In a team setting, wherein only group performance is tracked, we show that muted incentive contracts may be sufficient to motivate team members. By having the team repeat a task, explicit (contractual) incentives can be substituted by implicit incentives team members provide to each other. We also study an example in which, despite uncorrelated individual performance measures being available, it is optimal to condition each manager's pay on both managers' performance. This can be viewed as creating a group performance measure. Using a group performance measure provides each manager with incentives to monitor and a means of punishing other managers.
Arya, A., J. Fellingham, and Jonathan Glover. "Teams, Repeated Tasks, and Implicit Incentives." Journal of Accounting and Economics 23, no. 1 (May 1997): 7-30.
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