behaving assertively in this context. The present research supported this theory in numerous ways, as described in detail below.

However, the advancement of research is not only behooved by the demonstration and application of theory but also by disconfirming the potential role of alternative explanations. Due effort was given to the two predominant alternative accounts for gender differences in negotiated outcomes: entitlement and self-construal. Both of these accounts are based on the individual rather than the dyad and place blame on the victim for accepting a monetarily inferior outcome. In the present research, there was no support for either of these alternative accounts. Contrary to these alternative explanations, the gender role stereotype account proposes a situational constraint influencing both parties in a dyadic negotiation. Because value claiming negotiation tactics are defined by masculine characteristics, they are inherently in conflict with the behavioral expectations subsumed in the feminine gender role. This conflict between roles influences not only the behavior of the focal negotiator but also their negotiation counterpart to create a unique environment where women are inhibited in their behavioral expression for fear of social backlash.

Chapters 2, 3, and 4 examined empirical evidence in support of the gender role stereotype account of negotiation differences. Chapter 2 focused on outcome effects. Two
negotiation simulations were used to replicate the main effects of gender on negotiated outcomes that have been found in previous research, and to demonstrate the moderating effect of representation role on gendered outcomes. Chapter 3 focused on the perceiver. Evidence from two studies explored the likelihood and nature of social backlash against women who violated injunctive gender role stereotypes. Finally, Chapter 4 focused on the focal negotiator. Two studies explored how anticipation of social backlash leads self-representing female negotiators to hedge their assertiveness at the negotiation table, subsequently making larger concessions and agreeing to monetarily worse outcomes. The following section will detail more extensively the major empirical findings in these chapters and the implications for the gender role stereotype account.

**Empirical Findings and Theoretical Contributions**

Three distinct sets of empirical findings provided convergent evidence for how gender role stereotypes influence negotiations. The first set of studies demonstrated the outcome effects of gender and the subsequent studies more carefully tested the psychological mechanisms first from the perspective of the perceiver and then the focal negotiator. By focusing on each effect separately rather than simultaneously, studies could be refined to best test the specific predictions without the added noise of additional variants. Taken together the evidence from these studies supports the predicted model of how gender role stereotypes influence both members of the negotiation dyad, and that this relationship is moderated by representation role.

**Outcomes**

The studies in Chapter 2 provided evidence in replication of past research testing the effect of gender on negotiation outcomes. While gender effects on negotiation
outcomes are sometimes inconsistent and difficult to interpret (Kray & Thompson, 2005), when focusing on distributive negotiations results often converge to reveal a significant gender difference, with men negotiating higher profits than women (Stuhlmacher & Walters, 1999). More recent research has identified representation role as an important and viable situational moderator of this effect (Bowles et al., 2005). The results from Studies 1 and 2 replicate both of these findings. Specifically, men negotiated significantly better salaries than women but only under the self-representation condition. When negotiating on behalf of another, women negotiated outcomes just as favorable as men. Study 1 demonstrated these effects with data from a face-to-face negotiation simulation. Study 2 further demonstrated the robustness of these effects by finding the same pattern of results in data from a negotiation simulation conducted via computerized communication media (e-mail and instant messaging).

The theoretical importance of these findings is that they provide an important view of boundary conditions. Much of the inconsistency of past research on gender and negotiations can be attributed to variation in the negotiation context. Given the multitude of negotiation structures (distributive versus integrative, single-issue versus multi-issue, dyadic versus multi-party, etc.) comparison across structures requires concerted thought about the context itself and how its intricacies might facilitate or inhibit individual-level and social processes. By controlling the context of the negotiation, replication is more attainable and the results more interpretable. Thus, the evidence presented provides a clear framework for testing and retesting hypotheses in the negotiation context. Specifically, gender does have a reliable and significant effect on distributive negotiation outcomes under conditions of self-representation.
In addition, another theoretical contribution was the attention given to not only providing evidence in favor of the predicted psychological mechanism of the effects (the gender role stereotype account) but also to comparing and contrasting the predictions of and evidence for alternative accounts (entitlement and self-construal). Converging evidence for one explanation of effects may not necessarily distinguish one account from another; thus, due attention to understanding the logic of alternative accounts and their unique predictions is a more feasible means toward progressing theory.

**Perceiver Effects**

Chapter 3 examined how gender role stereotypes influence the perceptions made by negotiation counterparts of focal negotiators based on gender, representation role and assertiveness of negotiation tactics. Study 3 provided preliminary evidence of the tendency to socially punish assertive self-representing female negotiators. Counterparts who negotiated against self-representing women who were encouraged to use overtly aggressive negotiation tactics formed significantly less positive impressions of the focal negotiator than counterparts paired with similarly assertive men or other-representing women.

Study 4 followed up on these findings to analyze more closely when and how social backlash was enforced through a controlled experimental design. Using a computerized negotiation simulation that held constant the behavior of focal negotiators, the reactions of subjects were recorded and analyzed to test when they were likely to backlash against specific targets and the nature of the social backlash that entailed. Individuals socially punished behavior that violated injunctive gender role stereotypes. As predicted, assertive self-representing female negotiators were socially punished.
relative to all other assertive groups. Additionally, non-assertive other-representing female negotiators were also socially punished for not conforming to the communal feminine stereotype. These female negotiators were punished for not being assertive enough on behalf of another person. While not directly hypothesized, this finding serves as strong support for the model of gender role stereotypes in negotiations. With regard to the nature of social backlash against injunctive norm violators, the data showed that it is not limited to work domains or social settings but rather is a more diffuse punishment across generalized social contexts.

The major theoretical contribution of Chapter 3 is the application of theory developed in a separate research area to a new domain. Research on leadership and managerial potential has spent considerable energy attempting to understand the attributions made by perceivers of leadership qualities to male and female targets (Scott & Brown, 2006). Because leadership is defined by characteristically masculine traits, there is an inherent conflict between the expression of leadership potential and the feminine gender role. Women who violate the feminine gender role and behave in ways that appear more masculine are able to elicit higher conferrals of managerial competence from evaluators but at the cost of their social attractiveness (Rudman, 1998). That is, perceivers socially backlash against this injunctive stereotype violation. Drawing on the same underlying theoretical reasoning, Chapter 3 explains how gender role stereotypes affect the evaluations made by perceivers of target male and female negotiators. As with leadership, the behaviors associated with effective value claiming negotiation strategies are characterized by typically masculine traits. Thus, there is a conflict for female negotiators between the need to use value claiming negotiation tactics in order to
effectively negotiate distributive value and the injunctive feminine gender role stereotypes.

Another important theoretical contribution of these findings is the situational moderation of stereotypical expectations of behavior by representation role. Perceivers impose distinct behavioral expectations on female negotiators under conditions of self- and other-representation. Perceivers punish females negotiating on their own behalf for overly assertive behavior because it is incongruent with the gendered expectation that they behave according to the feminine gender role stereotype. However, when women negotiate on behalf of another, perceivers are accepting of that same assertive behavior. Instead, perceivers punish female agents for being too unassertive as this behavior is now in conflict with the gendered expectations of the feminine gender role stereotype. Not only are these findings supportive of the hypotheses set forth but they also provide an interesting perspective toward the study of stereotypes. The results suggest that while the content of a stereotype may be relatively fixed, the application of that stereotype is dependent on the situational context. Depending on the situation, perceivers may interpret the same behavior exhibited by a target individual as confirming or violating stereotyped expectations.

**Focal Negotiator Effects**

Chapter 4 examined the effect of gender role stereotypes on focal negotiators. Specifically, it explored whether anticipation of the backlash effects demonstrated in Chapter 3 influenced the actual behavior of focal negotiators. Two empirical studies tested whether focal negotiators behave differently in self- versus other-representative negotiations; one of these studies also tested the mediating mechanisms for the observed
differences in negotiation behavior. Study 5 provided preliminary evidence that representation role is a meaningful situational variant in negotiations. Consistent with past research, when negotiating on their own behalf, women tended to use less competing conflict resolution styles than men. However, when negotiating on behalf of another, there were no gender differences in the use of competing conflict resolution modes.

Study 6 used a computerized negotiation experiment to hold constant the behavior of negotiation counterparts in order to isolate and compare the actual negotiation behavior of men and women under conditions of self- and other-representation. Results of this study revealed that, in support of the hypotheses, self-representing female negotiators made quicker and larger concessions during the negotiation. In addition, pre-negotiation anticipated fears of social backlash for being too assertive directly mediated these results. In other words, self-representing female negotiators anticipated social backlash from their counterpart for gender role violation and this fear led them to behave less assertively during the negotiation.

An important theoretical implication of this work is the evidence of gender role stereotypes as the likely mechanism of gender differences in negotiation outcomes. Taken in conjunction with the results of Chapters 2 and 3, the model proposed has received full support, while considerable attention was also given to disconfirming the likely role of the alternative accounts.

Another theoretical contribution of Chapter 4 is that it provides evidence that stereotypes not only influence the evaluations made by perceivers, but also influence the behaviors of target individuals. Focal individuals are aware of and react to the anticipated response of others to their behavior. This adds a deeper level of analysis to our
understanding of gender effects. Past research has focused on individual differences of the focal negotiator or of the counterpart in predicting outcomes. However, this research points to the importance of the dyad; there are aspects within the social interaction itself that contribute to behavioral and outcome differences. In this case, the anticipation that counterparts hold gender stereotypical expectations of behavior causes focal negotiators to acquiesce and conform to those expectations.

In addition, there are two contributions derived from the methodology of Chapter 4, specifically from Study 6. The first is measuring and testing mediation of outcome effects by psychological factors. Proper procedures were used to show that the effect of gender and representation role on concessionary negotiation behavior was statistically mediated by anticipation of social backlash. Second, the experimental design developed and employed in Study 6 provides unique opportunities for the future study of negotiation processes, not just in relation to gender, but rather to a host of measured or manipulated variables. Unlike other computerized negotiation designs, this present design involved a level of richness that not only allowed for the collection of various types of data, but also provided a laboratory experience that most subjects were convinced was real. Rarely did any subjects express suspicion that their counterpart was a computer rather than another real person participating in the study.

**Complete Model**

Overall, the empirical results provided converging evidence for the proposed model of injunctive gender role stereotypes in negotiations. Upon demonstrating consistent gender differences in outcomes, independent studies tested the gender role stereotype account as the psychological mechanism driving these effects. Gender role
stereotypes were shown to influence both the perceptions made by negotiation counterparts as well as the behavior of focal negotiators themselves. Perceivers were found to socially punish violators of injunctive gender roles and targets hedged their assertive negotiation behavior in anticipation of these social consequences.

Support for the proposed model was found not only in confirmatory evidence from direct hypothesis testing, but also disconfirming evidence testing the alternative explanations. The pattern of results predicted by the self-construal account was not supported by the data. The entitlement account was ruled out because the basic assumption, that women feel less entitled relative to men, was not supported in any of the samples used, removing entitlement from contention as a mediator of the observed results.

The model also made an important theoretical distinction between the distinct social functions of gender role stereotypes. Although the content of gender role stereotypes is relatively stable, the descriptive and injunctive functions are very different. Descriptive stereotypes depict how men and women are, whereas injunctive stereotypes are expectations of how men and women ought to be. Violation of the former merely changes one’s perception of how men and women are, whereas violation of the latter is socially punished for nonconformity. Data was presented to distinguish between these two functions in isolating injunctive gender role stereotypes as the primary mechanism driving gender differences in negotiation behaviors and outcomes.

Another value of these studies is the focus on multiple points of influence in the negotiation process. These studies explore the effects of gender role stereotypes at multiple phases of the negotiation: before, during, and after. Pre-negotiation measures
assessed feelings of anticipated backlash. Measures during the negotiation captured processes of conflict resolution tendencies and actual concessionary behavior. Negotiation outcomes, both monetary and social, represented the effects of gender role stereotypes after the negotiation terminated. By analyzing effects during each of these stages, a more comprehensive picture of how gender role stereotypes influence negotiations can be obtained than by limiting analyses to merely one phase.

**Practical Implications**

In addition to the theoretical contributions of this research there are also significant practical implications. The most obvious implication concerns the gender wage gap. As described earlier, despite efforts that have been made to minimize it, the gender wage gap in earnings of similarly experienced male and female workers still exists. Although there are likely many factors contributing to the wage gap, disparity in salary negotiations is one that directly affects earning potential. The research presented here illustrates that the reason women often agree to lower salaries than men is not that they are less motivated or personally entitled, but rather that they are constrained by the behavioral expectations dictated by the gender role stereotypes prevalent in society.

Fortunately, the results of the research, in elucidating the cause of the problem, also imply practical remedies for managing the effect of gender role stereotypes on negotiations. At the level of the individual, while some may claim that evidence suggesting women are more concessionary is a form of blaming the victim, ultimately this knowledge can be empowering. Knowing the social constraints on behavioral expression in negotiation allows for discussion about how to alter the situation to relieve the effect of gender role stereotypes. For example, the moderating effect of representation
role demonstrates that in some cases the feminine gender role stereotype can align with assertive negotiation tactics. Thus, it may be possible in self-oriented negotiations for female negotiators to make a concerted effort to reframe the negotiation in an other-oriented context in order to be empowered to use the assertive value claiming negotiation tactics necessary to negotiate a better outcome. For example, when negotiating salary, a woman might benefit from requesting more money out of need to support her family rather than individual greed or feelings of deservingness.

There are also potential remedies at the organizational level. Because gender role stereotypes pervade the perceptions made by even the least sexist individuals, developing organizational practices that eliminate the potential for social backlash against female negotiators would alleviate the need for women to manage incongruent gender role stereotypes. For example, an organization might develop compensation systems that are independent of employee self-promotion. Specific compensation systems might rely on objective performance criteria for the determination of raises and promotion or use peer evaluations as a means for judging a target's worthiness rather than relying on that individual's ability to assertively self-promote. By eliminating the need for women to assert themselves to gain value, the organization may be able to mitigate potential pay disparities.

**Directions for Future Research**

While this research makes great strides in understanding how gender role stereotypes provide the psychological mechanism for gender differences in salary negotiations, future research should continue to explore other relevant facets. The gender role stereotype approach yields predictions about other situational variables that will
moderate the effect of gender in negotiations. For example, the manipulation of assertive negotiators employed in Study 4 involved assertive behaviors, not assertive numbers. This suggests that social backlash is not in response to counter-stereotypical women achieving higher outcomes, but rather it is in response to the manner in which they ask for more money. Future research should test the inverse manipulation, with behavior remaining constant and numerical counteroffers varying between assertiveness conditions. If it holds true that female negotiators are punished for just behavioral but not numerical assertiveness as an injunctive stereotype violation, this would suggest a beneficial practical remedy. Coaching women on how to ask for assertive values in an unassertive way would help them to negotiate monetarily better outcomes while avoiding social backlash.

The gender role stereotype account also suggests predictions about interventions that can be tested in future studies. It would be interesting to see how gender blind contexts moderate the effect of gender on negotiations. When negotiators are shielded from the potential for social backlash, in situations where signals about their gender are blind, it would be expected that men and women should behave in a similarly assertive manner and counterparts would not disproportionately backlash against women. Indeed, research on hiring for major symphony orchestras found that the use of blind auditions for hiring musicians resulted in a thirty percent increase in the proportion of female new hires (Goldin & Rouse, 1997).

Another interesting situational moderator to explore in future research would be contexts that alter the content of injunctive stereotypes. For example, it may be considered appropriate for female negotiators to self-promote when the content of the
qualifications being touted are more communal in nature. Specifically, a female nurse may be able to assert her deservingness of a promotion or raise without fear of social backlash because the qualities she is asserting are consistent with the feminine gender role stereotype. Similarly, future research should address contexts where gender role stereotypes may uniquely inhibit the behavior of men. A male nurse asserting his communal and nurturing qualities in order to get a raise may risk social backlash for violating the masculine gender role stereotype.

While the research here analyzed how gender role stereotypes influenced both parties in a dyadic negotiation, the studies used to collect the data were one-sided, focusing separately on perceiver and focal negotiator effects. Future research should address the interaction of focal negotiator and opponent behavior to understand how this dyadic interaction uniquely influences the influence of gender role stereotypes in salary negotiation. To do so requires simultaneously monitoring the behavior of both members of the dyad, which introduces additional noise to the experiment, but would allow for a richer understanding of the negotiation processes.

Another fruitful line of future research would to examine self- and other-representing female negotiators who successfully manage the incongruence between the behavioral needs of the situation and the injunctive feminine gender role. Blame-displacing social accounts likely play a large role in how other-representing women are able to behave assertively without social punishment. Future research should attempt to understand how other-representing women use social accounts to attribute their assertive behavior to the situation rather than the individual. In addition, though on average self-representing female negotiators hedge their assertive behavior in order to avoid social
backlash, there are many women who are exceptions. Qualitative studies of women who are able to assert themselves in negotiations yet still avoid social backlash for injunctive stereotype violation would provide valuable information in developing techniques to help other women learn to soften or feminize assertive negotiating behavior. One individual difference which may play an important role in this ability of female negotiators to be assertive yet still avoid backlash is self-monitoring. Individuals who score high on self-monitoring have (1) a heightened awareness of their social environment and (2) the ability to control how they present themselves to others (Snyder, 1987). Given this behavioral profile, self-monitoring is a likely moderator of the gender role stereotype account. Women who score high on self-monitoring may be uniquely enabled to manage the incongruent gender role stereotypes that inhibit the negotiation performance of a low self-monitor. Indeed, there is evidence in certain performance contexts that self-monitoring is more beneficial to women than men in order to overcome negative gender role stereotypes (Flynn & Ames, 2006).

While the results presented provide clear and consistent evidence for the part of gender role stereotypes in impeding the performance of female negotiators in certain contexts, it should be noted that only one type of negotiation structure was tested. Specifically, dyadic single-issue distributive negotiations over salary were used to test the hypotheses and measure psychological mediators. While appropriate for such purpose, this lacks generalizability to other negotiation structures. Future research should explore the effect of gender role stereotypes in other negotiation contexts, specifically how elements of integrative bargaining moderate the effect of gender role stereotypes. Arguably, integrative negotiation tactics involve more feminine behaviors, such as
working together, communality, and kindness. This might relieve some of the backlash
effects that female negotiators are faced with at the bargaining table, but may also
increase the potential for backlash against male negotiators. Given this added complexity,
future research should explore how and when gender role stereotypes affect negotiation
behaviors and outcomes across a spectrum of negotiation types.

In addition, while laboratory research was appropriate to test the hypotheses
proposed, it also lacks generalizability to real-life negotiation settings. As such, future
research would benefit from naturalistic and field-based research designs. Analyzing how
gender role stereotypes influence negotiations in real-world settings will allow for the
development of more practical interventions to rectify disparities in behavior and
performance.

Finally, a very interesting application of this research is to cross-cultural settings.
The theoretical development in this paper drew upon the gender role stereotypes
prevalent in U.S. society. However, injunctive gender role stereotypes likely vary
significantly across cultures, ranging from extremely lax egalitarian societies to stricter
societies with rigid conceptions of gender appropriateness. Given this variation there are
implications for cross-culture and cross-gender negotiations that warrant inquiry in future
research.

The fact that so many new directions for research stem from this foundation
demonstrates the important contribution of the work at hand. Outcome effects, though
intuitively appealing, are neither theoretically nor practically fulfilling as they provide
little to no understanding about the processes underlying the effects. Research exploring
mediating mechanisms is vital to the progression of knowledge in this and other domains.
Gender role stereotypes are pervasive and have profound influence on negotiation behaviors and subsequent outcomes.

Limitations

As mentioned above, some of the limitations of this research are best addressed through additional research to test the boundary conditions and generalizability of the results. For example, the majority of the empirical data presented employed negotiation simulations, either in the classroom or the laboratory. While these negotiation simulations allow for greater control and reduced noise in the statistical analyses necessary to test the predictions in this paper, such artificially defined simulations lack external validity to real-world situations.

In addition, most of the samples employed student populations. While the data from undergraduate students may not necessarily generalize to executives, most of the samples consisted of MBA students with significant negotiation experience. As such, though there may be some concerns about the external validity of student samples, in this context the subjects can be considered representative of the larger population of negotiators. Moreover, Study 5 measured conflict negotiation style on the part of actual managers, and found that women were less competitive when negotiating for the self, as opposed to for others.

Another limitation of these studies is the absence of individual-level variation. While the purpose was to demonstrate how gender role stereotypes lead to gender differences in negotiations, this does not negate the likelihood that individual variation will moderate such effects. Though entitlement and self-construal were both disconfirmed as mediators of gender differences in favor of the gender role stereotype
account, both are still likely moderators that will heighten or suppress the degree to which gender role stereotypes are imposed on and influence negotiator behavior.

Finally, these studies did not explore the potential differences in female-female dyads. In most of the studies the hiring manager in the salary negotiation was always male, both for experimental control as well as external validity to the real world environment. However, it is arguable that differences might emerge when women are seated in the position of power. It may be that women in this position are more sympathetic or possibly in some cases harsher to the other woman sitting across from her at the bargaining table. Future research would benefit from including this additional comparison in analyses.

CONCLUSION

Gender role stereotypes abound. When the content of stereotypes is accurate and the function is descriptive, they can be useful tools in aiding information processing. However, when inaccurate or functioning as injunctive norms, stereotypes can be harmful to the target and result in gender inequities. In the context of negotiations, the enforcement of injunctive gender role stereotypes impedes the performance of female negotiators advocating on their own behalf. Because competitive negotiation tactics are characterized by masculine traits, they are inherently in conflict with the characteristics defined by the feminine gender role (communion, kindness, gentleness, etc.). This creates a dilemma for female negotiators because to use the negotiation strategies necessary to claim value in a negotiation is a violation of the feminine gender role and as such is met by social backlash from those imposing the injunctive norms. However, by conforming to the feminine gender role stereotype, female negotiators are able to avoid social backlash.
but are ineffective at claiming value in the negotiation. Yet this is not the case in all contexts. When negotiating on behalf of another person, women are freed to use assertive negotiation tactics without fear of social backlash. This is because other-representation reinforces the communal and protective aspect of the feminine gender role stereotype. In this context, it is not only appropriate but rather socially required that a woman adopt an assertive stance in advocating the interests of another.

Overall, these findings provide keen insights into the study of gender and negotiations. While individual differences may moderate the effects, the psychological mechanism driving gender differences in negotiation behavior and outcomes is a social constraint imposed by gender role stereotypes that influences both members of the negotiation dyad. Additionally, the context of the situation moderates the content of the gender role stereotypes enforced. Women are able to negotiate as assertively as men without fear of social backlash when they are advocating on behalf of another person. These results warrant future research in developing practical interventions to capitalize on this moderation in an effort to balance gender-based inequities.
REFERENCES


Appendix A

Salary Negotiation Role Information

Confidential Information for the Recruit’s side

Self-representation condition:

Information about you:

You are P. Magee (if you are male P stands for Peter, if female Patty). You are a second year MBA student at Columbia Business School. You will be graduating this year and plan to work in a specialized niche of consulting. Your experience at BCG last summer and your high grades make you an attractive candidate. Last week, you had an on-site interview at the New York corporate office of ALPHA. You think you offer a lot to ALPHA because of your unique portfolio of previous work experiences, among which your resume emphasizes: "Cashier and customer service assistant at local Texoil station," "Inventory software system consultant for chain of convenience stores," "Technician in four different biology laboratories," and "Marketing associate for Genentech before business school." You have succeeded despite being orphaned at the age of 14 when both of your parents died in an accident, thanks, in part, to your estate lawyer, K. Henderson, who has become a mentor to you.

Information about ALPHA:

ALPHA is one of the five leading firms in this niche of the market, and one of your two preferred choices. ALPHA employs a mix of both college educated MBAs and PhDs as well as administrative personnel. It is an ethnically diverse firm composed of 45% Caucasians, 30% Asians, 15% Indians, and another 10% of other racial descent. The
gender diversity is less distributive with only 15% of employees being female and they do not occupy the high-paying, high-status jobs in the firm.

Information about your counterpart:

You are scheduled to meet with M. Gonzalez (Martin if male, Maria if female), the V.P. for Personnel at ALPHA, to resolve your salary. Though you would not be working directly with Gonzalez, you have come to learn that Gonzalez is a well-connected member within the ALPHA team and has a lot of influence in the company. As such, your reputation at ALPHA could be strongly influenced (both positively or negatively) by the impression Gonzalez forms of you following this negotiation.

The current negotiation:

Things are going well. You have been extended an offer from the department in which you would like to work, and the offer is competitive with your only other offer (from LAMBDA consulting, another one of the leaders in this niche) in terms of signing bonus, starting date, benefits and location. But the salary has yet to be finalized. Although most top consulting firms make non-negotiable salary offers to all new employees (for reasons of parity), ALPHA is the rare exception—they will increase the salary offer to lure a recruit with special strengths.

The salary is very important to you; it must be large. You are deeply in debt after business school. In addition, you have always aspired to being your own boss, and you and a close friend have committed to saving money and going into business together in a year and half. You have particular expertise in genetic engineering and you plan to start your own small consulting company; however, both you and your partner feel it's important that you first work for a prominent firm. In order to start your own company,
you'll need to save a lot of money this year. ALPHA cannot further increase what they have already offered in terms of first year bonus and signing bonus; other factors, such as benefits, are not important since you will be there for just a year. Thus, it's imperative you push for the largest salary you can.

You also have an offer from another firm, LAMBDA consulting, although they have not made their salary offer to you (all salary offers from LAMBDA are first and final--they do not negotiate salary). If you do reach agreement with ALPHA, you will sign with them and not pursue the other offer. If you don't reach a satisfactory agreement with ALPHA in the meeting today, you will accept the non-negotiable offer from LAMBDA. Although you don't know LAMBDA's salary offer, you have every reason to expect that it will reflect the current distribution of offers in this market.

In your job research, you have come across an informal magazine survey of compensation in biotechnology consulting firms. Starting salaries paid to graduates of the "top 10" business schools in the New York area ranged widely; the median was $108,000, with 70% of the salaries falling in the range $93,000 to $123,000; the lowest salary was $88,000 and the highest $127,000.

Other-representation condition:

Information about you:

You are K. Henderson, an estate lawyer (if you are male K stands for Kevin, if female Katie). One of your clients, P. Magee, has asked that you handle an upcoming negotiation about a job (if you are male Peter, female Patty). It’s a client for which you are willing to handle a matter of this sort. Magee was left an orphan at age 14 when both parents died in an accident. You have acted not only as a lawyer but also as a mentor to
Magee since then. Magee has left on a long-planned backpacking trip and has explained what you should seek in the negotiation.

Information about Magee:

Magee is a second year MBA student at Columbia School of Business. Upon graduating this year Magee plans to work in a specialized niche of consulting. Experience at BCG last summer and high grades make Magee an attractive candidate. Last week Magee was scheduled to have an on-site interview at the New York corporate office of ALPHA, a specialized firm that provides consulting to the biotechnology industry.

You both agree that Magee offers a lot to ALPHA because of a unique portfolio of previous work experiences, among which the resume emphasizes: "Cashier and customer service assistant at local Texoil station," "Inventory software system consultant for chain of convenience stores," "Technician in four different biology laboratories," and "Marketing associate for Genentech before business school".

Information about ALPHA:

ALPHA is one of the five leading firms in this niche of the market, and one of Magee’s two preferred choices. ALPHA employs a mix of both college educated MBAs and PhDs as well as administrative personnel. It is an ethnically diverse firm composed of 45% Caucasians 30% Asians, 15% Indians, and another 10% of other racial descent. The gender diversity is less distributive with only 15% of employees being female and they do not occupy the high-paying, high-status jobs in the firm.

Information about your counterpart:

You are scheduled to meet with M. Gonzalez (Martin if male, Maria if female), the V.P. for Personnel at ALPHA, to resolve the salary on Magee’s behalf. Though
Magee would not be working directly with Gonzalez, you have come to learn that Gonzalez is a well-connected member within the ALPHA team and has a lot of influence in the company. As such, Magee’s reputation at ALPHA could be strongly influenced (both positively or negatively) by the impression Gonzalez forms of Magee following this negotiation.

The current negotiation:

Things are going well. An offer has been extended from the department in which Magee would like to work, and the offer is competitive with Magee’s only other offer (from LAMBDA consulting, another one of the leaders in this niche) in terms of signing bonus, starting date, benefits and location. But the salary has yet to be finalized. Although most top consulting firms make non-negotiable salary offers to all new employees (for reasons of parity), ALPHA is the rare exception—they will increase the salary offer to lure a recruit with special strengths.

The salary is very important to Magee; it must be large. Magee is deeply in debt after business school. In addition, Magee said, “I have always aspired to being my own boss. A close friend and I have committed to saving money and going into business together in a year and half. My particular expertise is in genetic engineering and I plan to start my own small consulting company; however, both my partner and I feel it's important that I first work for a prominent firm.” In order to start this new company, Magee will need to save a lot of money this year. ALPHA cannot further increase what they have already offered in terms of first year bonus and signing bonus; other factors, such as benefits, are not important since Magee will be there for just a year. Thus, it's
imperative you push for the largest salary you can to further Magee’s ultimate career goals.

Magee also has an offer from another firm, LAMBDA consulting, although they have not made their salary offer yet (all salary offers from LAMBDA are first and final—they do not negotiate salary). If you do reach agreement with ALPHA, Magee will sign with them and not pursue the other offer. If you don't reach a satisfactory agreement with ALPHA in the meeting today, Magee will accept the non-negotiable offer from LAMBDA. Although you and Magee don't know LAMBDA's salary offer, you both have every reason to expect that it will reflect the current distribution of offers in this market.

In your preparation for this negotiation, you have come across an informal magazine survey of compensation in biotechnology consulting firms. Starting salaries paid to graduates of the "top 10" business schools in the New York area ranged widely; the median was $108,000, with 70% of the salaries falling in the range $93,000 to $123,000; the lowest salary was $88,000 and the highest $127,000.

Confidential Information for the VP’s side

Self-representation condition:

Information about you:

You are M. Gonzalez (if you are male M stands for Martin, if female Maria), the V.P. for Personnel at ALPHA Consulting, a specialized firm that provides consulting to the biotechnology industry. ALPHA interviews prospective recruits at the "top 10" MBA programs. The initial interviews take place on the campuses of the various universities. The finalists are then brought to the New York office for a final meeting. Departmental V.P.'s make the initial offer if they are interested in a recruit. If the offer sounds
acceptable to the recruit, the recruit comes to you to negotiate the final terms. You are a well-connected member within the ALPHA team and have a lot of influence in the company.

Information about ALPHA:

ALPHA is one of the five leading firms in this niche of the market. ALPHA employs a mix of both college educated MBAs and PhDs as well as administrative personnel. It is an ethnically diverse firm composed of 45% Caucasians, 30% Asians, 15% Indians, and another 10% of other racial descent. The gender diversity is less distributive with only 15% of employees being female and they do not occupy the high-paying, high-status jobs in the firm.

Information about your counterpart:

There are several attractive finalists this year for the slot you have open, two MBAs from Columbia School of Business, P. Magee and S. Keele (if male Peter and Stan, female Patty and Sarah). They have similar qualifications and are equally desirable to you. You recently made an offer to Magee, which was quite generous in terms of benefits and bonuses. In fact, you have already offered Magee the maximum signing bonus and first year bonus—you are not authorized to change these amounts.

Magee's resume places unusual emphasis on previous work experiences, among which are listed—"Cashier and customer service assistant at local Teroxil station," "Inventory software system consultant for chain of convenience stores," "Technician in four different biology laboratories," and "Marketing associate for Genentech before business school"--but it is not clear to you why these particular experiences should command an unusually high salary. Magee has succeeded despite being orphaned at the
age of 14 when both parents died in an accident, thanks, in part, to an estate lawyer, K. Henderson, who became a mentor to Magee.

The current negotiation:

The salary offer has not been resolved, and this is your task today. You would not be surprised if Magee, after years of hard work in business school, wants a substantial salary. Because ALPHA is strapped for resources this year, and because the market is soft overall, you would like to negotiate a salary favorable for ALPHA. After all, you are one of the top firms in this niche of the market, and experience with your firm has a great deal of professional and market value.

In the past, you haven’t always cared that much at the margin in negotiating salaries with recruits, because you knew that you would be working with these people if they accepted. However, this year it matters. You are currently in the process of planning a move to another firm, and you want a record of having negotiated effectively in this round of recruit salary negotiations. If you do reach agreement with Magee, you will sign with Magee, and you will not pursue the other candidate. If you don’t reach a satisfactory agreement with Magee in the meeting today, you will sign Keele, the other finalist. Instead of negotiating, Keele has asked simply that you match a salary offer received from another biotech consulting firm; you will do so because this has been ALPHA’s practice. You don’t know what that offer is yet, and you expect that it will reflect the general distribution of offers in the market.

An informal survey done by your office of several other leading biotechnology consulting firms found that starting salaries paid to "top 10" school MBAs in the greater New York region ranged widely. The median was $133,000, with 70% of the salaries
falling in the range $99,000 to $157,000; the lowest salary was $83,500 and the highest $181,000. You are authorized to pay a salary anywhere in this range, but of course you’d prefer the salary be on the lower side of this range.

Other-representation condition:

Information about you:

You are M. Gonzalez (if you are male M stands for Martin, if female Maria), the V.P. for Personnel at ALPHA Consulting, a specialized firm that provides consulting to the biotechnology industry. ALPHA interviews prospective recruits at the "top 10" MBA programs. The initial interviews take place on the campuses of the various universities. The finalists are then brought to the New York office for a final meeting. Departmental V.P.'s make the initial offer if they are interested in a recruit. If the offer sounds acceptable to the recruit, the recruit comes to you to negotiate the final terms. You are a well-connected member within the ALPHA team and have a lot of influence in the company.

Information about ALPHA:

ALPHA is one of the five leading firms in this niche of the market. ALPHA employs a mix of both college educated MBAs and PhDs as well as administrative personnel. It is an ethnically diverse firm composed of 45% Caucasians, 30% Asians, 15% Indians, and another 10% of other racial descent. The gender diversity is less distributive with only 15% of employees being female and they do not occupy the high-paying, high-status jobs in the firm.

Information about your counterpart:
There are several attractive finalists this year for the slot you have open, two MBAs from Columbia School of Business, P. Magee and S. Keele (if male Peter and Stan, female Patty and Sarah). They have similar qualifications and are equally desirable to you. You recently made an offer to Magee, which was quite generous in terms of benefits and bonuses. In fact, you have already offered Magee the maximum signing bonus and first year bonus--you are not authorized to change these amounts.

Due to a long-planned trip, Magee is out of the country and has arranged for a lawyer, K. Henderson, to negotiate the matter of salary (if male Kevin, female Katie). You understand that Henderson is something of a mentor to Magee, who was orphaned at 14 when both parents died in an accident. The recruit's resume places unusual emphasis on previous work experiences, among which are listed--"Cashier and customer service assistant at local Texoil station," "Inventory software system consultant for chain of convenience stores," "Technician in four different biology laboratories," and "Marketing associate for Genentech before business school" --but it is not clear to you why these particular experiences should command an unusually high salary.

The current negotiation:

The salary offer has not been resolved, and this is your task today. You would not be surprised if Magee, after years of hard work in business school, wants a substantial salary and has instructed Henderson to pursue this primary interest in the negotiation today. Because ALPHA is strapped for resources this year, and because the market is soft overall, you would like to negotiate a salary favorable for ALPHA. After all, you are one of the top firms in this niche of the market, and experience with your firm has a great deal of professional and market value.
In the past, you haven’t always cared that much at the margin in negotiating salaries with recruits, because you knew that you would be working with these people if they accepted. However, this year it matters. You are currently in the process of planning a move to another firm, and you want a record of having negotiated effectively in this round of recruit salary negotiations. If you do reach agreement with Magee’s lawyer, you will sign with Magee, and you will not pursue the other candidate. If you don't reach a satisfactory agreement in the meeting today, you will sign Keele, the other finalist. Instead of negotiating, Keele has asked simply that you match a salary offer received from another biotech consulting firm; you will do so because this has been ALPHA’s practice. You don’t know what that offer is yet, and you expect that it will reflect the general distribution of offers in the market.

An informal survey done by your office of several other leading biotechnology consulting firms found that starting salaries paid to "top 10" school MBAs in the greater New York region ranged widely. The median was $133,000, with 70% of the salaries falling in the range $99,000 to $157,000; the lowest salary was $83,500 and the highest $181,000. You are authorized to pay a salary anywhere in this range, but of course you’d prefer the salary be on the lower side of this range.
Appendix B

Study 4: Manipulation of Assertive/Non-assertive Negotiator Behavior

Assertive Condition

Your offer is insulting; it is way too low for me

I have other offers that are looking much more desirable right now

Your offer is unreasonable; I refuse to work for so little

I am shocked that you would offer me so little. I need to be paid more

You would be foolish not to seriously consider this counteroffer

If you do not consider this counteroffer, I may be forced to accept a position at another company

There is no way you can possibly expect me to work for less than this

I strongly suggest you accept this offer because I refuse to work for less

Non-assertive Condition

Thank you for that offer, but I was hoping to earn more

I appreciate your offer but unfortunately I just cannot accept

I feel we are making some progress, but unfortunately still cannot accept

While I cannot accept that offer, I feel we are nearing a satisfactory middle ground

I believe this salary is fair to both you and me

I believe this number serves as a reasonable compromise

I was hoping you might find this salary reasonable

I think both you and I will be happy with this salary
Appendix C

Study 4: Social Backlash Scale Items

Work-based Backlash

How interested would you be in working with Mary at Alpha?

If you were the project manager on a work assignment, how likely would you be to ask Mary to be part of the project team?

Is Mary the type of person you like to work with?

Personal Backlash

How interested would you be in interacting socially with Mary?

If Mary invited you out for drinks after work, how likely would you be to go with her?

Is Mary the type of person you like to socialize with?
Appendix D

Study 6: Salary Negotiation Role Information

Recruit (Self-representation condition)

You are a senior at Columbia University. Upon graduating in the spring you intend to pursue a career in consulting. Although you are interested in remaining in the New York area, you do not want to work for a large, impersonal firm, so have decided against participating in the on-campus recruiting dominated by these larger corporations. Instead you have learned about opportunities through other methods.

One company, Alpha, you learned about from a friend of yours who graduated two years before you. Your friend has boasted about the very rewarding experiences at Alpha and the smaller, more intimate working environment; both of these aspects make Alpha a company that you want to work for. Your friend recently informed you of a job opening at the firm and offered to submit your resume and a personal recommendation if you were interested in the position.

Having since accepted your friend’s offer, you have been actively pursued by Alpha. Alpha was impressed by your resume, which cites recognition from the Dean for your influential leadership on campus, a third place finish in a creative problem-solving contest, your prior work experience, and other accomplishments. Alpha immediately wanted to meet you in person. After bringing you in for a series of interviews with various members of their office, Alpha has extended you a job offer!

All of the terms of your position have been worked through except one… your salary. Since Alpha is a small firm and does not regularly hire many people each year their salary structure is very flexible and open to negotiation. You have a meeting
scheduled for today in which you will discuss salary options with a representative from Alpha. The hiring manager you have a meeting with is a well-connected member of the Alpha team and has a lot of influence in the company. As such, your reputation at Alpha could be strongly influenced (both positively or negatively) by the impression the hiring manager forms of you following this negotiation.

In preparation for today’s negotiation you have done a lot of research, including googling average starting salaries in this industry. You have learned that new hires in consulting that have education and experience similar to yours, average around $40,000 a year. Some additional statistics you were able to find are: Around 70% of new consultants earn somewhere between $33,000 and $50,000 with a low around $31,000 and a high near $54,000.

If you reach a satisfactory agreement on the level of your salary today you will accept the job offer and work for Alpha. If you do not reach an agreement, you will reject Alpha’s job offer and instead take a non-negotiable job offer from Lambda, another consulting firm that has offered you a job and that you have every reason to assume will pay a salary commensurate with the industry standard.

**Agent (Other-representation condition)**

You graduated from Columbia University two years ago and immediately began working for a small consulting firm in New York named Alpha. You have found Alpha to be a rewarding place to work for with a smaller, more intimate working environment compared to the larger, more impersonal firms in the industry.

You have a friend who is currently a senior at Columbia University. Upon graduating in the spring your friend intends to pursue a career in consulting. Although
your friend is interested in remaining in the New York area, your friend does not want to work for a large, impersonal firm, so has decided against participating in the on-campus recruiting dominated by these larger corporations. Instead your friend has learned about opportunities through other methods.

The company you work for, Alpha, is looking for a bright and resourceful individual to hire. You recently informed your friend of this job opening at the firm and offered to submit your friend’s resume and your personal recommendation if your friend is interested in the position. Your friend would be very interested in working for Alpha, because of its rewarding experiences and small working environment.

Your friend accepted your offer and has since been actively pursued by Alpha. Alpha was impressed by your friend’s resume which cites recognition from the Dean for influential leadership on campus, a third place finish in a creative problem-solving contest, prior work experience, and other accomplishments. Alpha immediately wanted to meet your friend in person. After bringing your friend in for a series of interviews with various members of their office, Alpha extended your friend a job offer.

All of the terms of your friend’s position have been worked through except one...the salary. Since Alpha is a small firm and does not regularly hire many people each year their salary structure is very flexible and open to negotiation. Since you referred your friend to Alpha, you are now charged with the responsibility of negotiating the salary on behalf or your friend. You have a meeting scheduled for today in which you will discuss your friend’s salary options with a representative from Alpha. The hiring manager you have a meeting with is a well-connected member of the Alpha team and has a lot of influence in the company. As such, your friend’s reputation at Alpha could be
strongly influenced (both positively or negatively) by the impression the hiring manager forms of your friend following this negotiation.

In preparation for today’s negotiation you have done a lot of research, including googling average starting salaries in this industry. You have learned that new hires in consulting that have education and experience similar to your friend’s, average around $40,000 a year. Some additional statistics you were able to find are: Around 70% of new consultants earn somewhere between $33,000 and $50,000 with a low around $31,000 and a high near $54,000.

If you reach a satisfactory agreement on the level of your friend’s salary today your friend will accept the job offer and work for Alpha. If you do not reach an agreement, your friend will reject Alpha’s job offer and instead take a non-negotiable job offer from Lambda, another consulting firm that has offered your friend a job and that you have every reason to assume will pay a salary commensurate with the industry standard.
Figure 1. A Model of Negotiation Outcome and Counterpart Backlash to Negotiation Behavior as a Function of Gender and Representation Role

- **Negotiator Gender**
  - Male
  - Female

- **Representation Role**
  - Self or Other
  - Self
  - Other

- **Negotiating Behavior**
  - Assertive
  - Non-Assertive

- **Negotiation Outcome (Economic Consequence)**
  - High Salary
  - Low Salary

- **Counterpart Reaction (Social Consequence)**
  - Acceptance
  - Backlash
  - Stereotype Violation

- **Ineffective Value Claiming**
  - Male: Self or Other -> Assertive -> High Salary -> Acceptance
  - Female: Self -> Non-Assertive -> Low Salary -> Acceptance
  - Other: Non-Assertive -> Low Salary -> Backlash
  - Assertive -> High Salary
  - Male: Self or Other -> Assertive -> High Salary -> Acceptance
  - Female: Self -> Non-Assertive -> Low Salary -> Acceptance
  - Other: Non-Assertive -> Low Salary -> Backlash
  - Assertive -> High Salary
Figure 2. Study 1: Mean Outcomes of Salary Negotiation by Gender and Representation Role
Figure 3. Study 2: Mean Outcomes of Salary Negotiation by Gender and Representation Role under Different Communication Media
Figure 4. Study 3: Post-negotiation Impressions of Assertive Target Negotiators

Formed by Perceivers

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Figure 5. Study 4: Social Backlash against Targets that Violate Injunctive Gender Role Stereotypes
Figure 6. Study 5: Thinking-Feeling Index by Gender and Representation Role

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Figure 7. Study 6: Pre-negotiation Reports of Anticipated Backlash by Gender and Representation Role

![Bar chart showing the threshold of social backlash by gender and representation role.]
Figure 8. Study 6: Concessionary Negotiation Behavior by Gender and Representation Role

[Bar chart showing concessionary negotiation behavior by gender and representation role.]
Figure 9. Study 6: Concessionary Behavior across Five Negotiation Rounds by Gender and Representation Role
Figure 10. Study 6: Post-negotiation Self-reports of Competitive Negotiating Style by Gender and Representation Role
Table 1. Study 4: Mean Pre-negotiation Aspiration Levels Set by Perceivers Based on Attributes of the Target Negotiator (Representation Role and Gender)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attributes of the Target Negotiator</th>
<th>Recruit</th>
<th></th>
<th>Agent</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reservation Point</td>
<td>$45,971</td>
<td>$44,990</td>
<td>$44,955</td>
<td>$44,828</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4748)</td>
<td>(3201)</td>
<td>(4525)</td>
<td>(4653)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target Point</td>
<td>$35,151</td>
<td>$35,864</td>
<td>$34,982</td>
<td>$34,836</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3810)</td>
<td>(3107)</td>
<td>(3649)</td>
<td>(3641)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opening Point</td>
<td>$35,606</td>
<td>$35,364</td>
<td>$34,670</td>
<td>$34,707</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3725)</td>
<td>(3571)</td>
<td>(3856)</td>
<td>(3934)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table entries represent means with standard deviations in parentheses.
Table 2. Study 5: Correlations between Gender and Conflict Resolution Style by Representation Role

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Representation Role</th>
<th>Self</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sex (0 Male; 1 Female)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competing</td>
<td>-0.35**</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accommodating</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avoiding</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collaborating</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>-0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compromising</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**p < .01 (two-tailed)
Table 3. Study 5: Means and Standard Deviations of Conflict Resolution Styles by Gender and Representation Role

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Representation Role</th>
<th>Competing (SD)</th>
<th>Accommodating (SD)</th>
<th>Avoiding (SD)</th>
<th>Collaborating (SD)</th>
<th>Compromising (SD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Self</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>6.73 (2.91)</td>
<td>6.32 (2.09)</td>
<td>7.88 (1.96)</td>
<td>4.63 (2.30)</td>
<td>4.44 (2.25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>4.39 (2.97)</td>
<td>6.78 (2.44)</td>
<td>8.33 (1.91)</td>
<td>5.56 (2.09)</td>
<td>4.94 (1.89)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>5.68 (3.13)</td>
<td>4.66 (2.27)</td>
<td>5.45 (2.20)</td>
<td>6.82 (2.11)</td>
<td>7.30 (2.43)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>5.09 (2.66)</td>
<td>5.36 (2.66)</td>
<td>5.73 (1.45)</td>
<td>5.73 (1.74)</td>
<td>8.09 (2.30)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4. Study 6: Means and Standard Deviations of Pre-negotiation Aspiration Levels

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Representation Role</th>
<th>Reservation Point</th>
<th>Target Point</th>
<th>Opening Point</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Self Male</td>
<td>40.47 (3.07)</td>
<td>49.88 (4.74)</td>
<td>52.65 (6.51)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>38.54 (4.10)</td>
<td>46.77 (5.36)</td>
<td>49.15 (3.76)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Male</td>
<td>38.64 (4.67)</td>
<td>49.86 (4.11)</td>
<td>53.00 (2.77)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>39.43 (2.75)</td>
<td>50.20 (5.06)</td>
<td>52.40 (4.15)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table entries are in thousand dollars; Mean (SD).
Table 5. Study 6: Regression Analyses Predicting Anticipated Backlash

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>B (SE)</th>
<th>β</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>R²</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-3424.57 (1954.04)</td>
<td>-0.23</td>
<td>-1.75†</td>
<td>1.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Representation Role</td>
<td>759.65 (1951.64)</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-7812.50 (2636.60)</td>
<td>-0.53</td>
<td>-2.96**</td>
<td>3.01*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Representation Role</td>
<td>-3455.36 (2584.12)</td>
<td>-0.23</td>
<td>-1.34</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gender*Role</td>
<td>8883.93 (3751.60)</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>2.37*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Gender is coded as 0 for males and 1 for females; Representation Role is coded as 0 for self and 1 for other; † p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01

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Table 6. Study 6: Regression Analyses Predicting Round 1 Counteroffer

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>B (SE)</th>
<th>β</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>R²</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-3825.67 (1444.10)</td>
<td>-0.32</td>
<td>-2.65**</td>
<td>6.34***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Representation Role</td>
<td>3742.27 (1442.44)</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>2.59*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-6287.33 (1997.08)</td>
<td>-0.53</td>
<td>-3.15**</td>
<td>5.41***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Representation Role</td>
<td>1380.25 (1956.25)</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gender * Role</td>
<td>4965.90 (2836.49)</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>1.75†</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Gender is coded as 0 for males and 1 for females; Representation Role is coded as 0 for self and 1 for other; † p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001
Table 7. Study 6: Regression Analyses Testing Statistical Mediation of Gender/Representation-role Interaction on Round 1 Counteroffer by Anticipated Backlash

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>B (SE)</th>
<th>Beta</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>R²</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-2482.80</td>
<td>-0.21</td>
<td>-1.66</td>
<td>23.58***</td>
<td>0.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representation Role</td>
<td>2768.71</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>2.00*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender*Role</td>
<td>352.97</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anticipated Backlash</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>7.67***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Gender is coded as 0 for males and 1 for females; Representation Role is coded as 0 for self and 1 for other; * p < .05; *** p < .001