We acknowledge that the behavior of the OSHA and EPA is complex and cannot be explained by simple capture theories, we nonetheless find ample evidence of OSHA and EPA actions that unnecessarily exacerbate or even artificially create indirect effects for political purposes (what we call enforcement asymmetries). Furthermore, despite mounting evidence of the inefficiency of OSHA and EPA, Congress has continued to be uninterested in adequate monitoring of regulatory effect, much less in regulatory reform. all this suggests that indirect effects are far more than innocent by-products—indeed, they may well be the primary political concern.
Bartel, Ann, and L. Thomas. "Predation Through Regulation: The Wage and Profit Impacts of OSHA and EPA." Journal of Law and Economics 30, no. 2 (October 1987): 239-64.
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