This paper compares the performance of standard-cost with negotiated transfer pricing under asymmetric information. Negotiated transfer pricing generally achieves higher expected contribution margins, as this method tends to be more efficient in aggregating private information into a single transfer price. Standard-cost transfer pricing confers more bargaining power to the supplier and therefore generates better incentives for this division to undertake specific investments. The opposite holds for buyer investments. If a corporate controller has disaggregated information about divisional costs and revenues, then the firm can improve upon the performance of standard-cost transfer pricing by setting a centralized transfer price equal to expected cost plus a suitably chosen mark-up.
Baldenius, Tim. "Intrafirm Trade, Bargaining Power, and Specific Investments." Review of Accounting Studies 5, no. 1 (2000): 27-56.
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