Bank Resolution and the Structure of Global Banks
Abstract
We study the efficient resolution of global banks by national regulators. Single-point-of-entry (SPOE) resolution, where loss-absorbing capacity is shared across jurisdictions, is efficient in principle, but may not be implementable. First, when expected transfers across jurisdictions are too asymmetric, national regulators fail to set up an efficient SPOE resolution regime ex ante. Second, when required ex-post transfers across jurisdictions are too large, national regulators ring-fence local banking assets instead of cooperating in a planned SPOE resolution. In this case, multiple-point-of-entry (MPOE) resolution, where loss-absorbing capacity is pre-assigned to jurisdictions, is more efficient. Our analysis highlights a complementarity between bank resolution and the structure of global banks: the more decentralized a global bank's operations, the greater the relative efficiency of MPOE resolution.
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Citation
Bolton, Patrick, and Martin Oehmke. "Bank Resolution and the Structure of Global Banks." Columbia Business School, February 7, 2017.
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