Compensation of mutual fund managers is paramount to understanding agency frictions in asset delegation. We collect a unique registry-based dataset on the compensation of Swedish mutual fund managers. We find a concave relationship between pay and revenue, in contrast to how investors compensate the fund company (firm). We also find a surprisingly weak sensitivity of pay to performance, even after accounting for the indirect effects of performance on revenue. Firm-level fixed effects, revenues, and profits add substantial explanatory power for compensation to manager-level revenue and performance.
Ibert, Markus, Ron Kaniel, Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh, and Roine Vestman. "Are Mutual Fund Managers Paid for Investment Skill?" The Review of Financial Studies 31, no. 2 (February 2018): 715-772.
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