In a decentralized supply chain, with long-term competition between independent retailers facing random demands and buying from a common supplier, how should wholesale and retail prices be specified in an attempt to maximize supply-chain-wide profits? We show what types of coordination mechanisms allow the decentralized supply chain to generate aggregate expected profits equal to the optimal profits in a centralized system, and how the parameters of these (perfect) coordination schemes can be determined. We assume that the retailers face stochastic demand functions that may depend on all of the firms' prices as well as a measure of their service levels, e.g., the steady-state availability of the products. We systematically compare the coordination mechanisms when retailers compete only in terms of their prices, and when they engage in simultaneous price and service competition.
Bernstein, Fernando, and Awi Federgruen. "Coordination mechanisms for supply chains under price and service competition." Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 9, no. 3 (Summer 2007): 242-262.
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